Northumbria Research Link

www.manaraa.com

New Public Management (NPM) Agency and Public Sector Reforms: A Case Study- Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund), Nigeria

Jacob Alada

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Northumbria at Newcastle for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Research undertaken in the Faculty of Arts Design & Social Sciences

July 2016

Abstract

This thesis examines the concept of Agencification against the backdrop of Public Sector Reforms in Nigeria in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. These reforms had components and elements of New Public Management (NPM). New Public Management ideas of public sector management and governance have been influential in reform strategies across the world since the 1980s. Notwithstanding its popularity, New Public management approaches and methods have attracted controversies in areas of practical applications and 'context' domain. Evaluation of New Public Management reforms in Developing and Developed Countries have produced mixed results, somewhat a hazy picture which cannot be categorised as either a success or failure (Overman *et al.* 2015). NPM, as a policy development tool and management initiative, raises more questions than answers. An assessment of NPM and public governance models by academics and public policy analysts have generated phrases expressions such as 'implementation habitats', 'cultural homogeneity', 'unstructured complexity', 'matrix of governance', choreographies of governance 'appropriateness milieu' etc. (Lieberthal, 1995; Swyngedouw, 2001; Jessop, 2004), to describe the rather complex nature of public sector reforms.

The main aim of this thesis is to understand the behaviour of an agency whose original design is inspired by the New Public Management (NPM) doctrines. The Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) Nigeria is the selected case study in this research. The objectives of the research are tied to the various narratives on NPM reforms and Agencification deliberations like the drivers, accountability, transparency, doctrines of autonomy, structural disaggregation, contractualisation, ministerial relationship, cross functionality, independence and governance (e.g. state- society relationship).

In the context of Nigeria, the implementation of NPM inspired reforms elicits several distinct analyses given the volatile politico-administrative structures and the oscillation between

political regimes and systems, e.g. parliamentary (1963-1966) to Military (First Junta,1966-1979, Second Junta 1983-1999) and to Presidential (1979-1983, Interim Presidential administration 23rd June1993-17th Nov. 1993, 1999-Present).

This research adopts a single case study research design and qualitative data collection methods. The research findings offer a unique insight into New Public Management Reforms in Nigeria and this enables us to draw some tentative generalisations about the organisational behaviour of public agencies in the context of a developing country such as Nigeria.

The research unveils an interesting finding that the TETFund does, to a large extent, display some form of autonomy. In contrast to what existing literature emphasis on problems and obstacles to NPM implementation in developing countries, e.g. corruption and political decay; the TETFund operates as a semi-autonomous organisation- in a political context which provides formidable challenges to an NPM agency.

List of Content

List of Tables and Figures

List of Figures

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to the Board of Trustees and Management of Tertiary Education Trust Fund both past and present for the opportunity to enrol and for supporting me all through the duration of the programme. I also acknowledge my colleagues at the Fund who are too numerous to mention for their support in various ways.

I also wish to express my profound gratitude to Professor Edoardo Ongaro my principal supervisor and the supervisory team namely Professor Keith Shaw, Dr. Rachael Chapman and Dr. Keith Baker (now at Oregon State University).

To my Mother and my siblings my gratitude is not shallow. To my bosom friend and confidant Samkelo Ndlela who stood by me through thick and thin- I say a big thank you. Last, but not in any way the least, to my late Father Mr S.D. Alada and my siblings who are of blessed memory - I cherish the love we shared, and you will forever remain special and evergreen.

Finally, to my friends, I thank you all for the words of encouragement, support and your goodwill.

Author's Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work. I also confirm that this work fully acknowledges opinions, ideas and contributions from the work of others.

Any ethical clearance for the research presented in this thesis has been approved. Approval has been sought and granted by the Faculty Ethics Committee / University Ethics Committee on 26th June 2012.

I declare that the Word Count of this Thesis is: 83,592

Chapter One

Introduction

1.0. Introduction

The swathe of public sector reforms, of varying degrees of intensity, in the past four decades continues to impact on governance and public sector management across the world. These reforms alter operations and functions of the public sector, and the relationship between the public and private spheres. In developed countries, reforms have taken different forms, e.g. the breakdown of established ministries, re-organisation of work culture and job contracts and the establishment of new autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies and agencies. These transformed the processes of recruitment, training, promotion, and (if necessary) dismissal of public servants, the legal and administrative relationships between the citizens using public services and the organizations providing them (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, a shift from centralized and consolidated public sector to a more decentralized, structurally devolved, autonomous bodies have become the rule (Christensen and Laegreid 2003, 2006; Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010). The reforms were implemented to enable the effective running of public sector organisation and improve service delivery. These reforms put citizens at the centre; a useful method for promoting inclusivity, involvement, participation and engagement. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) define public sector management reform as deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector organizations for efficient and effective delivery of public goods and services.

In developing countries, in this instance, of Africa, the implementation of public sector reform was triggered by the following factors: influence of Bretton Woods Institutions, changes in politico-administrative structures, frameworks and governance paradigms (from military dictatorship to democratic forms of governance), internal pressures from various

www.manaraa.com

democratic and social movements and groups such as trade unions and professional bodies, (as in the case of Nigeria- the Academic Staff Union of Universities, the Nigerian Labour Congress) and other similar bodies and organisations whose interests centre on social justice, equality and democratisation ideals and principles.

At the centre of public sector reforms are the New Public Management (NPM) frameworks, principles and ideologies mainstreamed into the management and delivery of public services. Indeed, NPM is controversial when we consider definition, the core principles, philosophical foundations, usefulness and contexts analysis. The apparent failures of these reforms have been captured in various Reports produced by World Bank, International Monitoring Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and institutions responsible for promoting public sector reforms (see, e.g. Basheka and Sebola, 2015). This is covered extensively in Chapter Two titled- New Public Management and Public Sector Reforms in Nigeria.

In the 1980s, some African countries embarked on comprehensive public sector reform programmes, assisted by international bodies and institutions (ECA, 2003). These reforms focused on the operations and activities of public sector institutions/ civil service like ministries, parastatals (state owned enterprises), and extra-ministerial departments. Likewise, the reforms were economically driven and informed by doctrines of NPM and IMF's Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). In Nigeria, public-sector reforms were influenced by problems of governance (e.g. dysfunctional public institutions), macro-economic policy failures and international interventions such as the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s (e.g. Adedeji, 1993; Onimode and Synge, 1995).

In Nigeria, public sector management is undertaken by the civil service (Monye-Emina, 2012). The civil service performs an important role in promoting sustainable socio-economic

2

development (Anazado *et al.*, 2012; Monye-Emina, 2012). According to (Anazado *et al.*, (2012) the civil service is a body of officials employed by the state to carry out functions of the government under the direction, ultimately, of the head of government. Maikudi (2012:72) defines the civil service as a well-organised body of permanent departmental and ministerial paid officials in executive arm of government, charged with the responsibility of implementing government policies and programmes in accordance with prescribed rules and procedures. The foundation of Nigeria civil service was laid by the British colonial administration (Maikudi, 2012). In Nigeria, pre- and post-independence, there have been thirteen public sector reforms (e.g. the Hunt Committee 1934, the Bridges Committee 1941, the Tudor Davies Commission 1945, the Harragin Commission 1946, the Gorsuch Commission 1954- 1955, Morgan Commission 1963, Adebo Commission, 1971, Udoji Commission of 1962-1974; the Civil Service Reorganisation Decree 1988, the Ayida Commission of 1997, the Dotun Phillips 1997, the 1999 Obasanjo public sector reforms and the Oronsanye Committee on Civil Service Rules and Financial Regulations (constituted in 2005). These reforms were carried out under different government systems, e.g. civilian, military, parliamentary, presidential, and federal to quasi-federal. Whereas, public sector reforms are a systematic intervention directed at the structure, operations and procedures of public service that, in turn, directly affect delivery of public services in general (e.g. Monye-Amina, 2012), civil service reforms, on the other hand, refer to the purposeful modification of management systems of the service with the goal of maximising administrative value and service delivery (Anazodo, 2009, cited in Anazado *et al.*., 2012: 17).

The literature on public sector reforms in Nigeria from the 1970s, states that these reforms were triggered by a range of factors including, but not restricted to, implementation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programme (although this assertion is demystified in this thesis as it relates to the establishment of the TETFund- the case study

used in this thesis), strike action by Academic Staff Union of Universities, trade unions and representatives of other bodies; and social, political and economic problems, impasse and imbroglio. Consequently, various agencies and parastatals were established, for example, the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) of Nigeria, whose organisational behaviour over time is the object of the analysis presented in this work.

The Tertiary Education Trust Fund (Establishment, Etc.) Act (2011) which repealed both the Education Tax Fund Act no. 17, (2003) and the Education Tax Cap. E 4 laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004) established the Tertiary Education Trust Fund. The Education Tax Fund (ETF), as the agency was first named at inception, was established by Decree no.7 of 1993 afterwards replaced by Decree 40 1998 which renamed the Fund as Education Trust Fund. Following the transition from military to democratic rule in 1999, both Decrees were renamed Acts No. 17 and Education Tax Cap. 4 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, respectively. The repealed Acts had conferred the responsibility for imposing, managing and disbursing this fund, or tax, to public educational institutions (both state and Federal owned) in Nigeria at all levels, (that is, Primary, Secondary and Tertiary). The 2011 Act mandates that an annual tertiary education tax will be assessed, collected and administered by the TETFund for the rehabilitation, restoration and consolidation of Tertiary education in Nigeria. The Act therefore removed primary and secondary levels of education from the scope of TETFund. The tax rate was to be 2 per cent charged on the assessable profit of any company registered in Nigeria, as specified in the Companies Income Tax Act 2007, or the Petroleum Profits Tax Act Cap.354 LFN 1990. The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) is responsible for assessing and collecting this tax from all registered companies in Nigeria. This Act empowers the FIRS to facilitate collections by devising processes and procedures, as it may deem necessary. By the provision of this Act, the FIRS will pay the tax into the Fund's account in the Central Bank of Nigeria. In return, the Board of Trustees (BOT) will

4

approve a return showing the name of company making payment, the amount collected, the assessable profit of the company for the accounting period and such information as may be required by the Fund for the proper administration of the Tax. Besides, the Act specifies that before disbursing funds to its beneficiaries, the Fund must set aside in each year an amount not exceeding 5 per cent of total monies accruing to it in the preceding year to meet the cost of administration and management of the Fund, for the maintenance of any property acquired by it or vested in it and generally to pay for services rendered to the Fund as well as for project monitoring and for meeting all the needs of the Fund necessary for the due administration and implementation of the purpose of the Act.

Although, the Fund was established in 1993, it commenced operations in 1998 following the inauguration of the 1st Board of Trustees. Conversely, following the review programme of the Obasanjo administration, the Board was dissolved and a new one constituted in 1999. Previously mentioned, the Fund has a mandate to use funding and project management approaches for rehabilitation, restoration and consolidation of education at all levels. Between 1999 and 2011, the mandate, functions and scope of operations of the Fund was amended in response to the reviews undertaken by Federal Government of Nigeria. As an illustration, the 2011 Act restricted its mandate to tertiary education in Nigeria, which explains the change of the Fund's name from Education Trust Fund to Tertiary Education Trust Fund.

Certainly, the operational frameworks of TETFund reflect principles and frameworks of New Public Management-Agency. This provided justification for the selection of TETFund as a case study- bearing in mind that it operates in a non- NPM context. There are elements of performance contracting, autonomy and structural disaggregation in the operations of the Fund (the concept of agencification is covered extensively in Chapter Three). Of course, the

adoption of New Public Management frameworks was foremost in the several public-sector reforms carried out by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) from the 1980s upwards. Specifically, the 1974 FGN-Udoji Report, recognised that the public service was bureaucratic and unadventurous, and reluctant to transit from an "administrative" to the "managerial culture". The Report advanced several principles and processes- recommending, "a new style public service", with results-oriented management systems operated by professionals, consultants and specialists alike. Accordingly, Udoji Report 1974 advocated the adoption of a set of management techniques, e.g. Project Management, Management by Objectives (MBO), Programme and Performance Budgeting System (PPBS); a radical detour from the traditional, hierarchical and bureaucratic systems of public sector management and organisation. The core message of Udoji Report is that the implementation of these techniques and frameworks would create a result-oriented system of public service management and services delivery. Therefore, one could deduce that establishment of government agencies like the Tertiary Education Trust Fund was envisioned as a solution to bureaucratic clutches of the Ministerial system and fragile civil service, so principles of New Public Management could be practiced, enhancing effective performance management and accountability practices. This raised important questions on contextual implications like whether NPM agency can be operationalised in developing countries, or whether issues of autonomy, performance, contracting and structural aggregation exist in the operations of the Fund- (for instance, the operationalisation of NPM elements in a non- NPM politico-administrative setting). Likewise, what is the appropriateness of the New Public Management model to Nigeria's public sector? Is it mere rhetoric or has it gone beyond management rhetoric? What is the level of applicability to all aspect of public sector management? What are the implications of the model on public service management in Nigeria? These are the issues raised, explored, examined and addressed in this thesis.

1.1. Aim and Objectives

The principal aim of the research is to understand the behaviour of a New Public Management (NPM) - driven Agency in the context of a developing country, in this case Nigeria. The Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) is the unit of analysis. This is achieved through qualitative data collection methods and the scrutinizing of various streams of literature on public agency behaviour and New Public Management principles, drawing on different theoretical perspectives and their relevance to public sector management in Nigeria. This will enable the researcher to unpack the behavioural patterns of TETFund together in comparison to 'fictional' models of how NPM public agency should behave according to the various NPM models and principles advocated in literature on public sector management. This research, after a thorough, preliminary literature review of the principles, doctrines and actual behaviour of NPM-inspired public agencies, will address three objectives:

- To detect the extent to which NPM doctrines have penetrated and shaped the organisational life of the public-sector agency under examination (TETFund); or rather have been factually rejected- though albeit nominally adopted- as they are spurious to the organisation and its context;

- To discuss the mainstreaming of NPM into public sector management in Nigeria, by using the TETFund case, and,

- To generate potentially transferrable knowledge and ideas for the development of public services agencies in similar contexts.

The research questions are: First, what is the behaviour of an NPM Agency in a non-NPM context; and second, what influence is NPM having on public management in a developing country, with the TETFund as case study and Nigeria as the cultural and politico-administrative context.

7

1.2. Background to the study

Deteriorating infrastructure and structure of the country's education sector, such as poor training, staffing and resources, rapid personnel turnover, unrest in the form of student riots and universities staff strike action combined with falling standards of education, the increase in illiteracy and low-level numeracy paved the way for negotiations on educational crises in Nigeria in the 1980s. The TETFund was established based on the outcome of a series of negotiations between the Federal Government of Nigeria, representatives of the Academic Staff Union of Universities and the private sector. The Academic Staff Union of Universities of Nigeria had an agreement with the Federal Government, part of which led to the introduction of a 2% Education Tax on assessable corporate profit. At that time, it was a solution to inadequate funding of Universities (Odebiyi and Aina, 1999). With the Education Tax Fund Decree no.7 1993 (which subsequently became known as Education Tax Fund Act no. 17, 2003, following the democratization process in Nigeria in 1999), the 2% education tax from assessable profit of all registered companies for the restoration rehabilitation and consolidation of education at all levels in Nigeria was established. The Decree No. 7 1993 was repealed and replaced with Decree 40 1998 which established the Fund as a Trust Fund and renamed it the Education Trust Fund. At the advent of a civilian regime in Nigeria this decree was renamed the Education Tax Cap. E 4 laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004). The Tertiary Education Trust Fund (Establishment Etc.) Act (2011) repealed and replaced both Acts of 2003 and 2004 mentioned above and renamed the Fund the Tertiary Education Trust Fund with a mandate for the restoration, rehabilitation and consolidation of Tertiary education in Nigeria from a 2 percent annual education tax on the assessable profits of all registered companies in Nigeria.

Political and Economic situations in Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s are also useful frameworks to explore the establishment of TETFund. Firstly, the problem in the education

sector was a miniature of the more general economic crisis of the 1980s. For example, the dramatic rise in the world oil prices in 1970's meant Nigeria became a wealthy nation, and resulting in a situation which, the US Congress Report then described as 'dynamic chaos'. In common parlance, it was claimed that the then Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria noted that money was not Nigeria's problem, but how to spend it (Osoba, 1996). In the 1980's, the country experienced growth and expansion of its economy accompanied by a rapid growth of various parts of the public sector including education (Moja, 2000). Because of falling oil prices in the late 1970s and 1980s, the Nigerian economic output slowed, and this affected the funding of various sectors of the polity, including the education sector (Moja, 2000). Therefore, the government could not sustain socio-economic interventions and support (Jega, 2000). Oil revenue dropped from $69.08 million US Dollars in 1985 to 51.31million US Dollars in 1986, and a debt burden of 20 Billion US dollars. The GND *per capita* during this period fell from $1,160 in 1988 to $300 in 1993, and this led to inflation (Jega, 2000). This affected several sectors for example healthcare, transportation, and education.

In 1986, on the recommendations of IMF and the World Bank, the Federal Government of Nigeria began implementing Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). The budgetary restrictions of SAP and the depreciation of the Nigerian currency (the naira) affected public sector provisions, as well as public and social policy interventions. According to Jega (2000), the political and social problems combined with the reckless, insensitive and irresponsible policy actions of the government prompted the collapse of public sector provisions. Obi and Ake (2004) posit that 'market-led economy' created a multitude of problems, amongst which was increased control of the policy process in Nigeria by the International donor communities and the Bretton Woods Institutions like IMF and the World Bank. The privatisation of state owned companies is an example of policy transfer and SAP initiatives.

As reported by Ayo-Sobowale and Akinyemi (2011) high level of corruption, favouritism and mismanagement, lack of economic diversification, poor investment in development programmes in education and healthcare, and other sectors impacted negatively on social and economic situations. The impact was felt more by the universities between 1992 and 1996 due to lack of funding support from successive military governments (Dike, 2001; Ayo-Sobowale and Akinyemi, 2011).

Conclusively, the TETFund was instituted against a backdrop of social, economic and political problems. This raised fundamental questions on the operations and behaviour of TETFund considering a range of contextual issues such as:' Is the politico-administrative framework conducive to the operations of an Agency?', and, 'Can an NPM agency function within a non- NPM setting?' These questions are given sufficient attention in the review of literature and the analysis and discussion of research findings.

1.3. Thesis Structure

Chapter Two assesses critically the New Public Management (NPM) literature; it highlights and discusses the principles, philosophical underpinnings and the influences it has had on public management around the world. It considers different definitions (that is definitional inconsistencies and disagreements) and it's mainstreaming into public management in developing countries, addressing the successes and failures. It investigates the idea of post-NPM as espoused in recent literature, albeit new frameworks both imagined and proposed. The arguments on culture and context- the variegated explanation of tapestry and canvas of national landscapes, in the application and implementation of NPM principles are also explored in terms of effects and implications, and imagined interpretations judging on literature. It then links the NPM to public sector reforms in Nigeria, with the prime objective of identifying the trend in the absorption and adoption of NPM frameworks. This chapter

also examines the idea of culture and context and how it is important to the understanding of organisational changes, behaviour and public sector reforms, country wise. Evident in the arguments presented in the chapter, is how societal and organisational cultures shape the context of NPM reforms, at policy adoption, formulation and implementation, and evaluation stages. The questions of compatibility of reform initiatives and culture, and governance structures create more questions, than answers it is contended here- a continuum rather than an end, so to speak.

Chapter Three reviews the concept of 'agencificiation' and scopes out the aims and objectives of this thesis. It investigates how agencification became a global phenomenon in public administration and management, exploring definitions, international adaptations and modifications and contextual debates, and mainstreaming into public sector management in both developed and developing countries around the world. Furthermore, the notion of modern public agency, which includes performance contracting, autonomy and structural aggregation, is discussed. Based on current debates, it explores whether all the three elements are essential foundations to the structure and operations of an agency and /or whether they are meant to operate in tandem in any given context.

Chapter Four discusses the methodology and data collection methods used. As such research paradigms and methods are preliminarily discussed, along with aspects like data collection techniques, tools and data analysis. The choice of method is the single case study research design. In addition, controversies surrounding the use of single case study as it relates to the research questions, the richness and density of data, process of distillation of findings and the value to qualitative research are presented. The fieldwork questions focused on the behaviour of agency, that is, autonomy, performance contracting and structural disaggregation identified by scholars as the three core elements of agencification, and strategic management

initiatives. Congruently, this chapter reviews components of the philosophy that underpins methodological approaches in general, and the research design for this thesis.

Chapter Five reports on the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) the case study and its operations alongside the three key elements of agencification (autonomy, contracting performance and structural disaggregation). It provides a description of the functions and behaviour, the operational strategies of TETFund, through a narrative supported by findings and data from the interviews conducted with key stakeholders, employees and beneficiaries. It establishes that these three key concepts can be found in the behaviour and functions of TETFund, to some extent, as specified in literature examined. This chapter, based on the findings of the case study, provides a discussion of reforms and questions some of the current assumptions about the New Public Management, 'agencification' and whether it works in developing countries, in general, and Nigeria. From the interview findings, it is claimed in this chapter that some of the contextual debates that have been identified in relation to failures of public sector reforms in Africa, (such as corruption, ethno-regional cleavages, politicisation and favouritism), are non-existent in the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund)- the case study. It also examined why this has been the case with TETFund, in the hope of identifying a workable model, or theory, that can be used by other agencies in Nigeria and/or perhaps more broadly within Africa. The chapter explores other relevant debates on public administration and strategic management and other contextual issues.

Chapter Six provides a summary of the various arguments mentioned and discussed in the previous chapters. It reflects on the limitation of the research approach used in this thesis and offers possible recommendations for future research on public reforms in developing countries.

Chapter Two

New Public Management and Public Sector Reforms (PSRs) in Nigeria

2.0. Introduction

The public management principles and approaches experienced significant changes in the mid-twentieth century. The impact is continuing in the twenty-first century, with the introduction of new frameworks and modifications of principles in the existing frameworks. The reasons for these changes are diverse, e.g. political, economic and social factors, information technology, and general changes precipitated by globalisation. However, central to this modification of public sector management is the New Public Management. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) note that NPM represents a global wave of administrative reforms that has had an impact on the public sectors of many countries over the last 25 years. The reasons for these NPM-based reforms are captured in expressions such as improving efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services and user satisfaction, the reduction and cutting back on excesses and other forms of public expenditure, and managerial accountability and transparency (see, e.g. Christensen and Laegreid, 2013:1). NPM is associated with the political move to the right in the 1980s, in both America and the United Kingdom (notably under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher). In most academic literature on public and social policy, this period was when neoliberalism and the notion of *laissez-faire* and freedom became dominant in political narratives and policy interventions (see, e.g. Boston, 2013). Therefore, it is unsurprising, that New Public Management exhibits elements of neoliberalism, e.g. privatisation, performance management, and the liberalisation of the economy in general (Noordegraff, 2015). Hood (1996) argues that the idea of NPM became widespread because of globalisation and the influence of various international bodies (IMF and World Bank). Despite these controversies and ambiguities which surrounded its

introduction, definition, application and implementation, NPM has become popular worldwide, even with countries that were (or are) classified or deemed culturally resistant (see, e.g. Laking, 2005, Verhoest, 2013). Drawing on the narratives above, it is necessary to examine the influence of NPM in Africa and Nigeria to provide a basis for the aims and objectives of the research to unravel. Therefore, this chapter will cover the diverse debates on NPM, essentially its definition, principles and ideas/ contents, implementation and application in various settings and what the consequences have been- that is, an assessment of successes and failures. It will also explore public sector reforms in Nigeria from the 1980s to identify elements of New Public Management. It also reflects on examples from other African countries. In addition, it examines and discusses the idea of culture and context in relation to public sector management reforms.

2.1. The New Public Management

In the 1950s, public management reform was different- because it was treated as a technical or legal, rather than a political or economic matter; and it was national and sectoral (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). However, from the 1970s, public management reforms changed, particularly through the influence of NPM. Consequently, NPM significantly altered the dynamics of public sectors across the world. As Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) observed, NPM has reshaped many public agencies – particularly at the operational or service delivery level – to become more firm-like responding to 'market-like' conditions and operating with principles of quasi-markets. The doctrines and principles of NPM is hinged on the new politico-economic approach of the 1980s and influence of the New Right political ideology then dominant in the America and Britain. This concerned the free market neoliberal policies (as mentioned above). The radicalising events around the world, and the perceived failure of the welfare model (influenced by the Keynesian Economic Model), also precipitated the emergence of the NPM model as a solution to socio-economic and political problems and

upheavals of the mid-1970s and the 1980s. At the social and economic level, there was the shrinking of the working class, the questioning of large public service provisions and the failure of various welfare reforms to produce desired results (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). High modernism, for example rapid changes in science and technology created changes in the way the society and government operate, and it equally triggered the first wave of NPM reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The conditions and events mentioned above provided a potent brew for the rise of the New Right ideology (Kritsol, 1995). Therefore, the NPM governance model altered the operations of public sector organisations and agencies by moving them closer to private sector models, underpinned by neoliberal free market doctrines (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) the reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s tended to fragment public sector organisations, producing fewer large, multi-purpose forms and more single, or limited purpose organisations, each pursuing more explicitly defined sets of goals and targets, specific to certain aspects of public service delivery.

Notwithstanding the popularity of NPM across the world, evidence suggests that there had been resistance from some countries, classified as 'low' NPM jurisdictions- e.g. France and Germany (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). These NPM alternatives are the New Public Governance (NPG) and 'Neo-Weberian State (NWS). New Public Governance focuses on collaboration, what works, evidence-based policy, joined-up government, whilst Neo Weberian State centres on promoting a high-quality and user-friendly ethos- thereby creating responsive services (Hood, 1991, 1995; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). NPG's core claim is to modernise the traditional state apparatus, with a shift to more professional, more efficient, and more responsive to citizens, and its purpose is to include diverse social actors in both policy making and implementation (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011:22; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). In the case of NWS, the business model plays a

subsidiary role in this, but the state remains a distinctive actor with its own rules, methods and culture; authority is exercised through a disciplined hierarchy of impartial officers (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011:22). Indeed, NPM-driven reform has attracted controversy from various circles. For those on the left of the political divide, it was considered a way of mainstreaming neoliberal ideology and Washington Consensus into governance, ideas associated with Bretton Woods Institutions (such as IMF and the World Bank). The political left views it with suspicion, because it is an appendage of neoliberalism. For the political right, NPM is solution to numerous problems threatening the public sector- a pragmatic way of responding to changing spheres of society in the twenty- first century. However, the critique of NPM extends beyond the left and right divide of the political spectrum; as the argument tend to move to that of pragmatism. Despite these philosophical and intellectual divide, it is intriguing to note that NPM reforms were adopted in developing countries in Africa, under different circumstances; as such the results and impacts on governance are different (as discussed in section 2.3).

Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) see NPM as a two-level phenomenon. At a higher level, it is a general theory or doctrine which advocates the notion that public sector performance can be improved using business concepts, techniques and values that reflects neoliberal economic ideologies and principles. At the more specific ordinary level, NPM is a bundle of specific concepts and practices, including: (1) greater emphasis on 'performance', especially through the measurement of outputs; (2) a preference for lean, flat, small, specialized (disaggregated) organizational forms over large, multi-functional forms; (3) a widespread substitution of contracts for hierarchical relations as the principal coordinating device; (4) a widespread injection of market-type mechanisms (MTMs) including competitive tendering, public sector league tables, with performance-related pay, and, (5) an emphasis on treating service users as

16

'customers' and on the application of generic quality improvement techniques such as Total Quality Management (TQM) (See also Pollitt, 2003; Christensen and Laegreid, 2011, 2013).

According to Christensen and Laegreid (2013:3), one primary characteristic of NPM is the adoption, by public organisations, of the management and organisational forms used by private companies', a major detour from the traditional model which is about isolation from private sector models and any form of business-oriented models, likewise the restriction of the influence of public officials in the handling of contracts and other forms of financial dealings (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Christensen and Laegreid, 2013). The NPM model is about the blending of both management principles of private and public sectors (Christensen and Laegreid, 2013). The proponents of NPM argue that its principles offer more flexibility in view of changing times (in terms of economics and information technology), and situations and events happening around the world both at physical and temporal levels (Christensen and Laegreid, 2013). This point was further enunciated by Christensen and Laegreid (2013) noting that NPM provides managers in the public-sector organisation the opportunity to apply discretion in the day-to-day running of their organisations; somewhat a conduit for efficiency and effectiveness. These managerial and management models is related to ideas of devolution, delegation of authority and autonomy (some of these ideas are explained in the agencification narratives- see chapter three). This is associated with basic management models. The first model describes the idea of letting the managers manage based on the idea of devolution. According to Christensen and Laegried (2013:3) the second model focuses on making the managers manage, influenced by the idea of incentives, decision-making and strategies. The second model inadvertently will lead to exposure to competition, contract management and market orientation (contracting out, purchaser-provider models) (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:3). With NPM there is the notion of performance management, cost-cutting and budgetary discipline, since the pre-NPM public

management structure was accused of financial recklessness and lack of accountability. The increased use of formal performance indicators represents an attempt to quantify the activities of public organisations more extensively, while ex-post scrutiny and auditing are ways of connecting and comparing goals and actual results (Christensen and Laegried, 2013: 3). The underlying principle is that good results should be rewarded while poor results should be punished (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:3-4). This is connected to Michael Power's Audit Society: the rituals of verification- that describes the audit explosion as one of the hallmarks of the twenty-first century.

Indeed, economic principles of budgeting, competition to mention but a few are central to New Public Management. Likewise, it advocates diverse administrative principles, what Pollitt (1995) describes as a sort of 'shopping basket' of different elements, useful to those reforming public administration. Reformers claim this diversity would create some elements of flexibility in its adoption and implementation. According to Christensen and Laegreid (2013) what this flexibility entails is that some of the reform elements may be inconsistent, or in conflict, with one another. More reason why NPM reforms have been labelled as ridden with ambiguities, conflicts and problems of implementation. However, Pollitt (2005) believes due to the variety of elements that NPM has, it offers public leaders some form of flexibility in the areas of public sector reforms. However, Christensen and Laegreid (2013, p3) note that the ambiguity makes reform inconsistent and potentially conflicting.

According to Christensen and Laegreid (2013:3), one important set of NPM reform measures is structural, and it involves splitting up public organisations through horizontal and vertical specialization (structural devolution), whether inter- or intra-organisational. The main vertical change introduced by NPM was increased structural devolution, meaning a trend towards more autonomous agencies and state-owned enterprises (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:3). A further main reform element was increased horizontal specialisation, based on the

principle of the single purpose organisation, 'which makes different organisational units' roles purer (Gregory, 2003). This is discussed extensively in relation to the concept of agencification in chapter three.

Purportedly, these NPM ideas have created a different form of public service management and delivery. For example, in the 1950s, the public sector was treated as a technical or legal, rather than a political or economic, matter, and it was national or even sectional (strictly managed and driven by the government), (e.g. Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The essence of more recent NPM reforms is, at times, said to signify a switch from government to governance (distillation of processes of management), a major attempt to modernise traditional bureaucracy, thereby making it more professional, efficient and citizen-friendly. Under NPM, the perception of citizens as users or consumers exists and this is seen in its increased emphasis on service-orientation, user participation and satisfaction, and responsiveness to demands from customers, users and clients, (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:4). In the academic literature on governance and NPM, governance is the process and method of creating a more representative and inclusive approach, in contrast to the idea of government, which NPM advocates view as a traditional, somewhat antiquated horizontal top down management approach. Nonetheless, it is essential to note that NPM advocates disregard governance as an alternative to government, because government remains one of its principal constituent elements (Stivers, 2009; Pollitt and Bouchaert, 2011). Therefore, the argument is about management and processes that govern the activities of a modern public sector organisation or services.

Following the introduction and implementation of NPM, the public sector was exposed to a range of neo-liberal market principles (ranging from performance management, competition, market, quality and choice for citizens, and the diffusion of models of strategic management originally developed for the private/ commercial sector), in variance to the operational rule of

the centre which was the primary focus of public sector management before the introduction of NPM (e.g. OECD, 1995).

According to Ferlie *et al.* (1996) there are four different aspects of NPM: the efficiency drive; downsizing and decentralisation; the search for excellence, and, public service orientation. NPM promises to integrate these themes, linking efficiency and accountability. Other distinctions are between 'hard NPM tools', which address accounting, auditing, and performance measurement, and 'soft NPM tools', which include things like human factors, user-orientation, quality improvement and individual development (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:4).

NPM ideas have been implemented to different degrees, at a different pace and with differing emphases in different countries and sectors (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:4). Research findings suggest the degree of variation between countries as it relates to success and failures (discussed further in section 2.3). Consequently, Christensen and Laegried (2013:4) debate whether NPM is a kind of generic reform-wave, or whether it is primarily suitable for some types of public policy areas. This question is usually linked to issues such as the effects and implications of NPM reforms. For example, questions have been asked on the use of market-oriented models and forms of management, as a tool of efficiency. However, this has yet to be evidenced by facts as there are different results from various countries around the world. This is further complicated by issues of context and the fact that NPM reforms are introduced for different reasons. Therefore, drawing a pattern of analysis from the implications and effects of NPM reforms is being problematic and challenging. According to Christensen and Laegried (2013:4) the effects are often assumed or promised, and there are few systematic and reliable studies on whether they occur, so hard evidence is often lacking. In addition, it is difficult to establish whether improvements in performance are the result of NPM, because there are many other factors that require consideration. Nevertheless, few studies have

demonstrated a favourable macro-economic effect for NPM (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:11).

2.1.1. New Public Management Reforms and Context Discourses

'It is largely accepted as a fact that national cultures affect the structure and performance of Public Administration (Andrews, 2008)

The formulation and implementation of reform policies are shaped by economic, cultural, social and political factors. The extent to which governments are receptive to internationally propagated NPM doctrines, and how these ideas are actually translated into decisions and actions, is influenced and moulded by what is called 'implementation habitats' (Verhoest *et al*, 2012:47). At the core of the analysis of implementation habitats lie cultural values at the societal level and politico-administrative system. As such NPM reforms are not culturally neutral. More reasons why the implementation of NPM within countries vary is because it is based on organisational cultures, societal values and administrative traditions. Verhoest et al (2012) argue that organisational cultures act as a filter and influence, either in a positive or negative way, the receptiveness of organisations to managerial reform ideas and initiatives. Therefore, it is argued in some academic quarters that cultural homogeneity is the strength of NPM and can equally act as its weakness (see, e.g. Bouckaert et al 2010; Verhoest *et al* 2012).

Often, the success or failure of policies hinge on these factors. The comparative study and analysis of public administration literature highlights the importance of such contextual factors because they serve to measure the outcomes of reform policies. According to Pollitt and Bouchaert (2011), the standard comparative analysis of public management reforms in the 'advanced' Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries has stressed the major influence of contextual factors on the formulation, implementation and outcomes of reform policies. Pollitt (2013a: *vx*) notes that the many prominent academic

authorities on comparative public administration and management recognize that contextual factors such as constitutions, cultures, political systems or politico-administrative traditions, do have major effects on stability and change - even on what can be 'good government'. Therefore, there is a consensus amongst public management analysts and experts that context is crucial in understanding the outcomes of public policy interventions, in both developed and developing countries respectively.

Research reports on public sector reforms worldwide, produced by multi-national organisations such as the Economic Commission for Africa, (ECA), the OECD, the World Bank, (WB) and the International Monetary Fund, (IMF), also recognise the importance of contextual issues (as confirmed by Pollitt, 2013 a & b and other World Bank Group Research Paper). Their respective research reports highlight, to a large extent, the various intricacies and interplay of contextual factors in the formulation, implementation and outcomes of policies. The concept of 'context' itself has been said to operate at the macro, meso and micro levels, with each interacting in a way that impacts significantly on the outcomes of reforms or policies. As such there is no one single context, but rather a range of multiple and intersecting contexts and these can be cultural, ideological, temporal, political or economic in nature (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015, also discussed below).

According to Ekaette (2005) for any nation, the structure and features result from a complex interplay of its socio-economic aspirations and development objectives, cultural influences, political considerations and the evolution of public service administration. These arguments have led to a range of terms used to somewhat encapsulate the rather variegated nature of context, such as, 'no size fits all', 'institutional transfer,' or 'local contexts,' etc. Clarke (2013) notes that public service organisations operate in many and remarkably diverse, 'houses,' (cited in Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). Certainly, the cultural, societal, politico-

institutional and administrative context in which public organisations function or operate is directly relevant to understanding the behaviour of an organisation (Clarke, 2013, cited in Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015).

Therefore, it is argued in this thesis that a range of factors have influenced public sector reforms implemented around the globe and these factors are contextual in nature. In developed countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), United States (US), Canada and Australia, radical changes in public administration and management systems were driven by economic and fiscal crises within the state, the influence of neo-liberal ideas, like public choice theory and the criticisms of the old public administration, changes in political and ideological context like the New Right ideas, the failure of welfarism, the development in information technology and the growth in the role of management consultants (ECA, 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). In the African continent, and in other developing countries of the world, public sector reforms were driven by economic necessities, the democratization processes and the search for administrative efficiency in the delivery of the quality of goods and services to the public (ECA, 2010). It is worth mentioning however, that reforms in Africa were inspired by, or have parallels in, the public administration reform experiences of both countries outside Africa (Adamolekun and Kiragu 1999; Caiden and Sundaram, 2004) and the influence of Bretton Woods Institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Dzimbiri (2008:45) argue that donor countries and agencies recommended reforms to developing countries in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes, which were economic, political and administrative in nature. For example, the economic reforms related to the liberalisation of the economy, the denationalisation, privatisation, or involvement of private sector methodologies and the emphasis on the market. Political reforms have focused

on issues of democratization, decentralisation, public accountability and the people's engagement and participation (e.g. Dzimbiri, 2008; ECA, 2010). Those administrative reforms advocated include de-bureaucratization and the downsizing of the public service, with the aim of reducing of corruption to enhance productivity. These ideas are embedded in the Washington Consensus, to an extent importantly revised nowadays, yet influential in many past and present reform programmes across Africa (ECA 2003a &b; 2010).

2.1.2. Context: The Theoretical Arguments

> *"The general concept of context assumes entities that are related to each other and form a large, tissue- like entity that has no explicit boundaries." (Pollitt, 2013b: 4)*

In recent years, public administration and management research have focused on the idea of context as the yardstick for measuring and illuminating our understanding of comparative public policy interventions. According to Peters (2013) all institutions function in a complex environment, structured along certain behaviours which either nurtures or constrains their opportunities and operations. Andrews (2008) note that social context is also likely to impact on the way public institutions are perceived by the public itself, that is, as legitimate or not. Invariably, the successes of institutions are largely contingent upon creating some regularity of behaviour (Peters, 2013). However, the use of a contextual, analytical framework for evaluating public policy interventions and reforms in nation states is not devoid of controversies. As Proeller (2013:219) mentioned, whilst there exists a common agreement that context influences public management (and vice versa), there are no standard references on how to integrate, model and operationalise contexts, or variables of contexts, or how to embed and frame these within public management research. A similar point is also made by Ferlie and Ongaro (2015), that there has been limited information or discussions on how

context affects the strategy of an organisation in the public sector, as well as on why strategic management in the public policy literature is thin on matters of context.

The word context originates in Latin: *'contextere'* means to weave together to make a connected whole (Rugge, 2013). Context has been defined as the background, the environment, or the set of circumstances that surrounds an event or the behaviour of an organisation or institution (Proeller, 2013: 219). Van Dijk (2009) notes that context is what is relevant to a situation, or operations, of an organisation. Examples of context for John (2006) are the situational opportunities and constraints that affect the existence and meaning of organizational behaviour, as well as functional relationships between variables. Bamberger (2008) sees context in the form of situational factors, such as from industry-, sector-, or economy-wide characteristics, to normative and institutional structures and regimes. Conclusively, context includes structural, cultural and functional elements that exert both direct and indirect influences on the outcome of policy interventions and operations of an institution, organisation or a nation state (De Jong *et al.* 2002).

Discourses on institutional transfer also deliberate the idea of context. It entails the reproduction of an institutional pattern in a context different from the one in which that pattern was generated (Rugge, 2013). Within this framework of analysis, Rugge (2013) notes that there are three facets to the word context: (1) it denotes an object of undetermined extension (2) denotes one object but evokes two. There is no context without that which is contextualised; an object is, or should be, put into a context. In this case, the contextualised, or 'contexted,' relates to an institutional pattern that belongs to one context though transforming to a new one, supposedly ready to receive it, and, (3) a metaphor for context suggests a palimpsest or fabric as the institution intended for transfer is woven into another institution and into others more numerous and diverse. Rugge (2013) reports that, for the advocates of 'intransigent context,' 'context is made up of diverse, cohesive, consistent and

homogenous elements; so much so that no exogenous pattern or institution modelled in a foreign context can ever intrude into it'. As such, any form of external heterogeneous element will be refused, rejected or distorted (Rugge, 2013).

O' Toole and Meier (2013) identify three key contextual variables: political, environmental and internal. Political context are issues such as unitary versus adversarial powers. Environmental context represents the extent of complexity, turbulence, munificence; the presence or absence of social capital; the extent of development. Internal context represents the extent of goal clarity and consistency, organizational centralization versus decentralization, and the degree of professionalism (O' Toole and Meier, 2013). On the other hand, Pollitt and Bouckaert's (2011: 48-49) ideas of context focuses on public management reform worldwide; based on five key contextual variables: the state structure; the nature of executive government; the relationship between political executives and top civil servants; the dominant administrative structure, and, the degree of diversity among the main channels through which ideas come that fuel management reforms (cultural and functional elements).

Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) provide a broader-based analysis of contextual issues in public management discourses. The authors contend that context play an important role in strategic management of a public organisation, an argument that extends the position posited by Pollitt and Bouckaert's (2011) and O' Toole and Meier (2013). According to Ferlie and Ongaro (2015:122-123), context affects what we label 'the strategic space' of a public services organization, constituted by: (i) the autonomy that a public services organization enjoys (a precondition for strategy to form, the alternative being the absence of any strategy for the organization, perhaps partly filled by mere tactical behaviours, individual maximizing behaviours, or bureaucratic politics taking place); (ii) the political– societal expectations towards a public services organization (what is expected of a public service organization strategy, as a key legitimating dimension), and, (iii) the obligations and accountability bases

26

under which a public services organization operates (what public managers as 'strategists' are accountable for, to whom and how). In contrast to views which dominate the policy and academic literature, this states that strategic management is generic and universalistic and its applicability and usefulness cannot be ignored in the present day public management. Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) believe strategic management in the public sector is context- sensitive and context-dependent. The researcher believes the argument offered by Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) is pertinent to understanding the context of agencification in Nigeria and the Tertiary Education Trust Fund. Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) argue that context is constituted by both the 'politico-administrative' context, i.e. the relatively stable feature of a political–administrative system, and the transformative effects of administrative reforms occurring in each jurisdiction. This point is relevant to the case of TETFund as the establishment of the agency and modification of its interventions through the amendments of its enabling Act occurred under different politico- administrative frameworks, alongside public sector reforms going on in the country (Nigeria) at various periods in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) identified four key important variables on context. First, that there is not one context, but rather multiple and intersecting contexts, i.e. multidimensional and hydra-headed in nature, and cross cutting. This means that 'context' should be conceived of in the plural, as 'contexts' (cultural, economic, temporal, political, and spatial). Second, contexts are both factual and conceptual. Whilst factual refer to entities or dimensions of social reality (e.g. where? when? who? and what?), conceptual contexts involve interests, motivations, paradigmatic view and methodological preferences of the subject of know- that is the person researching or the author). Third, 'contexts' is constitutive of action rather than just a mere backdrop: action simply either 'is in context', or it is not. Four, is about analysis of the mechanisms and processes (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015: 124-125).

This research uses the work of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), O'Toole and Meier (2013) and Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) as the analytical frameworks to unpack context, and the various elements identified by these authors will be examined in chapter five as part of the analysis. Also, the researcher agrees with the notion when exploring context, strategic management matters are of utmost importance (see, e.g. Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). According to Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) strategic management in public services organisations is both contingent (models of strategic management have nowadays enhanced applicability to many contemporary public sector organizations compared to what they had in the past) and perennial (strategic management is part and parcel of managing public services organizations, or at least managing them where improving performance is one goal). TETFund since inception has been focusing on improving performance towards attaining its vision, mission, goals and objectives (see Chapter Five).

2.2. History of Nigerian Civil Service

The civil service in Nigeria has its origin in the colonial service that was set up by the British authorities as the administrative machinery of government in Nigeria for the implementation of government policy, routine maintenance of law and order, simple tax collection and operation of a modicum of socio-economic services meant apparently for the benefit of Britain and British Colonial administrators in terms of self-sufficiency (Phillips, 1985; Adegboroye, 2006; Lawal and Oluwatoyin, 2011). Following the amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914 by Lord Frederick Lugard the civil service become more unified. In terms of the structure, the higher rung of the ladder of the colonial service that is executive, judicial and legislative was occupied by the British, although traditional rulers were co-opted into the colonial power structure. It is worth mentioning that during this period the civil service was politically neutral towards the colonial struggle.

Political and policy decisions were carried out in the colonial office in London and by British colonial officials in Lagos. According to Phillips (1985) the system benefitted from the fact that the top echelon of the civil service was made up of British colonial officers (from governor downwards), who by virtue of their positions, also constituted the political class. They also appeared to be better educated in the Western sense, than the Nigerians in the lower levels of the civil service then. This dual role of the civil service (civil servant as well as political boss) gave the service the relative calm, anonymity, and neutrality which it enjoyed during the period (Phillips, 1985).

With the creation of three regions-North, East and West in 1954, three regional civil services emerged. From the services, emerged what laid the foundation of civil service structure in Nigeria and from the late 1950s and 1960s, the service became Nigerianised and politicised, with ethnic politics and struggle which is still dominant in modern day civil service in Nigeria.

After independence, the civil service expanded its activities from maintenance of law and order and simple tax collection to issues such as social and economic development of the country. The civil service became major player in policy formulation and implementation. Subsequently, the number of civil servants and number of Ministries and Departments increased rapidly from 1960s onward (Phillips, 1985).

The civil service reform started with Hunt Committee in 1934 and Bridges Committee in 1941, however, the most significant reforms began in 1945 with the Tudor Davies Commission. Since that period (1945), there have been more than 12 of such reforms in Nigeria, with varying focuses and complexities of coverage, in terms of their attempts at installing more appropriate structures and conditions of service and the need to improve the

efficiency and service delivery. Pre -independence there were five commissions set up to review the activities of the civil service.

In 1945, Tudor Davies Commission was set up to review wages and general conditions of the civil service by the British colonial administration. This was followed by the 1946 Harragin Salary review Commission, which looked at wages and general conditions of service. The Report of the commission on the Civil Services of British West Africa, 1945-46 by Sir Walter Harragin, Kt. C. M.G., Chief Justice, Gold Coast divided the service into 'senior and junior' service and it covered the four British West African territories of Nigeria, the Gold coast, Sierra Leon and the Gambia. It established the two-service structure of 'senior service' (formerly Groups 1 and 2, almost entirely staffed by Europeans) and 'junior service' (formerly Groups3 and 4, almost entirely staffed by Africans) heralded the recruitment of some few Nigerians into the Senior Service. It also recommended a Limited Authority Service Commissions (for junior service postings only) and dealt with issues such as the terms and conditions of Service, Housing, Pensions, Allowances and some individual Job Grading. However, the aspect of pensions addressed concerned the benefits of the civil servants and their eligibilities in the then Pensions Acts and Schemes and did not consider the broad aspects of Pensions as a method for facilitating manpower mobility throughout the economy (Public Service Review Commission, 1974:211).

The Commission Report on the Public Services of the Government in the Federation of Nigeria, 1954-55 by L. H. Gorsuch, on its part made a review of the remuneration and structure of the Service. It noted the absence of a viable middle category in the Service created 5 main Grades. The aftermath of this Report made possible abolishing Senior and Junior Services and putting in place instead a five Grade Service structure that had parallel classes for both administrative and professionals' cadres. It is instructive to note that this development remains the basic structure of the Nigerian Federal Civil Service today.

Similarly, the report focused on issues such as the Nigerianization of the service, terms and conditions of service, as well as training, organisation and methods, and delegations of authority within the service. As a result, it proposed a new set of salary scales, based on the revised grade structure for the Service. These proposals are of significance considering the fact that they reflected the newly-created Federation of Nigeria on 1st October 1954 and the consequent demands this constitutional and administrative change made upon the public services.

In January 1959, the A.F.F.P. Newn's Committee recommended the integration of Ministries and Departments as well as defining the roles and functions of Permanent Secretaries within the Service. This report focused primarily on integrating existing Ministries and Departments of the Federal Civil Service, defining the role and functions of Permanent Secretaries within the service and putting in place an administrative machinery for control of Government expenditure as well as establishment matters. However, it excluded in its recommendations issues that had to do with wages, salaries, or conditions of service. The committee's recommendations, which were modelled after the U.K. situation, were accepted by the Government.

After Newn's Commission, was the Review of Salaries and wages Report by the Commission appointed by the Governments of the Federation, Northern Region, the Eastern Region and the Southern Cameroons, in November 1959 headed by L.N. Mbanefo. This Commission's review contained itself to matters related to salaries and wages, but neither recommended any alterations as it affects salary structure or grading within the Services nor considered matters concerning terms and Conditions of Service. However, it did consider the effects of the cost of living as against the existing salaries of Public Servants and the need to align Regional and Federal wage rates following workers agitation for competitive wages as well as commenting on the disadvantages of using review committees and commissions.

After independence a number of committees and commissions were set up by the Federal Government to provide recommendations on how to develop the Public Sector. The independence of Nigeria in 1960 was achieved by various nationalist movements in Nigeria who had used the indigenisation of the civil as a campaign slogan during their struggles. Thus, with independence British officials in the civil service were replayed by Nigerians following the Nigerianisation policy adopted then by Nigerian leaders (Ogunrotifa, 2012: 13). This did not come without attendant problems amongst which are shortage of skilled manpower, inefficiency, politicisation and agitations for improved wages. These culminated into a general strike in 1963 which forced Government to set up the Morgan's Commission to address issues raised by the workers particularly those relating to wages and conditions of service of Junior Workers. The Commission not only considered issues contained in its mandate but went further to recommend a grading the entire Service of the Federation, covering all the five grades levels and introduced for the first time ever a minimum wage for each region of the Country (EL-Rufai, 2008).

Similarly, it did recommend the establishment of a National Wages Advisory Council which could keep pace with cost of living changes and make recommendations to Government. This followed on Mbanefo Commission's recommendations on the need to create some form of monitoring machinery within Government as the answer to wage and salary adjustments, rather than setting up commissions and committee from outside the government.

In 1966, the Elwood Grading Team/Commission was established to examine the anomalies in the grading of posts and to propose a uniform salary for officers performing identical duties. This grading exercise which resulted from Morgan report did not alter Gorsuch Committee's recommended structure of the public service but attempted to rationalize the grading of individual posts or groups of posts within that structure. It also went further to comment on disparity of wages in the Public Services (i.e., 'the levels of the higher salaries

are already too great relatively to the levels at the bottom.') and noted that salary levels in the more senior reaches of the services should not be increased. This echoed the recommendations made by the Morgan commission (Olaopa, 2012).

In 1971, the Adebo Wages Commission was set up with a term of reference to look into wages and salaries at all levels of the Public Services and in Statutory Corporations as well as in all State-Owned Companies. However, the Commission went beyond its terms of reference and made comments and recommendations on many subjects. These included: creation of a new 20 grade salary structure, qualification requirements, the role and responsibilities of the Permanent Secretaries, management of Statutory Corporations, functions of the Trade Union Movement, etc. This was the first report that defined and distinguished three different forms of 'structures' in relation to the Civil Service as follows: (i) organisation of Government (ii) organisation of individual Ministries and Departments, (iii) payor grading structure. Lastly, this report recommended the establishment of a Public Service Review Committee to examine: the role of the Public Service Commission; structure of the civil service; conditions of service; and training arrangements. The significance of that Commission's Report was that it broke the pre-1970 cycle of mechanical reduction of the problem of the service to one of compensation. The Commission's Report thus signalled, prophetically, the administrative fault lines and systemic stress fractures of the inherited Weberian service structure; issues that are well beyond the confines of wages and salaries (Olaopa, 2012).

In 1972, the Udoji Commission which was constituted to address issues relating to efficiency and effectiveness of the civil service in Nigeria had terms of reference which were broader and more exacting than those of any previous commission or review as they encompassed the whole of the art and practice of public administration in Nigeria excluding the Military (Public Service Review Commission Main Report 1974 p.1). The Committee identified the

33

need for the country to modernise its civil service and address the issue of shortage of skilled manpower which has been a problem since independence. It emphasised on improved personnel management in recruitment, selection, pay, promotion, appraisal, supervision and most importantly training. It also noted that corruption was one of the serious problems of the Civil Service in Nigeria and recommended that Government must make it one of its prime objectives to control it. Similarly, the Committee also noted that the Public Servants in Nigeria were too enamoured by the ways things were done in other Countries as it affects organisation of Ministries and other aspects of administration but while these Countries were modernising many of their systems the Civil Servant in Nigeria had more reverence for the past than for the present or the future. Many policies and management practices in the service the Commission noted were based on experience and guess work rather than on objective information obtained through reliable research. To improve on effectiveness and efficiency of the public service the commission observed that, an institutional research relationship between the Government and Universities must be established. It therefore recommended that an attempt must be made to bring to bear research results of the Universities on the problems of the Public Services in Nigeria. It also identified other problems affecting the Public Service and which need to be addressed and these are; animosity and jealousy between Public Servants rather than cooperation and team work to meet desired objectives of Government, contest for power and rewards, elitism which has its roots in the colonial period and which is noticeable in the Public Service which is divided into relatively airtight classes which stand in a hierarchy of power and prestige which is both undemocratic in spirit and an obstacle to efficient management, reluctance of superiors to delegate responsibilities to subordinates and observed reluctance of subordinates to accept responsibilities, lack of appreciation of the role of specialised knowledge and professional training in the of the public service, lack of an indigenous lingua franca, which has resulted

in people below the topmost positions in the service conducting activities in a language (English language) which ,in varying degrees they had not mastered and this affects efficiency due to poor communication, lack of time and number management which affects planning and   results oriented management objectives. It therefore, recommended the introduction of a new style management system that was capable of meeting the challenges of the 70's and beyond through; a new conception of management which emphasises results oriented approach to public service, recruitment and training of skilled personnel and the use of scientific knowledge, understanding the concepts and application of project management, programme budgeting   and management by objectives, and motivation of human resources in the service towards achieving defined goals and effectiveness.

In addition, it introduced the Open Reporting System for Performance Evaluation and established a Unified Grading and Salary Structure covering all posts in the Service. It created a unified senior management group for both administrative and professional staff for central management career. Further recommendations of the commission are as follows; (1) a new, single public service staffed and led by professionals and officers who possess the requisite skills and knowledge and can apply such in setting goals and achieving targets; (2) the need for every public manager to be trained in project management, management by objectives, and programme budgeting; (3) the adoption of project management as a tool for inter-ministerial task execution to hone skills/competencies and ensure better integration of Government services; (4) greater delegation of human resource management functions to Ministries, Departments and Agencies(MDAs); (5) the decentralization of staff consultation and negotiation machinery; (6) the speedy treatment of disciplinary cases arising in the face of complicated disciplinary procedures and canvassed for recognition of Civil Service rules as part of the contract of service; and (7) the institution of an ombudsman (at both federal and

state levels) for the review of administrative decisions which are considered unjust (Public Service Review commission main Report 1974).

2.3 Public Sector Reforms in Nigeria from the 1980

2.3.1 Onosode Presidential Commission on Parastatals 1981

This commission was set up by the Federal Government against the backdrop of persistent agitation by statutory corporations and state-owned companies and other parastatals for their inclusion in the unified grading and salary system for the public service following the recommendations of the Udoji Public Service Review Commission in 1974 (Report). The progressive reduction of their autonomy, pay and benefits in comparison to the civil service had started in 1968, following the recommendation of the working party on statutory corporations and state-owned companies under the chairmanship of Chief Michael Ani. The main thrust of these agitations was the degree of autonomy, higher salaries, and more generous fringe benefits and generally the better conditions of service (compared to the civil service) they enjoyed before the recommendations of the working party committee, (Onosode, 1981).

They argued that the undesirable rationalisation neither reflected the differences in work nor its complexities; it did not take into consideration the main reasons for setting up the statutory corporations to operate outside the civil service. These parastatals questioned the appropriateness of their inclusion in the unified grading and salary system since, in their view, they differed from the civil service because they were profit-oriented, simply, and the nature of their work was not similar. They felt being asked to adapt the civil service salaries and grading system to be detrimental to their decision-making process as it brought them directly under the full control of the ministries, which had hitherto exercised only a distant supervisory role over them. They demanded unfettered autonomy to undertake their activities

without the interference of the ministries and the parastatals. They also called for the freedom of their various Boards of Directors to determine their wages and fringe benefits and being recognised as commercial and /or industrial enterprises with freedom to behave as such in a competitive market. Further, they agitated for remuneration according to the market value of their professions and industries and on a basis comparable to the private sector practice. Equally, they demanded the limits of authority for approval of contracts by their Boards and Management to be raised and for recognition as government's expert advisers in matters relating to their operation given that this expertise lay in the parastatals rather than in the ministries themselves. They also asked for sufficient freedom to fix tariffs and other charges for services rendered to the public to make profit or at least to break even.

The Onosode Commission was set up to address these concerns; the contentions had been protracted and had affected staff morale. Onosode Commission examined the operations of these parastatals, e.g. the organisation, structure, management and job content of all Public Corporations and Federal Government-owned Companies and other Parastatals (excluding universities). In view of the relationship between these and the rest of the Public Service and similar organisations in the Private Sector, it considered whether any Parastatals should indeed be removed from the present unified salary system; the justification for doing so was assessed and offered guidelines for fixing salaries of any such Parastatals removed from the said unified grading system.

The Commission, amongst other things, recommended that Boards of these Parastatals be given appropriate authority to undertake their own responsibilities and from whom proper accountability should be consistently demanded. Similarly, it recommended that the Parastatals should be given more autonomy, especially for devising conditions of service appropriate to their employees and the removal of some of the Parastatals from the unified grading system.

2.3.2. Dotun Phillips Reform Committee 1986

The Dotun Philips Reform Committee was set up in 1986 and it attempted to reform the Civil Service alongside the Structural Adjustment Programme of Government. The Committee examined the Structure, Staffing and Operations of the Federal Civil Service (Anazodo *et al..*, 2012). The recommendations of the Phillips panel were: to enhance professionalism; to align with the Presidential System of Government; to decentralize and delegate; to combine authority with responsibility; to enhance accountability; to enhance checks and balances; to implement a general modernisation of the Service, and, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency as well as speed of operation. These recommendations were put into law through the Civil Service Reorganization Decree No. 43 (1988). Some of the most important provisions of the reforms were the abolishment of the Office of the Head of Service. Ministers, in addition to being the Chief Executives of their various Ministries had also become the Accounting Officers in place of Permanent Secretaries, removing the post of Permanent Secretaries and thus creating, in its place, the new political post of Director General who was to hold office at the pleasure of the President. Such an appointee was also expected to vacate office when the Government that appointed him or her completed its term of Office, unless re-appointed by an incoming Administration. The changes were to encourage the professionalization of the Service to stimulate specialisation and expertise thereby ensuring that officers develop a career in a Ministry or Department. The restructuring of Ministries was along Departmental lines to reflect the basic functions and areas of concern of the Ministry. Each Subdivision further Sub-divided into branches. These, too, were yet further sub-divided into smaller Sections. Furthermore, each Ministry was authorised to undertake the appointment, promotion and discipline of its staff under the General and Uniform Guidelines provided by the Federal Civil Service Commission (FCSC). Lastly, each Ministry or Extra-Ministerial Department was to be allowed to have up to three and not more

than five common services Departments, namely, Personnel Management, Finance and Supplies, and of Planning, Research and Statistics.

The 1988 Civil Service Reorganization Decree 43 promulgated by General Ibrahim Babangida had a major impact on the structure and efficiency of the Civil Service. This reform gave a formal recognition to the politicization of the upper rung of the Civil Service and some other changes. For example, Ministerial responsibilities were merged with administrative controls as Ministers were not only the Political Head of the Ministries, but also the Accounting Officers. The designation of Permanent Secretary was replaced with Director General who was also recognised as Deputy Minister with a tenure concomitant with the Government that appointed them. The appointment of the Director General was no longer based on seniority as anyone from within and outside the Service could be so appointed. Further, the office of the Head of Service and the Officers' Pool System were abolished (Igbuzor, 1988).

2.3.3 Ayida Civil Service Review Panel 1995

In 1995, the Government set up the Alison Ayida Civil Service Review Panel, in response to criticisms of the Dotun Philip Reforms. This panel recommended that Decree No. 43 of 1988 be abrogated, because it discovered that the Civil Service was over-centralised and there were constant conflicts between cadres and poor drive for attainment of results and concrete performance. Similarly, the Panel found the Civil Service has low staff morale, suffered from inadequate staff development initiatives and reduced productivity.

2.3.4. The Public Sector Reform 1999-2007

In 1999, a range of Public Sector Reforms was initiative in response to weak economic performance, poor infrastructure, poverty and high level unemployment, corruption, lack of confidence in Government and massive debts. These were associated with prolonged Military

Rule. In his inaugural speech on 22nd May 1999, titled 'the New Dawn,' the President Olusegun Obasanjo described the kind of Public Service of his dream in the following words:

> *'...people–oriented rather than self- serving, innovative rather than the rule-bound, capable of forging constructive partnership with outside groups rather than being insular; that is professionally competent and free from corruption; that constantly subjects programmes to relevance and effectiveness tests rather than being complacent; that uses hierarchical control as a means of strengthening management accountability rather than as a device for stifling initiative and creativity'.*

In order to achieve this goal, President Obasanjo later revealed his vision for the Civil Service and (by extension) of the whole Public Service as follows: a competent, professional, development-oriented, public-spirited and consumer friendly Civil Service, capable of responding effectively and speedily to the needs of the society; the restoration of the core values of the Service, such as political neutrality, impartiality, integrity, loyalty, transparency, professionalism and accountability; public service that is guided by equity, where things are done in the right way, based on extant rules and regulations, but with room for discretion, which should be exercised in the public interest; creation of a suitable environment where Civil Servants are assured of protection and job security in the faithful discharge of their duties and responsibilities; and, a competitive, well-remunerated, and motivated Public Service (Ogunrotifa, 2012:18).

Conclusively, Public Sector Reforms by Obasanjo administration came from internal and external pressures. For example, in both Developing and Developed Nations, the role of the Government had changed from sole providers to that of enablers of job and wealth creation (this of course is in line with New Public Management). Other factors responsible for this Reform are: economic pressures, technological advances and changes, need to manage resources and reduce wasteful Public Service expenditure, the need to improve citizens' confidence in public services and goods, pressures from Non-Governmental organisations,

Millennium Development Goals priorities, pressure from the International Development Partners and other Donor Communities demanding reforms as conditions for development grants as well as pressure from regional agreements (NEPAD agreement, for example).

2.3.5. Initiatives towards Public Service Reforms 1999

Between 1999 and 2001, Obasanjo's administration reorganised the top hierarchy and the Directorate Cadre of the Civil Service. This, the administration argued is vital to progress in the Public Service. To achieve its reform the Presidency organised series of retreats for Ministers, Special Advisers and Permanent Secretaries to consider reforming the Civil Service. The Office of the Head of Civil Service produced a document containing a comprehensive strategy for reforming the Civil Service based on the directive of Federal Executive Council (2001). The document was produced through a pilot study of seven ministries and agencies namely: Federal Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, National Planning Commission, Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation and the Office of the Head of Service of the Federation. The findings of this study were as follows: an aging Civil Service, in which about 60 per cent of the staff were 40 years and above; the preponderance of unskilled Staff within levels 01-06 which constituted about 70 per cent of the entire workforce; the prevalence of ghost workers, symptomatic of the poor record keeping of personnel records and payroll systems; stagnation at the higher levels, especially the Directorate Cadre, reflective of poor succession and career planning; absence of mission and vision statements, work programmes, corporate and individual schedules of functions; under-sourcing of key institutions; absence of working tools; erosion of professionalism and espirit de corps; non-transparent and corruption ridden procurement System; abandonment of training courses to sharpen skills for Service, further accentuated by the decay of all training institutions; ad hoc responses to policy making, devoid of vigorous long–term policy analysis, consultation and monitored control; near absence of an IT-enabled

41

system of work operations; unproductive rule-based hierarchical system which stifles individual and corporate creativity, as well as accountability, and, a fundamentally flawed performance management system totally devoid of objectivity (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on Nigeria's Public Service Reform, 2006:44).

Based on these findings, the Government established the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) in 2003. NEEDS is the National Strategy for Public Sector Reforms with a range of partnership drawing on stakeholders from States and Local Governments and National Assembly. It was deemed as a perquisite to good governance, and sustainable National Development.

NEEDS have three main priorities informed by Macro Economic Framework: job creation, provision of affordable housing, improving health care services, strengthening the skill base, protecting the vulnerable and promoting peace and security; promoting and encouraging private enterprise by creating an enabling environment for business to thrive, stabilizing the value of the Naira, diversifying the economy to reduce dependency on oil, privatizing, de-regulating and liberalizing government-owned industries, developing infrastructure, improving agriculture and promoting other key sectors such as information and communications technologies, tourism, entertainment and financial services, protect the environment and ensure sustainable management of natural resources; and changing the way government operates by identifying the core business of government and adhering to them while allowing other stakeholders to run business and provide other services for which they have comparative advantage over government. Others include implementing accountability, transparency and anti- corruption measures and curtailing unbridled waste in the Public Service through pension reform, modernization of fringe benefits, national health insurance scheme and budgetary discipline (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on Nigeria's Public Service Reform, 2006:44).

These key priorities are entrenched within the economic management, governance and institutional strengthening, Public Service reforms transparency, accountability and anti-corruption reforms will be achieved through the establishment of the following: the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

It is however, important to note that regional initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's) were incorporated into NEEDS.

Key Areas of the Public Service Reforms of 1999

The Public Service Reforms focused on five key areas:

Budget and financial management: procurement system review, institutionalization of fiscal responsibility, accounting reforms and audit reforms;

Accountability: due process, transparency and accountability in government transactions, establishment of Service Charters and institutionalization of compliance enforcement;

Human Resources Management: decentralization of human resources management from the Federal Civil Service Commission to Ministries, Departments and Agencies, personnel records and payroll cleaning, staff cadre reviews, remodelling of recruitment and promotion procedures of the Civil Service, including the injection of competent professionals, young and bright people, experts with rare skills; introduction of a new performance management scheme; creation of professionally-manned Human Resources Management Departments, competent in manpower planning, career and succession manning, training and development etc., undertaking pay reforms, as a strategy for attracting and retaining talents in the service, massive capacity development and training and organisational culture change;

Operation and system: organizational restructuring and right-sizing, work process redesign and information and technology applications;

Value reorientation and integrity reforms: This involves the development of a new generation of leaders of high integrity and a service driven by a culture of integrity (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on Nigeria's Public Service Reform, 2006:44).

Similarly, the reforms affected Parastatals and their Management. For instance, there were over 500 government-owned Agencies, Parastatals and Corporations. Over the years, they have haemorrhaged government resources. The following are some of the measures taken in relation to the functions of the Parastatals: accelerated privatization through the Bureau of Public Enterprises(BPE); scrappage and/or merger of some Parastatals; review of mandate and amendment to the legal instruments through the adoption of incorporated legal forms to replace the legal status of Statutory Corporations; possible conversion of some Parastatals to Executive Agencies; total removal of subvention for certain categories of Parastatals; reorientation of Management of Parastatals towards self- sustenance, profit making, cost effectiveness and cost consciousness; establishment of benchmarks of recruitment/overhead ratio to capital expenditure; redundancy management and right-sizing; and re-professionalization, and, Strengthening of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism of parastatals through the introduction of such accounting instruments such as service charter. In addition, regular survey of stakeholders' perception and service delivery, peer review, as well as league-ranking parastatals based on predetermined corporate performance indicators is recommended (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on Nigeria's Public Service Reform, 2006:44).

2.3.6. The Oronsaye Committee and Recent Reforms

During Obasanjo's government, the Oronsaye thirteen-member presidential committee on the Review and Revision of Public Service Rules, Regulations and Procedures was constituted On Thursday 3rd February 2005. It comprised two Ministers of Cabinet Rank, five serving and one retired Permanent Secretary, a Commissioner from the Federal Civil Service Commission, Accountant General of the Federation, Auditor-General for the Federation, the Director General, Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON) and Director General Bureau of Public Service Reforms (BPSR) (Adegoroye, 2005). The Committee which was Chaired by the Principal Secretary to the President and Permanent Secretary, State House Mr Stephen Oronsaye, who later become the Head of the Federal Civil Service; had the following mandates: to immediately work out transitional arrangements to facilitate on-going Public Service Reforms, especially in the areas of recruitment/ appointments, deployment, discipline, performance management and incentives and voluntary exist incentives, among others; to study, analyse and review the existing January 2000 Public Service Rules, Financial Regulations, Circulars and other Extant Regulations and to bring them in line with the current reforms of government, taking into account, recently policies like monetization of Fringe Benefits, the Pensions Reform Act and Public Procurement Bill; to incorporate into the Revised Public Service Rules and Financial Regulations, other relevant rules and procedures that will ensure enforcement of compliance, strict observance of transparency, justice, equity and accountability in the conduct of Government business; to make appropriate recommendations that will ensure that the application of the Public Service Rules and the Financial Regulations on Public Officers is consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, and, to make any other recommendations on the Public Service Rules and Financial Regulations as may be deemed necessary (Adegoroye, 2005:6).

In April 2005, the Oronsaye Committee submitted an Interim Report to the President containing provisions on appointments, recruitment and deployments, performance management and incentives, discipline and exit from the service, pending the conclusion of its assignments (Adegoroye, 2005:6). On April 16, 2012, Oronsaye submitted its report to President Goodluck Jonathan in which it recommended the reduction of the existing 263 Statutory Government Agencies in the Country to 161. In all, the committee recommended the abolition of 38 Agencies, merged 52 and reverted 14 Agencies to Departments in the relevant Ministries (Adetayo, 2014). The white paper was printed in March 2014 (Anuforo, 2014).

The Public-Sector Reforms of President Jonathan were anchored on his Transformation Agenda TA (2011-2015) and Vision 20: 2020 of his predecessor President Yar'adua which aimed at making Nigeria one of the top 20 economies in the world by the year 2020. The Transformation/Vision 20:2020 agenda aimed to address: decades of personalised rule that undermined the processes of governance and the integrity of their operators; the erosion of confidence of the Civil Service; weak Parliament that was short on confidence and at best tentative in its constitutional role of checking the Executive; a weak Judiciary would require time to recover from long years of Executive intimidation and interference; a Media that needed to find its voice again as the Fourth Estate; weak institutions around the country, at Federal as well as State levels and, unsustainable economic growth or development with the state of poor infrastructure, education and healthcare, limited job opportunities for the population, (Mid-Term Report of the Transformation Agenda (May 2011- May 2013) - Taking Stock, Moving Forward)

The TA is not a standalone, strategic plan, as it builds on the foundations of the 1st National Implementation Plan (NIP) of the Nigeria Vision 20:2020 (NV20:2020). The implementation of the NV 20:2020 would be through three medium term Strategic Plans: 1st National

Implementation Programme 2010- 2013; 2nd National Implementation Programme 2014-2017, and, 3rd National Implementation Programme 2018-2020 (Usman, 2013). The NV 20:2020 is an expression of Nigeria's intent to improve the living standards of her citizens and place the Country among top 20 economies in the World, with a minimum GDP of $900 billion and *per capita* income of not less than $4000 per annum. Other objectives are to achieve fiscal prudence, fiscal balance, low inflation and availability of infrastructural facilities to propel the economy, (Mid-Term Report of the Transformation Agenda (May 2011-May2013).

In Nigeria, the Public Sector has experienced, or witnessed, a variety of government and governance systems or administration, e.g. Civil, Military, Parliamentary, Presidential, Quasi-Federal and Semi-Military. The Military and Quasi-Federal Systems have had the longest and the most profound impact on the sector. The reforms introduced the privatisation of goods and services such as electricity, transportation and communications. Similarly, Monye Emina (2012:19) notes that the Public-Sector Reform in Nigeria has entailed large-scale worker retrenchment (retirement or outright lay-off) under the euphemisms of 'down-sizing', 'right-sizing', 'reorganisation' and 'restructuring'. In addition, some key Government Parastatals were removed from the mainstream Public Service and autonomous and semi-autonomous Agencies were established. According to the ECA (2010:48) the Reforms in Nigeria were influenced by New Public Management.

Progress has been made in relation to the Public-Sector Reforms in Nigeria since 1999. Firstly, waste curtailment through monetization of Fringe Benefits, the introduction of National Health Insurance Scheme, Pension Reforms, Service Compact with all Nigerians (SERVICOM), Procurement Reform, Integrated Personnel Payroll Information System (IPPIS) and the passage of a Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007/10 to ensure prudent

management of resources. The Pension Scheme, also known as the Contributory Pension Scheme, was introduced to address the problem of increasing difficulties on the part of the Government to meet pension liabilities to its workers - both those retired and those still working (Omisore, 2013:18). The objectives of the new Pension Scheme are to: 'ensure that every person who worked in either the Public Service of the Federation, Federal Capital Territory or the Private Sector receives his retirement benefits as and when due; assist improvident individuals by ensuring that they save to cater for their livelihood during old age and, establish a uniform set of rules, regulations and standards for the administration and payments of retirement benefits for the Public Service of the Federation, Federal Capital Territory and the Private Sector' (Omisore, 2013:18).

Discussed above is how in Nigeria, all MDAs have a contract with their customers incorporated in Service Charters. This must be discharged, and it is used for measuring their effectiveness on quality and timely delivery of services (Adegoroye, 2005:2). The Charter details outlines 'the mandate areas of the organisation, its range of customers, the range of services provided, quality expectations, schedules and time of delivery, avenue for lodging complaints and of seeking redress, among others' (Adegoroye, 2005:2). SERVICOM-Service Compact with all Nigerians- which Abdullah (2008) referred to as the mother of all reforms, is an initiative aimed at achieving service excellence in public sector organisations (see Omisore, 2013:20). The focus of SERVICOM is to ensure that the Vision and Goals of Public Sector Organisations are achieved (Omisore, 2013:20). The focus in the Charter is about improving service delivery, staff training, ensuring transparency and accountability, and empowerment of Citizens by responding to their needs (Abdullah, 2008, cited in Omisore, 2013:20). In addition, every Government Department, Ministries, Agencies, and Parastatals must have a SERVICOM Unit. In TETFund, there is a SERVICOM Unit which focuses on service delivery.

The National Health Insurance Scheme was introduced to allow employees and dependants to register with any Health Care Provider (HCP) approved by Government (Public or Private), (Omisore, 2013:20). The objectives of the Schemes are 'to ensure full private sector participation in health care delivery, every Nigerian has access to quality health care services, protect families from the financial hardship of huge medical bills, limit in the rise of cost of health care services, and ensure availability of funds to the health sector for improved services' (Omisore, 2013:20).

Secondly, restructuring of the Civil Service- (such as the Federal Capital Territory Administration, Federal Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA's) - was introduced with the aim to promote efficiency and effectiveness. Service-cleansing focused on the retrenchment of Grade Levels 01-06, consisting of cleaners, gardeners, drivers, messengers, and clerical assistants who form 70% of the core civil service. Thirdly, there was a focus on rules and regulations, e.g. strengthening existing training institutions such as the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON) in Badagry. The Public Service Institute (PSI) was established in Abuja to train both middle level management and executive management (also discussed below). The major anti-corruption Agencies created are the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Similarly, the Code of Conduct Bureau and the Code of Conduct Tribunal were set up by the Federal Government as extra Ministerial Departments under the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, Cap 56, LFN 1990 (the functions and activities are discussed below). The Code of Conduct Bureau was set up to assist public officers to be accountable and to adopt transparent practices in carrying out their duties (Adegoroye, 2005).

The standards of behaviour expected of public officers are also clearly spelt out in the Civil Service handbook, and it is expected that officials who violate these provisions would be sanctioned in line with the law (Adegoroye, 2005). The Code of Ethics for Public Officers, as enshrined in the handbook further reinforce and expand the scope of similar codes contained in the Civil Service Handbook. Similarly, the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act (2012) and the Public Procurement Act (2007) respectively, were meant to address issues of transparency and accountability in the country (Adegoroye, 2005) (as discussed in Chapter Six). The Bureau of Public Sector Reforms (BPSR) was set up to oversee and sustain the reforms (ECA, 2010: 67).

On 13 June 2000, the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) through the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 was signed into law (Adegoroye, 2005; Aduda, 2007: 27). Its duties, as delineated in Section 6 (a-f) of the Act 2000, and can be summarised thus: Enforcement duties:- to receive and investigate reports of corrupt offences as created by the Act and in appropriate cases prosecute the offender (s); Prevention Duties - to examine, review and enforce the correction of corruption-prone systems and procedures of public bodies, with a view to eliminating or minimizing corruption in public life, and, Education Duties - to educate and enlighten the public on, and against corruption, with a view to enlisting and fostering public support for the fight against it (Aduda, 2007: 27).

Approaches to corruption by ICPC includes coordinating the establishment of Anti-Corruption and Transparency Units (ACTUs) in 145 Government Ministries, Parastatals, Departments and Agencies; carrying out studies on the systems, practices and procedures of 44 public sector organisations, located in various states of the Federation, with a view to identifying the dysfunctionalities in the systems and the work processes of these sampled

organisations which encourage the acts of corruption in order to address them; carrying out public education and enlightenment campaigns on the ills of corruption with special focus on Public Sector institutions and youths; and developing a National Values Curriculum in collaboration with the Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council for implementation at all levels of the educational system (Adegoroye, 2005, see also Aduda, 2007).

EFCC was established in 2002. The enabling Act mandates the EFCC to combat financial and economic crime (Aduda, 2007: 27). The commission is empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise economic and financial crimes and is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of other laws and regulations relating to economic and financial crimes (Aduda, 2007). EFCC operates through coordinating the enforcement of the following laws: Money Laundering (Prohibition Act 2004); The Advanced Fee Fraud (other related Offences) Act 1995; The Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994; as amended; The Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991; as amended Miscellaneous Offences Act 1983 Other complimentary laws on economic and financial crime, including crime code and penal code (Adegoroye, 2005).

In 2003, the government of Nigeria (among others) set up the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU)- otherwise known as 'due process'- to check widespread corruption, gross incompetence and related vices in public procurement and service delivery to citizens. The Unit aims to block the loopholes inherent in the reckless and dubious processes that contract awards often involve, and to ensure compliance with guidelines and procedures laid down for procurement in capital projects and associated goods and services (Aduda, 2007, xi). It was created to enforce standards in Public Sector Procurement. Prior to the establishment of the Unit, the Procurement System was ridden with corruption leading to huge losses to government. With this current system, however, a mechanism has also been

put in place to detect and punish over-invoicing of government contracts. Unlike previously, where tenders are open to all bidders, contract awards now also undergo a process of rigorous review, oversight and certification by the BMPIU. This has curtailed the 'looting' of public funds and ensured value for money in all government transactions (Adegoroye, 2005). BMPIU is a progressive measure that promotes good governance and financial management at the same time ensuring provision of quality goods and services (Aduda, 2007).

BMPIU was established with a remit: to harmonise existing government policies/ practices and update same on public procurement; to determine whether or not Due Process has been observed in the procurement of services and contracts; to introduce more honesty, accountability and transparency into the procurement process; to establish and update pricing standards and benchmarks for all supplies to government; to monitor the implementation of projects during execution with a view to providing information on performance, output and compliance with specifications and targets, and, to ensure that only projects which have been budgeted for are admitted for execution (Aduda, 2007: 28).

The goal of the BMPIU is to ensure full compliance with the guidelines and procedures as laid down for the procurement of capital and minor capital projects as well as for associated goods and services (Aduda, 2007:47). In terms of Implementation strategies, the BMPIU operates under the following guidelines: regulatory functions, certification functions, monitoring functions, and, training and advisory functions (Aduda, 2007: 20 29). The creation of the Bureau of Public Service Reforms in 2003 and its formal establishment in 2004 provided an institutional platform to promote professionalism and ethical standards in the Public Service (Adegoroye, 2005).

In addition, the National Planning Commission was established. This Commission is responsible for the coordination of Strategic Planning Process of the country- including

monitoring and evaluation of policies, programmes and projects; policy research and advice to national and sub-national governments; formulation and coordination of national development plans- including oversight of the implementation of TA and the NV 20:2020; monitoring and evaluation of policies, programme and projects; managing multi-lateral, bi-lateral and regional economic cooperation, including development aid and technical assistance, and carry out surveillance on the economy; coordinating and production of official statistics and managing the National Statistical System; capacity development for efficient and effective utilization of resources and, generation of credible knowledge for national development, serves as secretariat to the National Economic Council (Usman, 2013:12).

From 2010-2013, NPC championed various strategic initiatives: at Federal and State levels and implemented several reforms and initiatives- leading to improved outcomes (Usman, 2013: 22) such as;

Institutionalisation of strategic planning process at the Federal Level: cascading the strategic planning to sub-national levels and MDAs; professionalization of DPRs at the Federal Level; conducting Needs Assessment of State's Planning and Statistical Agencies for enhanced service delivery; improvement in human and infrastructural capacity of the institutions; MDAs and States are encouraged to develop the culture of strategic planning, and, to align budgetary submissions of MDAs to the plan provisions

Institutionalisation of Performance Management and Contracting: aimed at measuring ministerial and individual officer performance against negotiated performance targets; with the introduction of the PMS, the public service has recorded improvement and clarity in the alignment of institutional and individual performance (Usman, 2013)

At the level of government, there is awareness of the need to sharpen the skills of Public Service officers. This is being done through a mix of strategies including: repositioning of existing training institutions such as the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON) Badagry, the Centre for Management Development, Federal Training Centres, etc; establishment of the Public Service Institute in Abuja to focus on both middle level Management and Executive Management training and development; strengthening the capacity of the Management Development Office (MDO) in the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation for effective discharge of its oversight functions in the area of service wide training and development; adequately harnessing the opportunities provided in the area of training and development through the avenues of international cooperation as well a partnership with development partners such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, World Bank, Department for International Development (DFID), and, realigning training curricular and current requirements in terms of needs service wide (Adegoroye, 2005:5)

Current strategies being implemented to promote ethical conduct in the Public Service include: creation and strengthening of anti-corruption agencies for strict enforcement of anti-corruption laws; creation of more institutional platforms for enforcing standards; initiating reforms to combat corruption and promote transparency and accountability; balancing the power of Ministers, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and the Federal Civil Service Commission in the area of discipline; empowerment of the top hierarchy of the Service to set the moral tone in ethical conduct, and, creation of African Peer Review Mechanisms Desks in MDAs (Adegoroye, 2005).

There are still some challenges inspite of the various initiatives described above. These are: the existence of ghost workers (although to some extent this has been addressed by the recently introduced Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information System-IPPS), lack of professionalism, resistance to reforms at institutional and individual levels, centralisation,

lack of customer orientation, capacity gaps, lack of integrated approach to service delivery (silo operation methods) and information sharing and management.

2.4. NPM Inspired Public Sector Reforms in Africa

In the 1970s and 1980s, Public Sector Reform was pervasive in most African countries; induced by economic conditions, democratization processes, administrative inefficiency, lack of accountability and presentation, excessive power, indifference to public needs and demands, weak public services, influence of IMF and World Bank, and international and continental push for Public Management Reforms (see, e.g. ECA, 2003, 2010; Ayee, 2008). Initiatives and Pan-African governmental agreements, e.g. New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union, are examples of continental push for public sector reforms. The reforms were underpinned by neoliberal ideology, modernisation of Public Management efficiency, establishment of Public Private Partnerships, citizen participation, accountability, Management by Objectives, free market principles etc. The reform was an approach seen as necessary to rescue Africa from economic and social upheaval.

The Public Management Reforms introduced across African countries, reflected New Public Management techniques and principles (ECA, 2003; 2010). NPM was used as a uniform template for Public Sector Reforms in Africa (see ECA, 2010). Nonetheless, the weak institutional capacities of some of the Countries in Africa made reforms difficult (AfDB, 2005:132). For example, NPM reforms failed to address inherent problems of clientelism and neo-patrimonialism in the public sector of some of the African Countries (Ayee, 2008:26; ECA, 2010). Accordingly, the failure of NPM reforms in some African countries is associated with social, political and economic problems. Therefore, the argument would be that (also in line with the premise of this thesis) evolution, structure and feature of a

country's public sector is shaped by socio-political, cultural and historical experiences. This position is important for successful implementation of public sector reforms.

In some African Countries, Public Sector Reforms produced remarkable results, e.g. Botswana. The success of reform in Botswana is often associated with the political, environmental and internal contexts of the Country. For example, Botswana has good institutional capacity: political stability, efficient civil service, constitutional order, law-based state and respect for the rule of law, state legitimacy, to good leadership succession (ECA, 2010:7-8). Notably, the Country concentrated on promoting economic market discipline and created enabling environment for public and private sector partnership to flourish (ADB 2005; ECA, 2010: 7-8). The following are examples of reforms adopted by the Botswana government: the 'Botswana and its Vision 2016', mainstreamed through NPM techniques such as Performance Management System (PMS), Work Improvement Teams (WITs), Computerized Personnel Management System (CPMS), Organization and Methods Reviews (OMRs), Performance Based Reward System (PBRS) and Decentralization (Dzimbiri, 2008; ECA, 2010). Correspondingly, through the rationalisation of ministries and government departments, a few Agencies were established. The reforms were successful in Botswana because of competent leadership and dedicated workforce (ECA, 2010: 7-8).

In 1996, Tanzania adopted the Agency form of organisation as Public Sector Reform agenda. This was done to address failing economic and weak Public Service. According to Caulfield (2002) the Government of Tanzania launched the Civil Service Reform Programme with the objective of achieving a 'smaller, affordable, well-compensated, efficient and effectively performing Civil Service. Following this, Parastatals accused of inefficiency and corruption were dismantled and privatised and some became Agencies (Caulfield, 2002). The Agencies in Tanzania had capacity problems as they experienced financial problems. For instance, most of the Agencies operated on vastly reduced Personnel and for those Agencies were

unable to afford to appoint new staff, Performance management responsibilities had fallen heaviest on the cadre of Professional Staff. According to Caulfield (2002) the resources of time and money were major problems. The Agencies also suffered from the problem of inadequate parenting. Permanent secretaries failed to grasp the important 'Strategic Management' role that they must play, especially and most importantly their role in Performance Monitoring (Caulfield, 2002). In addition, the wider political culture affected the performance of the Executive Agencies. Caulfield (2002) notes that perhaps the biggest difficulty for Tanzania's Executive Agencies is the wider political culture that experiences power as very centralised on the President, where direct relations with the President and the Chief Secretary are what really count. In this environment, the concept of Ministerial responsibility remains underdeveloped and the governance of Executive Agencies remains weak. Based on these experiences of reforms in Tanzania, one could argue that NPM style solution must be introduced with alternatives that take into consideration the socio-economic and political context of a Nation State.

2.5. Summary

NPM comprises neither a unified theory of, nor a random collection of, ideas about public management, but rather it embodies a kind of administrative argument based upon specific doctrines and related justifications (Barzelay, 2001). Research particularly that which is country specific, has been able to identify successful implementation of NPM. There is an emerging narrative, described as post-NPM, which is a modification or replacement to NPM, with diverse arguments around it, with some school of thought arguing that it is not an alternative. Post-NPM narratives are diverse in nature, covering issues such as terrorism, climate change and financial matters. NPM is still alive in many countries, and NPM reforms have been revised or supplemented by post NPM reforms (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:13). NPM reforms have been a success in some Countries. NPM has capacity to adapt,

it is robust and flexible, even after a long period of NPM reforms and emerging post-NPM reforms (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:13).

In Nigeria, numerous Public Service Reforms have been embarked upon since 1945, instituted by both Military and Civil Democratic Governments. Noteworthy is the Military take-overs in Nigeria between 1966, 1979, 1984 to 1999 and how this affected the functions and operations of the Civil Service. Consequently, Nigeria experienced about 35 years of Military Rule with only short periods of Civilian Rule (Anazodo *et al..*, 2012). Several factors triggered the various Public Sector Reforms in Nigeria, e.g. corruption amongst Civil Servants (impunity, lack of probity and accountability and transparency).

The reforms ranged from wage review to conditions of service and structure. In part, sections of the review, which were informed by internal developments, international pressures and influences, ought to be considered. Such international pressure is the influence of Bretton Woods' Institutions, a wave of public sector reforms in Developed Countries, and the ideological influences of Neoliberalism and the accompanying Public Government Framework- New Public Management (NPM). The influence of NPM dominated the Reforms from the 1980s, that is, the Dotun Phillips and Onosode Commissions, respectively. Some of the recommendations offered were in line with NPM doctrines - such as value for public money, responsiveness, outcome and output, contracting, purchaser/provider, autonomy, entrepreneurial management culture, steering, transparency, accountability, budget and financial management, human resources, enhanced checks and balances, general modernization of the service, and enhanced effectiveness and efficiency, training and development, professionalization of the service as well as speed of operation. In addition, elements such as scrapping of Ministries, Departments, Agencies, mergers and acquisitions, the creation of Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Parastatals, and the actual restructuring of existing Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Parastatals dominated the

reforms from the 1980s to 1999 and onwards. In 1990s restructuring, privatization, merger and scrapping of public organisations were some of the reforms introduced. The various measures introduced, albeit at different periods and forms, have a strong leaning towards the ideological position of neoliberalism- captured in the free market doctrines and principles.

One of the agencies affected by this reform is the Tertiary Education Trust Fund, (previously referred to as Education Tax Fund and later Education Trust Fund), which was established by Education Tax Fund Act no. 17, (2003) and the Education Tax Cap. E 4 laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004). As noted, both laws were replaced by the TETFund Act (2011). Though this Fund was established in 1993, operations began only in 1998 with the inauguration of its first Board of Trustees. However, as part of the reform and review programmes of the Obasanjo administration (which was constituted after the 1999 democratic elections in Nigeria), this Board of Trustees was dissolved and a new one constituted in 1999 with a mandate to use funding and project management for the rehabilitation, restoration and resuscitation of education at all levels in Nigeria. Between 1999 and 2011, the mandate, functions and scope of operations of the Fund has changed often related to the various reviews undertaken by government. The current mandate of the Fund as enshrined in the TETFund Act (2011) is to manage, disburse and monitor the education tax for the rehabilitation, restoration and consolidation of public tertiary institutions in Nigeria. These and other issues, such as the behaviour of the Fund are discussed in Chapters Five and Six informed by the data from the fieldwork.

Reforms in Nigeria have been criticised. For example, Monye-Emina (2012) claimed that the manner of implementation in Nigeria demonstrated a hastily designed programme - perhaps in line with the dictates of international donor institutions and agencies. There were also issues related to the payment of terminal benefits and entitlements to personnel disengaged in the process of reforms. Also, some of the reasons highlighted for setting up the various

reform committees and commissions in Nigeria, persist - only, very limited progress has been achieved thus far. According to Monye-Emina (2012) privatisation and liberalisation, together with unemployment problems, tend to aggravate poverty in the country, widening the gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots'. Further, these various reforms have all been implemented without taking into consideration contextual issues (Omar, 2012).

In the context of this research, the various reforms were introduced under different politico-administrative settings- e.g. parliamentary, military dictatorship, democratic systems of government. The reforms were introduced because of both internal and external pressures. A review of the reforms (e.g. ECA, 2010) highlighted the fact that some of the reforms did not achieve or attain the stated objectives. Could this be due to contextual issues, which have been identified in a range of comparative public management reports and research? Or could it be that in some cases, institutional transfers do not actually work? In the case of Nigeria, why was an NPM agency introduced in a non-NPM setting when it was becoming partly out of fashion in other parts of the world- especially in some OECD Countries? These questions are examined in both Chapters Five and Six, in view of the TETFund operations and behaviour within the Nigerian context.

In summary, this chapter has examined the various debates on New Public Management, its key principles and frameworks, and how it has been mainstreamed into public sector management since its emergence in the public policy debates. It is argued, drawing on a range of public sector reform initiatives, that NPM models of management has been mainstreamed into public sector management in Nigeria. In addition, the chapter reflected on NPM reforms in nation states in sub-Saharan Africa, concluding that the results have been mixed- in this case the importance of context also discussed.

The next chapter examines the concept of agencification, that is: the definition, scope, characteristics and framework of operations of an agency, and identified the concepts, relevant research aims and objectives. It discusses the various characteristics of agencification and how it is now the norm in various countries around the world.

61

Chapter Three

Agencies and Agencification

3.0. Introduction

'The agency idea is sometimes old, sometimes new, sometimes borrowed and sometimes untrue'
(Talbot, 2004)

The word agencification is now a buzzword in international circles (Pollitt *et al.* 2001), referred to as a contagious fever (Verhoest *et al.*, 2012:4). In many jurisdictions, it is a tool for 'unbundling bureaucracy' into different semi-autonomous organizations. "Agencification" is *transfer* of government activities to bodies vertically specialized outside ministerial Departments (Trondal, 2014:545). Agencification is about creating flexible, performance-oriented public sector organisation (Talbot and Caulfield, 2002; Pollitt *et al.*, 2004; Mortensen, 2016; Verhoest *et al.* 2012:3). According to Mortensen (2016:1) many public administration reforms in recent decades have implied a break-up of formerly monolithic bureaucracies into separate agencies. Certainly, introduction of agencification into public sector is driven by wide-ranging factors including, but not restricted to, politics, policy exigencies, administrative demands, modernisation and globalisation agenda. Agencification focuses on revitalisation of public service for citizens and de-politicisation of organisations by keeping them at arm's-length, thereby reducing party political interference (Pollitt *et al.* 2004:2; Trondal, 2012).

On policy exigencies, the focus is on rationalising specific goals and creating strategic tools for policy formulation and implementation. Indeed, agencies have become 'big businesses, also, instruments of efficiency improvements both managerially and administratively, professional management, citizen empowerment and participation, and the reduction of political meddling,' (Pollitt *et al.* 2004; Elton, 2014). International organizations and regional

bodies, such as World Bank, IMF, European Union, have set up agencies as part of their operations. Trondal (2014: 546) note that currently, more than 30 EU agencies have been established. Apart from the geographical spread throughout the Union, EU agencies cover multiple policy areas; have various legal standings and formal powers, staffing, and funding provisions, and, engage in a web of relations with external institutions (Trondal, 2014: 546), referred to as 'externalisation of task' (Vos, 2003). The growth of agencies worldwide is controversial e.g. such as definition, rationale for their establishment, roles and responsibilities, steering and control, autonomy, accountability, benefits or otherwise of agencies, national and international variations in roles and responsibilities particularly so contextual issues and organisational culture (Wethen-Hall, 2005; Verhoest *et al.,* 2012).

Whilst agencies, (whether semi-autonomous or Non- Departmental Public Bodies – NDPB's) are not a new phenomenon (Schick, 2002; Pollitt *et al.*, 2004; Dan, 2014), what is new are the structures, operations and functions (Verhoest *et al..,* 2012). Hence, agencies are an old idea, however its functions and activities in contemporary public management and administration is at a different level (Schick, 2002). In Sweden and United States of America, for example, agencies have long been part of government administration, while in the United Kingdom, large-scale Ministries had quangos before the spread of such Agencies; and developing countries have had Parastatals (Talbot, 2004). Correspondingly, international organisations and regional bodies also promote and encourage agencification programmes in transitional and developing countries, 'with a few of the how to do it recipe' or even, 'systematic guidance' about what agencies were, are, or could be, (or about their strengths and weaknesses) (Manning, 2001; ECA, 2003 a&b; Talbot, 2004). Variations exists in the constitution of agencies informed by public sector administrative traditions and cultures of countries. For example, the United States of America and Australia have single agency

legislation, whilst some countries, like Tanzania, operate generic agency legislation (Talbot, 2004).

This chapter explores literature on agencification, agencies and public management. Highlighted in this chapter are the definitions of agency, its characteristics and public management functions. In this chapter, the key elements of agencification will be identified and subsequently used as part of the research findings and analysis. In the summary section, public sector reform in Nigeria (discussed in Chapter Two) is examined again in view of agencification agenda in Nigeria.

3.1. Agencification: A Review of Literature

'Agencification' or 'distributed governance' is one of the core elements of the New Public Management (NPM) and it is the most often implemented in administrative reforms around the world (Moynihan, 2006:1). In most literature, agencification is placed under the umbrella of 'administrative decentralisation' (Verhoest and Verschuere, 2002), a trajectory of public sector and organizational reform and modernization (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000), linked to a desired or intended future of public sector organization and management (Verhoest *et al..,* 2012). Smullen (2004) likened administrative decentralization to agencification. Administrative decentralization is when the state seeks to create organizations that are more responsive to consumers, whilst at the same time retaining some form of control (Hambleton, 1992). There are three identifiable choices with decentralization (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). The first is political decentralization, which is transferring authority to elected political representatives at a lower level in the state organization (e.g. from central to local government). Administrative decentralization represents the second choice and it entails transferring authority to another body (e.g. an agency), (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). It concerns passing authority to another body selected by competitive means, (e.g. through

competitive tendering) and transferring authority by non-competitive means. Finally, the third choice is between internal and external decentralization (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). Internal decentralization is the transfer of power within an existing organization. It also implies that full political responsibilities of the Minister and the hierarchical ties between the Minister and the decentralized organization remain unchanged (Moynihan, 2006; Verhoest *et al.* 2012). On the other hand, external decentralization means passing authority to an independent external body, an organization that exists or is newly created (Pollitt, 2000). In contrast to internal decentralization, the relationship between the Minister and the decentralized body becomes a relationship that is legally both described and prescribed. Conclusively, agencification can be said to be a form of 'organizational reform' (Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012; Trondal, 2014).

In the last three decades, agencification has gained prominence in policy circles, as a form of apparent global convergence, with agencies quite fashionable in 'the realms of public management and especially central government reform' (Talbot, 2004; Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012). Other ideas/ elements associated with the concept of agencies include: efficiency; customer orientation; service standards; transparency and accountability; innovative management; revenue generation, and resource (accruals) accountability. These elements appear in agency initiatives from the outset, sometimes as 'add-ons' as the initiatives evolve contingent on a range of factors, events and political changes, which could be at organisational or national levels. Agencies undertake public tasks, implement policies, regulate markets and deliver public services and other tasks that impact on everyday lives of service users, that is citizens (Pollitt *et al.* 2004; Moynihan, 2006; Verhoest *et al..*, 2012; Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012; Trondal, 2014).

Moreover, controversies abound on what constitutes an Agency. As such, despite the popularity, there is no convergence about what constitutes an Agency (Fedele *et al.* 2007).

This is due to variation in national legal systems, organisations and political systems (Pollitt *et al.*., 2004; Wettenhall, 2005; Monihan, 2006). These differences are obvious in the various reports that have been written, which covers issues of implementation strategies and outcomes of agencies across the world. Similarly, Smullen (2010) notes that the definition of agency is complicated by differences in institutional contexts and differences in translation of the idea of the Agency in different countries, reflecting both the complicated interior and exterior histories of the concept itself (see also Monihan, 2006). Recognized above is the confusion agencification generates (see e.g. Bouchaert and Peter, 2004). Subsequent paragraphs will explore the academic definitions of agency and the core elements of agencies and agencification.

According to Talbot *et al.* (2000) to be an Agency, an organisation should be: at arm's length (proximal or further) from the main hierarchal 'spine' of central Ministries/Departments of State; carry out public tasks (service provision, regulation, adjudication, and certification) at a national level; secure core staffed by public servants (not necessarily 'civil servants'); financed (in principle) by the state budget (in practice some are financed up to 100% from their own revenues, but even here the state remains liable for their financial condition), and, subject to at least some public/ administrative law procedures (i.e. they are not predominantly or entirely private law bodies).

Pollitt *et al.* (2004) argue that an agency must display the following attributes: Firstly, have its status defined principally or exclusively in public law (though the nature of that law may vary greatly between different national systems); secondly, be functionally disaggregated from the core of its Ministry or Department of State; third, enjoy some degree of autonomy which is not enjoyed by the core Ministry; fourthly, be nevertheless linked to the Ministry/Department of State in ways which are close enough to permit Ministers/Secretaries of State to alter the budgets and main operational goals of the organisation; fifthly, is

therefore not statutorily fully independent of its Ministry/Department of State, and, finally, it is not a commercial Corporation.

Examining the various definitions of Agencies, Dan (2014:223) notes three main interpretations of Agency functions: First, activities/processes (for example, budgeting, making accountability statements; organizing to produce services; and training staff);Second, outputs (for example, treatments/lessons/inspection/information delivered to service users; grants; and loans issued); and Third, outcomes (for example, improved health status for citizens; better economic growth; educational attainment for students; and increased citizen satisfaction with the quality of services).

The definitions indicate that Agencies are not Divisions or Directorates within Ministries or Departments of State, and corporate bodies set up for commercial purposes. However, they are independent bodies that are free or almost free from direct Ministerial instructions. This is because Ministers/Secretaries of State can alter the budgets and the main operational goals of organizations without necessarily having to introduce new legislation, (Pollitt *et al.* 2004; Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012; Trondal, 2014). According to Verhoest *et al.* (2012) financial and personnel and management autonomy varies by organisation and countries. Nevertheless, they are 'closer to' the Ministerial/Secretary of State of core governments than independent 'quangos,' (Pollitt *et al.* 2004; Wettenhall, 2005; Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012; Trondal, 2014). What is obvious is how Agencies have more autonomy - whether in terms of finance, personnel, organisation or any combination of the three than the 'normal' Divisions or Directorates in the core of the Ministry (Pollitt *et al.,* 2004; Wettenhall, 2005). Agencies are often headed by senior public servants operating within a framework agreed on by Ministers, but at arm's length from the Minister and with some discretionary space in terms of achieving their objectives (Mortensen, 2016:1). An "Agency," is an administrative body that is formally separated from a Ministerial, or

Cabinet-Level, Department and that carries out public tasks at a national level on a permanent basis, is staffed by public servants, is financed mainly by the state budget, and is subject to public legal procedures (Trondal, 2014). Matsuda and Manning (2000) assert that there are two types of Agencies: Type 1 Agencies operate within the executive, and consequently typically referred to as Executing Agencies. Type 2 Agencies restrain the executive power and are typically statutory commissions or autonomous regulators. With Type 1 agencies as proximal instruments of Ministries for policy implementation, they are expected to improve operational efficiency in service delivery areas through both greater managerial discretion and flexibility with relatively secure funding and organizational autonomy. Conversely, Type 2 Agencies are designed to give statutory independence to Agencies in charge of functions that require protection from politicians' short-term orientation. In turn, this includes long-term policy-making, (e.g., monetary policy) or quasi-judicial/regulatory functions (Matsuda and Manning, 2000). In some instances, the State organisation of Agencies takes six different formats, as reflected in both public private law organisations (in terms of statutory regulations) and, at times, in Ministerial or non-Ministerial organisation. (Tyne, 2004). Tyne (2004), indicate that the various combinations are contingent upon the different applications of the term Agency and this is often shaped principally by jurisdictional interpretations.

Notwithstanding the lack of congruence as per the definition of Agencies, there are some apparent areas of agreement. These are: (i) that Agencies are structurally disaggregated from government (structural separation from the core of the Ministry) and, ii) they operate under conditions more like businesses than like government bureaucracy (Verhoest *et al.* 2012; Trondal, 2014). To Pollitt (2000) the process of agencification, through the creation of Agencies, starts from two conceptual core ideas: structural separation and performance contracting.

In the literature on New Public Management and Agencification, there are three core elements that are referred to customarily These are: (1) Structural disaggregation/ and or the creation of task specific organisations; (2) Performance contracting- some form of performance target setting, monitoring and reporting, and, (3) Autonomy- deregulation (or more importantly reregulating) of controls over personnel, finance and other management matters (Talbot, 2004).

To Pollitt *et al.* (2004), Agentification is as a tripartite blend of doctrines: structural disaggregation; autonomisation, and contractualisation (see also Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012; Wettenhall, 2005). According to Talbot (2004) these three central elements capture the idea of Agency around the globe and are apparent, in varying degrees in Agencies around the World. This is attributed to path dependency. For example, some organisations are already organised along disaggregated agency structural lines, so any reform will be limited to addressing 'performance and reregulation components'. Accordingly, not all agencification-inspired initiatives embrace the whole Agency package; the possibility that the three reform components operate independent of one another or in any combination exists (Talbot 2004).

There are disagreements amongst policy makers and academics, which supports this apparent convergence towards a united generic form of Agency (Pollitt *et al.* 2001). While some critics consider that the Agency-form is not as homogenous as it is been claimed, Bouckaert and Peters (2001) contend that whilst there are similarities in the way Agencies are created all over the World, the variations are also discernible - not only in terms of *modus operandi* of these organisations, but also their set up or establishment. Verhoest *et al.* (2012) note that these variations occur along the following dimensions: first, governance structure and the relation with Ministerial authorities; second, the degree of autonomy of these organisations, and third, the variety of tasks these organisations perform. These numerous changes or

challenges, according to Verhoest *et al.* (2012) have provided the basis for asking wide-ranging questions in respect to the numbers, varieties and characteristics of Agencies Worldwide.

As most literature on agencification demonstrates, there is an agreement that Agencies are guided by three core elements: structural disaggregation; autonomization, and contractualisation (Talbot, 2004; Wettenhall, 2005; Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012). Depending on the reform the three may not be present at all, or may not occur at the same time, or may be in pairs, nonetheless, it is when these three come together that the full force of the 'agency' concept becomes most apparent (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). The following subsections will explore the three elements before analysing the challenges of the agentification processes and procedures in real terms.

3.1.1. Structural Disaggregation

Structural disaggregation involves splitting up of large bodies into a 'parent' body and various subordinate 'Agencies'- mostly applied to splitting up 'Ministries' into a core central body and several Agencies carrying out specific tasks (Talbot 2004). Hence, it is a form of separation of policy details from executioner or purchaser (Talbot, 2004; Wettenhall, 2005). Clearly, this is a radical departure from the traditional public sector which was often highly aggregated and even quite independent regarding policy and strategies issues in some areas, yet equally tightly regulated by external government actors on a range of personnel, financial, purchasing and other matters of management (Graham and Roberts, 2004). According to Fedele *et al.* (2007) there are three core aspects to structural disaggregation: first, there is institutional distancing between Agency and Parent administration, which is often framed by legal imperatives and features. Pertaining to the legal aspect, the emphasis is on the workings of Agencies, particularly its power to determine the content of its own

statue, furnished by the presence of a Corporate Board representative, which highlights the plurality of stakeholders (Fedele *et al.,* 2007); Second, the complexity of the task transferred to the Agency in terms of heterogeneity of its activities, functions and outputs. This does not concern the 'degree' of disaggregation, but rather the modality of it, which raises questions on whether an Agency operates in more than one policy area. This is especially so with the heterogeneity of the agency's output and the nature of the public functions performed, respectively, and, third is, the agency specialisation on operational tasks as an indicator of the existence of clear-cut distinctions between the responsibility of policy formulation and the responsibility of policy delivery. All agencies have legal status, given the fact that in legalistic systems it is almost a pre-condition for disaggregation (Fedele *et al.* 2007). Indeed, structural disaggregation impacts on multi-functional organisations, particularly where it is difficult to discern what funding and actions contribute to which functions.

Other elements of structural disaggregation in literature are: creating an identifiable, separate, organizational structure with its own name; the body has single or small set of functions; functions usually are primarily about delivery, execution or provision and not about policy-making; the body is given a clear 'constitution'- in the form of some sort of legislation or at least a formal (if not statutory) 'framework document'- which sets out its purpose, powers, and governance arrangement; it has a single, named individual - usually a Chief Executive (CE) responsible for managing and reporting on the new body. Such a person is, or can be, appointed usually- actually or potentially- through an open process, separate from the normal Civil Service recruitment; the staff of the new body are usually different in some ways from mainstream Civil Servants, most often by changing their formal employment status, and finally, there is a drawing up of formal reporting arrangements and putting in place separate accounts for the new body (Talbot *et al.* 2000; Wettenhall; 2005; Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012; Dan, 2014; Trondal, 2014).

Table 1 below provides an illustration of the workings of agency and its administrative doctrines as it applies to key areas of control, independence, specialization and decision making, stressing the idea of structural disaggregation as it applies to agencies.

Table 1: Agency and Administrative Doctrines

Administrative doctrines-Choice areas	'Ministries'	New style 'Agencies'	Traditional 'Boards'
Control	Control exercised principally by levers of inputs (budgets) of processes.	Control exercised primarily through outputs or outcomes.	Control exercised principally by levers of inputs (budgets) or processes.
Independence	Direct control by the ministers in integrated classical bureaucracy.	Direct control by the ministers through a mixture of direction and legal or quasi-legal frameworks.	Formally and legally independent 'boards' with no direct ministerial control.
Specialization	Integration of policy and operations.	Separation of policy making and operational implementation functions.	Integration of policy and operations.
Decision making	Decisions made principally by rule and rote.	Mostly local discretion with some general rules.	Mostly externally imposed rules with some local discretion.

Source: Hood and Jackson (1991).

Several other reasons are advanced for disaggregating Ministries into small units called Agencies. According to The Rt. Hon Richard Luce, *"by breaking down areas of responsibility in the Civil Service into tailor-made, discrete and clear-cut services, and moving away from a more amorphous body, we are likely to have a more effective Civil Service which will be of benefit to the government of the day and the public,"* (cited in Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1990:52). Structural disaggregation is in the form of 'separateness and differentiated governance structure which allows for specialization of functions and a clearer focus on client needs. It is also referred to in policy circle as the 'organisation divorce' (OECD, 2002:6).

72

The separation of Agencies from their respective Ministries does not imply autonomy (Talbot, 2004). There is an argument that agencies, in some cases, or Countries, are regulated in areas such as personnel, finance, procurement and other issues that tend to limit managerial autonomy. Also, the complex nature and relationship between public organisations make autonomy very difficult to attain. Questions have also been raised on separateness, with arguments bordering on whether separation is in degrees or absolute, with some agencies being clearly far more 'separate' but with none being entirely independent (Talbot, 2004; Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012). Even in situations where there were legal groundings, structural independence and autonomy was mere formalities or, at times, even tokenistic. Talbot (2004), mention that agency 'separation' is more often like movement along a spectrum (or multiple spectra) rather than 'quantum leaps'. (Talbot, 2004; Trondal, 2014). In the UK, 'agencies' are said to be separate, but within the parent Ministry, and have no real legal 'personality' outside of their Ministry (or formal legal basis) and the staff remain civil servants. By contrast, in Japan and Tanzania, for example, new agencies have been established on a legislative basis, outside of ministries and their staff has ceased to be civil servants (Talbot, 2004). As such, qualitatively, there are different degrees of separations.

The functions (whether single or multi) they perform affect the independence of agencies. Revenue agencies in the UK and some Countries, for example, are multi-functional in character - they deal with tax collection, enforcement and other duties (cited in Talbot, 2004). The varied nature of functions, impacts on agency relationship with Ministries and other bodies and such structural and functional imbalances have consequences on the relationship between Agencies and Ministries in that they are less unbundled and far more powerful than might have originally been intended and in others the reverse is the case (Alexander and Agency Policy Review Team, 2002; Talbot, 2004). Other identified complications include

the perennial focus - coordination dichotomy - of new bodies created with a greater focus for a single function and matters of better coordination across closely related functions (Talbot, 2004; Trondal, 2014).

How coordination and integration influence the functions of Agencies, are debates that get mentioned in structural disaggregation narratives. This is associated with the 'multi-agency' or 'joined up government agenda' idea that dominates modern governance approaches. As Talbot, *et al.* (2004) observed, the growth and spread of agencies in various countries have had significant impact on issues of 'joined up government'. Although agencification is probably not responsible for this new emphasis on coordination, it has certainly contributed to it (Pollitt, 2003 Wettenhall, 2005; Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012). Furthermore, the division between 'policy and execution' or 'purchaser and provider' has been generally accepted as part of agency programmes, even though some have always denied this was the aim of agencies (Kemp, 1993).

The appointment of a Chief Executive can impact on the independence of agencies (Painter and Yew, 2012). The Chief Executive, who is solely responsible for a new Agency, is appointed from outside the traditional Civil Service ranks and this can affect accountability. Again, staged changes vary immensely and in some cases employees were removed from the Civil Service, such as in Jamaica and Tanzania whilst elsewhere, they remained fully within the civil service structure, as in the United Kingdom (Manning, 2001; Talbot, 2004). In addition, the issues on reporting arrangements for agencies also vary. This is especially true in cases such as finance and account auditing where formal reporting is a major requirement. Structural disaggregation varies considerably and as such is less universal, being influenced by contextual issues and interpretations (Talbot, 2004).

3.1.2. Autonomization

Government-agency relationships are underpinned by both legal and non-legal power, which inadvertently affects the extent of agency autonomy, or, conversely, the extent of government control (Tynne, 2004). Notably, both forms of power are fundamental - as the legal form embraces the agency roles; management of human and financial resources and the non-legal covers all aspects of agency life in one way or another. Just like other public law organisations, Agencies have legal power pursuant to a constitution and/ or statutes (including subordinate legislation), and they can receive this power by a process of either delegation or devolution, each having implications for their autonomy and control (Tynne, 2004:96). On delegation, the power delegated to an Agency is usually power that is vested in a Minister and related to specific role, a central personnel body (such as a Public Service Commission, for human resource matters) and a central financial body (such as Treasury for financial resource and administrative means) without reference to the legislature. This power can be withdrawn or revoked (Tynne, 2004). Notably, in such a situation, the delegator can continue to exercise power even though it has been delegated. What can be deduced from the above is that this represents a situation where there exists a weak form of Agency autonomy because of the existence of strong central control and management. Conversely, regarding delegated power, we have a situation where power is invested in an Agency by Constitution or Statue. Therefore, power is removed from the hands of Minister, personnel or financial body and the Agency can operate with a considerable degree of autonomy from Central or Ministerial control. Due to this type of arrangement, power can only be centralised by constitutional rearrangement. That is why it is argued in some academic literature that to critically examine the autonomy of Agencies, it is imperative to understand the difference between delegation and devolution. The significant task of any research on autonomy and agency is to determine where control lies in individual Agencies-in an

autonomy graph centralisation-delegation would be placed on the vertical axis and centralisation-devolution on the horizontal (Tynne, 2004).

Certainly, automatization is not entirely new. Autonomization is how much discretion organisations or individuals have in taking decisions, as well as how much they can be circumscribed by specific rules or their own normal standard operating procedures. However, in relation to Agencies and within this context, autonomization applies to issues of regulation within government, that is, how a separated-out, disaggregated organisation be subject to decision making by externally imposed rules and how much discretionary decisions they can make themselves. According to Verhoest *et al.* (2004), autonomy is the level of decision-making competency (discretion) of an organisation. Equally, there are two types of autonomy, located at strategic or operational level: managerial autonomy and policy autonomy. Managerial autonomy entails the right of an Agency to take decisions on managerial issues, concerning, for example, personnel and financial management independently without recourse to the parent Department or Ministries. This can occur at individual transactions or employees (operational) level or at the level of general rules where criteria apply regarding the use of these resources (strategic). Policy (implementation) autonomy implies the discretionary authority of Agencies to decide on certain aspects of the initiation and implementation of policies without particularly needing the approval of parent Departments or Ministries, e.g. prioritization of activities to be performed (operational), the delineation of the target group of the policy implementation, the quality and quantity of outputs and the policy instruments to be used or deployed (strategic).

Autonomy is also referred to as re-regulation and they have often been confused with decentralisation and independence. Talbot (2004) notes, whilst structural and regulation changes often go together, they are not the same because it is perfectly possible to have structurally separated organisations, which have equal, lesser or even greater levels of

regulation than their parent bodies. Regulation means the laid down standard operating procedures and rules within government on how public bodies must operate and function. The concept of de-regulating as a government policy, according to Osborne and Gaebler (1992) has come to be associated with structural change represented by agency-type initiatives (Behn, 2001) and wider decentralisations as well as disaggregations, (Hood *et al.* 1999). The arguments are that public organisations have been Weberian rule-based bureaucracy, which is ideal for creating fair and independent organisations in the past (Barzeley, 1992; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Denhardt, 1993). This is necessary considering the mountains of unnecessary 'red tape', which hinders efficient management of the public sector.

Therefore, it is assumed that the creation of Agencies should be closely followed by a significant amount of de-regulation because this will allow for the freeing up of new bodies from much of the superfluous accretions of decades of over-enthusiastic rule- makers (Talbot, 2004). Regarding Agency programmes, regulatory change has taken several forms ranging from personnel, finance purchasing, equality, to probity and ethics, etc.

In some cases, it might be freeing Agencies from rules imposed by specific regulatory bodies (e.g. Public Service Commission) and others from central Ministries and in some cases, both. In the case of TETFund for instance, the Federal Character Commission insists on the quota system for appointments, whilst the Wages and Salaries Commission determine and approve salaries and allowances of staff.

Despite the rhetorical discourses and narratives, regulation of public administration cannot easily be entirely abolished or even slimmed down beyond a certain point, without creating problems of accountability, probity and ethics (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Wilson, 1994; Pollitt, 2003). Moreover, no matter how hard governments want to effectively abolish or

strongly minimise regulation, they have the habit of resurfacing in other forms (Hood, *et al.* 1999). It can be the case that Agency creation leads to effectively greater regulation in some areas than before. A small Agency may have to conform to all sorts of regulatory arrangements which place a disproportionate burden on their management (Talbot, 1996; Alexander and Agency Peer Review Team, 2002), in much the same way as small businesses often complain that generic private sector regulations place a disproportionate burden on them. In the general context of the rising levels of audit and scrutiny of public bodies (Rener, 1997, cited in Hood *et al.* 1999), the creation of many separate organisations may increase the audit- burden - both for the organisations and for the auditors or inspectors (Hood *et al.*, 1999). Policy changes need to be viewed with caution because they are not always what they appear to be - in some cases de-regulation is less radical or at any rate far more problematic, than it appears at first sight (Talbot, 1997; Pollitt *et al.*, 1998). Finally, where there has been much deregulation, this has caused severe problems (Pollitt, 2004). On a lesser scale, in the UK, several cases of highly questionable management decisions - mostly related to 'de-regulated' parts of Public Service - came in for severe criticism from Parliaments (Public Accounts Committee, 1994). The issue of regulation in an Agency context is primarily to liberate management and allow more degree of control - to improve performance. The assumption is managerial freedoms will allow much greater prospects of improving performance, unencumbered by cumbersome rules. A more recent development is the notion of 'earned autonomy' (Behn, 2001), where agencies that demonstrate good performance are rewarded by greater de-regulation and increased autonomy. Some have argued that much de-regulation has not produced 'post-bureaucratic' organisations, which the authors call a deceptive variant - 'the cleaned bureaucracy' (Heckscher and Donnellon, 1994). In other words, the organisations are re-regulated - in simpler, leaner ways - rather than 'de-regulated' in the sense of abandoned regulation altogether as some of the extreme 'de-regulations' seem

to suggest. Arguably, in terms of their internal systems, agencies are 'cleaned bureaucracies' rather than 'post-bureaucratic' organisations.

Conversely, problems have been identified with issues of Agencies and autonomy. Research has established that formal autonomy given to Agency by laws and regulations at times differ from the actual autonomy that Agencies have or perceive to have (e.g. Verhoest *et al.* 2004; Yesikagit and Van Theil 2008). For example, Agencies are sometime curbed by the control of the parent Department, their Ministers or other Government actors. This control is about constraints imposed to influence the actual use of autonomy or influence Agency decisions by parent Ministers/Departments. Accordingly, control can be encompassing - guidance, control in a strict sense (monitoring) and evaluation of Agency actions. Indeed, the control of Agency by parent Ministries and Departments can be exercised in the form of ex-ante or post-ante, as well as mainly oriented on input or on results.

Verhoest *et al.* (2004) note that both controls may have their principal focus on the choice and use of inputs or the delivery of results but in actual practice they mostly appear in pairs (ex-ante on inputs and ex-post on results). Traditionally, the control of organisations tends to be mainly ex-ante and input-oriented with focuses explicitly on before the fact such as the formulation of detailed rules, regulations, standard operating procedures and approval requirements that give directions to actors in terms of the attainment of desire objective. In relation to this type of control, the Minister or Parent Departments have the right to veto or annul decisions by Agencies, based on risk assessment and performance oriented issues, (Wirth, 1986). The crucial focus on this form of control is on issues of legality and compliance with rules and regulations (Verhoest *et al.* 2004). On the contrary, the ex-post control emphasises whether the intended organisational goals and targets set in the first instance have been achieved by the Agency, and if there is the need for further interventions in terms of corrective future action. Objective setting, monitoring, evaluation, audit and

sanctions are the elements of the ex-post control. Possibly, ex-post control increases the performance of public sector organisations including Agencies.

Apart from the two forms of control mentioned previously, the government also exercises control through appointments, steering and evaluation of the senior management of Agencies and Board members (if it exists) and this is akin to a structural control. In addition, government can control agencies through both formal and informal contacts between the Agency Management and Administrative Principals. Structural control can also take the form of financial control, in the sense that the government can refuse to grant an agency financial resource or autonomy. From the above, agency autonomy is not clear cut, what exists are combination of a range of factors and trade-offs, principally influenced by contextual issues.

3.1.3. Contractualisation

Performance contracting is one of the key features of Agencies. It is important to note that Government - Agency relationships are frequently governed by a contract or similar sort of arrangement (Thynne, 2004). Performance contracting is about expectations, commitments, rewards and sanctions and these underline and influence their relationships in terms of accountability and control, which can affect the degree of autonomy of an agency (Greer, 1994:13-20; Greve, 2000; Lane, 2000). According to Lidbury and Petrie (1999) performance contracting is a way of setting targets for organisations and reforming on the activities of an agency, which is at times loose - that is, it does not necessarily mean a formal contract, but any self-generated, agreed or imposed set of performance targets for agencies, formulated into a specific agreement, contract plan, or statement of some sort. According to Thyne (2004) an analysis of the contracts could usefully be guided by at least three sets of questions as they are largely directed at the agency side of the relationship. They also raise important questions about the existence of important commitments on the part of a government. First,

what is specified contractually concerning the roles to be performed and the resources to be utilised by an agency? What methods, tools or strategies are to be adopted? What outputs and outcomes are expected? Second, what explanations and justifications are required in relation to the strategies, outputs and outcomes of role-performance and resource utilisation? How often are explanations and justifications expected? In what kind of detail, and in what form, are they to be presented? Third, what rewards, sanctions and related matters are prescribed as responses to the strategies, outputs and outcomes of role-performance and resource utilisation? What sorts of rewards are to be allocated? What kinds of sanctions could be imposed and by what means? What forms of rectification or restitution are to be sought in relevant situations? (Thyne, 2004). These questions are important to unpacking the various tensions and controversies that surround performance contracting - in terms of agency and government relationships. For example, if considered from a legal and non-legal power arrangement, some contracts are already included in statutory provisions that established the agency, whilst others are fluid and contingent on a range of issues including but not limited to intangible features of human interaction (see, e.g. Thyne, 2004; Dan, 2014).

This performance contract or agreement in some cases can be tightly worded and detailed agreements may be very close to a legal contract, at least in form if not substance. According to Peter Kemp with performance contracting, ' we are moving from a hierarchical system to a system in which the Minister and Chief Executive are in a quasi -contractual position, (cited in Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1990: 51). Similarly, Fortin and Van Hassel (2000) note that the idea of putting relationships within the public service between purchasers and providers, or parent Departments and Agencies as well as between Ministers and Chief Executives on contractual or quasi-contractual basis usually associated with performance has been seen to have become fashionable (Lane, 2000; OECD-PUMA, 1999).

Performance contracting is linked to Principal-Agent theory and the series of new institutional economics, which emphasise on creation of internal markets and the introduction of other market-type mechanisms and functionalities within the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). In fact, there are variations in the application of performance contracting in both public and private sectors, particularly in terms of it being legal or *ad hoc*. Talbot *et al.* (2000) argued that the absence of formal legal contract in some cases have resulted in defects in outcomes and delivery. Despite these observations, there are clearly no example of legal disputes between agencies and principal ministries when issues of poor performance have been identified, since legalistic agency performance contract/agreement, is a one-way contract - the purchaser (government) telling the provider (agencies) what they are expected to provide in performance terms. To Talbot (2004) Agency failure are most often subject of discussion, negotiation and eventual consensus rather than punitive; and where punitive measures are applied, it usually affects the Chief Executive or the Board.

The performance contracting is a management tool between superiors and subordinates in a Government - Agency relationship. For Agencies, some form of performance contract will usually form one basis of judgement regarding the Agency's performance by its parent Department or Minister or Stakeholders (Talbot, 2004). In previous Agency arrangement, performance contracts have never been crucial; it is the idea of purchaser-provider split, or Principal - Agency relationship. With the new Agency structure, contractual arrangements are linked to resources and results to be achieved; these are usually specified in terms of service delivery, outputs or outcomes but may also include measure of processes and even of resource utilization or inputs, (e.g. the analysis of UK agency targets in Talbot, 1996). There are variations in performance contracts, targets and those who set targets. For instance, Ministers or the Secretary of State usually sets UK targets. In the USA, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) mandates agencies to set their targets, but these are

then formally approved by both the Executive and Legislative branches. In Sweden, parent Ministries set targets, with specific measures left to the Agencies to resolve.

With some Agencies, there are no single 'principal' contracts. For instance, the constitutional arrangement in the USA means there are at least two principals - Congress and the Executive Office of the President. In countries like the UK and others that operate the Westminster – style government, there are usually several principals. These are only examples of the formal, managerial authorities usually other various bodies exist charged with regulation inside government, who set performance targets or performance parameters for Agencies. They do this, for example on matters such as equal treatment of personnel, proper handling of purchasing contracts, etc. In the case of Nigeria, there are bodies like the Bureau for Public Procurements, the Federal Character Commission, SERVICOM (Service Compact with all Nigerians) to mention but a few that perform similar roles. Therefore, as articulated by Talbot (2004) Agency target setting is a 'zero sum' power game between the various actors in the policy arena, (Ministers, parent Departments, the Agencies themselves, and Legislature and in some cases Inspectorates and Auditors).

The balance of power and the idea of target setting could vary over time, even with the same formal institutional setting. Performance and targets can be difficult to define. Sometimes, performance assumes a narrow economic sense - traditionally these are the three E's- Economy Efficiency and Effectiveness. Alternatively, this could represent Equality, Equity Evaluation, etc., (Pollitt, 2004; Talbot, 2004). In formal lineal models of public sector production, the sequence is often defined as inputs – processes – outputs - outcomes with many variations and additions. Arguably, the models of performance and production can focus on one or these elements (Pollitt, 2004; Talbot, 2004).

Based on pervasive growth of Agencies in developed and developing countries, the argument is that total government spending is consumed by state employees, when compared to traditional Ministries (Pollitt *et al.*, 2004). For instance, 75 per cent of the civil service in the United Kingdom are employees of Agencies, 30 per cent in Netherlands and almost 85 per cent in Sweden (OECD, 2002; Pollitt *et al.* 2004; Smullen, 2010). In 2003, an estimated proximal body in Central Government 'accounted for between 50 per cent and 75 per cent of public expenditure and public employment in OECD countries,' (OECD, 2003:5). In the last fifteen years, Countries such as Canada, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Tanzania, Thailand, Ghana, and the United Kingdom adopted agencification as a public administration model (Pollitt *et al.*, 2004). However, in Finland and United States of America, Agencies have been in existence for some time as key players in the administrative work of Central Government (Greeve 2000; Pollitt *et al.*, 2001; Schick, 2002; Pollitt and Talbot, 2004).

Despite disagreements on the rationale for their establishment, positive and negatives themes can-be identified from different literature, ranging from political, economic to social (Talbot and Caufield, 2002; Talierco 2004). Politically, the setting-up of Agencies lessens political interference, enhances specialisation as opposed to bureaucracies of large Ministries, creates partnership/ multi-Agency working and creates island of excellence compared to backward public administration (Pollitt *et al.*, 2004). Economically, Agencies create islands of income generation (collection of taxes and issuance of licences), help maintain public infrastructure, lead to downsizing of Civil Service and regulates public utilities (Pollitt *et al.*, 2004). Socially, Agencies bring public services closer to the citizens to encourage and facilitate user responsiveness and improve performance - that is service proximity (Pollitt *et al.,* 2004).

The above rationales need to be examined using 'context' narratives. Therefore, there are incoherencies, tensions, contradictions and ambiguities around the establishment of Agencies. Pollitt *et al.* (2004) note a single Agency reform may be fuelled by three, four or more of these motives simultaneously. For example, it can be advantageous to several groups (politicians, senior civil servants, professional experts, etc.), whilst at the same time, a reform may be triggered for ambiguous and/or contradictory purposes. Further, there are inconsistencies in adoption methods and processes. Pollitt *et al.* (2004) argue that structural separation is not clear cut, with contested levels of autonomy and multiple and contradictory aim and focus of the agency.

Blame shifting was identified in literature as a negative dimension of Agency. Mortensen (2016:2) claim that with autonomy there is tendency for blaming and/ or blame avoidance. Mortensen (2016) further argues that the way Agencies operate creates an open avenue for the political principals to point accusing fingers at the Agencies when policy interventions fail. This has been the case in developing countries where weak institutional capacities render Agency interventions very ineffective (Manning, 2001).

Other negative aspects identified in both the academic and official literature in relation to the establishment of Agencies are: (i) to pay off political allies and create an institutionalised power base for some party or faction (somewhat a patronage Den); (ii) to gain legitimacy by imitating an organizational fashion which is seen to be associated with modernization; (iii) to create a sense that modernisation is taking place, and (iv) to distance politicians from awkward or potentially unpopular activities, and enable them avoid responsibilities (Dunleavy, 1991; OECD, 2002: 7; Talbot and Caulfield, 2002; James 2003; Vos, 2003; Yamamoto, 2004). Table 2 below summarises other problems synonymous to Agencies and their interactions within the public sector.

Table 2: Externalities and Collateral Damage

Aspects	Challenges
Policy Lock-In	Are autonomous agencies undermining policy objectives by creating constituencies that will compel governments to maintain existing policies? Because Agencies are created, but rarely closed or merged, as such policy becomes what the agencies do, not what the government proposes. Consequently, there can be situations of unhealthy rivalry between agency and the parent ministry which is by statutory right responsible for a given policy domain. In situations where there are dysfunctional bureaucracies, which is often time reflected in the ineffectiveness of traditional ministries, agencies tend to dominate de facto policy making at the detriment of parent ministries. This could then lead to poor policy synchronicity and lack of cross functionality.
Policy Creep	Are autonomous Agencies adopting quasi-fiscal activities that stretch beyond the original policy intention of government? It has been argued that the autonomous status given to agencies can encourage them to engage in quasi-fiscal activities (e.g., fee-based services, special concessions to certain groups) that serve the same role as taxes and subsidies, and exceed the original policy intention of government.
Budget Balkanization	Are autonomous Agencies undermining the coherence of the budget? The argument is that an unchecked Agency creation can destabilize the budget in three ways. First, it can create an argument for earmarked funding, which undermines the strategic ability of government to shift funds to emerging priorities, thereby leading to budgetary rigidities and over-stretched funding. Second, it can create scenarios (a.k.a. "bleeding stump" arguments) in which government must provide additional resources or face the unthinkable — e.g., teachers on strike, nurses without jobs, etc. The arms-length nature of agencies makes "bleeding stump" arguments more likely since the imminent problem is less easily identified by the central agencies. Finally, an unchecked agency creation can create contingent liabilities for government by borrowing against assets or making other commitments.
Special privileges	Are autonomous Agencies distorting public sector incentives? To attract qualified staff, autonomous agencies are often given exceptions from the government personnel regime to offer higher salary scales as well as other attractive benefits. The uneven

	incentive structures within the public sector make it difficult to lure competent individuals to traditional ministries, while those who remain in the non-autonomous parts of the government become unmotivated or even resentful of those receiving better incentives and benefits in autonomous agencies.

Source: Manning and Matsuda (2000)

Spread of Agencies can be linked to the adoption of NPM reforms (James, 2003). Sometimes it is described as NPM-based agencification which, according to Smullen (2010), has been translated very differently in different political - administrative settings. Agencification and link to NPM is controversial with claims and counter claims. Some schools of thought claim that agencification has created new governance problems, e.g. fragmentation of the public sector-control and coordination (Bouckaert and Peters 2004), somewhat leading to what Pollitt *et al.* (2004) referred to as 'hollowed out' fragmented governments. Some argue that the lack of accountability creates democratic deficit (Flinders, 2001). In 2003, the OECD claimed that the creation of non-commercial bodies outside the core public service on *ad hoc* basis, led to administrative 'zoo' (OECD, 2003:9). The report points out that the approach reduces the transparency of government for the citizen, and may compromise oversight and accountability within government itself. Similarly, agencies are providing lucrative job opportunities for the favourites of those in power and in some instances even facilitating corruption. In Japan, for instance, those termed, 'decent from heaven' headed most of the Agencies created, thus undermining the thrust for Agency autonomy and recruitment of talented citizens (Yamamoto, 2004). Out of the 57 Chief Executives of Independent Administrative Institutions (IAIs) in Japan, only 7 came from non-governmental background with 42 of them coming from the Civil Service while 8 were retired Civil Servants (Yamamoto, 2004).

Further negative aspects of Agencies are that the command of technical skills and specialist knowledge gives them the ability that may result in 'captures' when they begin to run

Ministries - instead of the Ministries running them or Ministries becoming too strong by interfering in the running of the Agencies (Pollitt *et al.,* 2004). In Latvia, for instance, Ministries were found to be seriously short of the capacity to control the Agencies (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). In Canada, on the other hand, it was found that the first generation of special operating Agencies lacked sufficient autonomy (Aucoin, 1990). The freedom of the Independent Administrative Corporations (IAC) in Japan was circumscribed by the insistence of the Ministry of Finance on annual reviews of funding and by appointing IAC Chief Executives from Senior Civil Servants. (Yamamoto, 2004). In Tanzania also, the theoretical autonomy of Agencies was affected by cash flow shortage, and high handedness of the Executive (President and Secretary General) (Talbot and Caulfield, 2002). To Pollitt (2000) agencification idea is a rather complex structure of arguments about politics, policy and administrative solutions to perceived problems of democratic accountability, allocation efficiency and technical efficiency in public organisations. Reasons for spread of Agency reforms across the world are diverse, with multiple theories of Agency behaviour and management and organisational strategies (Pollitt *et al.*, 2004). Understanding of Agency can be explained form the point of context, since there are different politico-administrative traditions, cultures and legal systems in Countries, the stages and outcomes in state organisations and development are different (Verhoest *et al.,* 2012). Similarly, historical heritages such as colonialism, institutional culture and traditions, civil wars and financial crisis and governance structures (e.g. democratisation) influence the adoption of agency as a form of public governance (Verhoest, *et al*. 2012).

3.2. Summary

Agencies continue to dominate most public administration management and interventions in countries where traditional public administration models have failed to deliver public goods and services in a very efficient and effective way in line with the demands of the 21st century.

This assumption itself raises several fundamental questions, e.g. whether the so-called prescribed autonomy or even ministerial distancing is achievable or is the concept of administrative efficiency based on the theory of Principal Agent link. There are mixed results on the performance of Agencies in public sector management.

Nonetheless, there are some interesting claims about Agencies in Nordic Countries - that is Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, which point to a high degree of performance, balance in autonomy and in control in their politico-administrative systems (Hansen *et al.,* 2012). The reasons are that these Countries have traditionally practiced agencification extensively and there exists a high level of mutual trust between the political and administrative executives (Hansen *et al.*, 2012). In addition, it is often claimed that the Agency was invented in Sweden (Pollitt *et al..*, 2004; Smullen 2010). Also, Nordic Countries are relatively homogenous, have high economic equality, large universal welfare provision and an egalitarian culture founded on the social democratic principles. The case of Nordic Countries also raises fundamental questions such as: are solid institutional capacity necessary for the efficiency of Agencies or that the size of a Nation's impact on the efficiency of Agencies, or do Agencies function better in Countries that operate the social democratic economic models. Furthermore, terms such as strong institutions, state capacity, administrative capacity, the system of government (presidential versus parliamentary), legitimacy (democratic versus authoritarian regime), economic models (social democratic versus monetarist free market *laissez-faire*) and organisational ambiguity, to mention but a few, are often used in assessing the effectiveness of such agency. The questions raised above are in themselves pertinent to any scholarly work that intends to explore the operation of an agency.

This chapter identified that agencification agenda is a global phenomenon, as Agencies are now considered important to public administration and management. According to Trondal,

(2014: 545) "agencification" is high on the agenda of administrative policy makers for two decades, partly because of the New Public Management (NPM) wave. Two decades of NPM reforms made agencification phenomenon highly topical and it continues to attract considerable scholarly attention (Trondal, 2014: 545). Whilst not totally new, the rate at which they have become popular in public governance is striking. As such, international and regional bodies as well as national governments are continuously creating agencies. Despite a lack of universally agreed definition of agencies, it is accepted that agencies must have three key elements: structural disaggregation; performance contracting, and, autonomy which in themselves appear simple in nature, but are indeed complex. Questions are raised regarding the prescribed contextual issues (e.g. historical and legal jurisdictional differences as well as functions, (single or multi-functional) of agencies. This chapter is of utmost importance to this thesis, since one of the research questions is on the behaviour of the Tertiary Education Fund (TETFund) in Nigeria.

TETFund is an Agency that is under the Ministry of Education, Nigeria. As discussed in Chapter One, since 1945, there have been more than 12 public service review committees in Nigeria; each with a varying focus and remit in terms the structure, conditions, composition and operational methods. Each sought to efficiency and service delivery. The mid- and late-twentieth century reforms and inquiries into the public service in Nigeria were initiated under the military regime to explore the responsiveness of the civil service to the demands of the 20th century and beyond. Even since the return to democratic rule in May 29, 1999, the civil service continues to undergo gradual and systematic reforms and restructuring. The Dotun Phillips Reform Panel of 1986 (whose recommendations were implemented in 1988), set the tone for the agencification agenda in Nigeria, as it recommended that all parastatals, due to their failures, should be converted to departments and agencies of their current supervising ministries, with set objectives and targets. Consequently, the Tertiary Education Trust Fund

(TETFund) was established by Education Tax Fund Act no. 17, (2003) and the Education Tax Cap. E4 laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004) -now repealed and replaced with Tertiary Education Trust Fund Act 2011- against a backdrop of neglect, as seen in: the deteriorating educational infrastructure and structures; lack of facilities and infrastructure required for teaching and research; inadequate funds for training and staff development; low morale of staff working in the sector; decline in the quality of service delivery; falling standard of education, poor remunerations; poor quality output; high turnover of personnel, and, the general unrest in the sector as a result of strikes by both students and staff. The principal mandate of the agency is to use funding and project management for the rehabilitation, resuscitation and consolidation of public tertiary education in the country at both Federal and State levels.

The next chapter discusses the methods used for this research and includes the description of the case (TETFund), case study research methods, methodological discussions and the data collection methods and strategies.

91

Chapter Four

Research Methods and Design

4.0. Introduction

In Chapter Three, the author discussed the concept of agencification, definitions and functions of agencies and explored the key elements –autonomy, structural disaggregation and contractualisation-identified in academic literature and policy documents as fundamental to the operation of agencies. It highlighted that agencies have become widespread around the world, adopted by nation states and international organisations, as semi-autonomous administrative bodies. In addition, it emphasised that agencies have been introduced differently Country to Country and have not followed any 'standardised model' or 'prescribed framework', due to issues such as interpretational vagaries, definitional inconsistencies and contextual variations in implementation. The success of the agencification agenda is equally different across the board.

Social science research differs from research in the natural sciences and draws on various long-established traditions. It is concerned with people, their life context and with philosophical questions relating to the nature of knowledge and truth (epistemology), values (axiology) and being (ontology) which underpin human judgment and activities (Somekh *et al.*, 2005). Informed by the research questions, this research adopts a qualitative research method. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2011), 'qualitative research is difficult to define clearly. It has no theory or paradigm that is distinctively its own, nor does qualitative research have a distinct set of methods or practices that are entirely its own' (cited in Ormston *et al.,* 2014:2). Thus, Ormton *et al.* (2014), note that qualitative research is a very broad church and includes a wide range of approaches as well as methods found within different research discipline. Flick (2009) observes that, 'at a general level, qualitative

research is often described as a naturalistic, interpretative approach, concerned with exploring phenomena 'from the interior (cited in Ormton *et al.*, 2014:3).

This chapter provides an explanation of research design and approaches used in this research. The discussion in the chapter covers philosophical underpinnings of social research, the different paradigms, the choice of single case study method, and the data collection methods.

4.1. Research Methodology

According to Farrelly (2013), the choice of a research method is influenced by many factors such as the researchers' purview of the world, the research question and the research topic. Whilst this might appear simple, it is far more complex as the different research approaches are underpinned by different theoretical frameworks and understandings. However, before delving into further details about this, it is important to examine what research is, to provide a meaningful analysis of the various research paradigms. In both popular and academic discourse, research is defined differently, influenced by the various ways in which the term is deployed in practical sense. Knowledge inquiry, defining and redefining problems, formulating hypotheses or suggesting solutions, scientific and systematic search for information, making deductions and reaching conclusions, organizing and evaluating data, verifying and evaluating knowledge, formulating and testing hypothesis, construction and deconstruction of theories, scientific investigation and discovery are examples of terms that have been used to capture the focus of scientific or applied research as the case may be. Research can be said to be a logical and systematic search for new and useful information on a topic, investigation of finding solutions to scientific and social problems through objective, rational and systematic analysis (Rejasekar *et al.*, 2013:1). Also, Bhattacherjee (2012) note that research is scientific when it contributes to a body of science and deploys a scientific method, and argues that research contributes to existing knowledge, which in turn permits

and consequently results into advancement in society. Howell (2013) observes that research involves the relationship between the individual undertaking the investigation and the environment being researched, previous research and the thoughts and analyses of others. Therefore, research has considerable significance, e.g. influencing government policies - policy formulation, implementation and evaluation to the study of society itself - societal relations, seeking answers to a range of existing problems, new developments, dynamic alteration to society, etc. The various objectives of research can thus be summarised as follows: (1) to discover new facts, (2) to analyse an event or process or phenomenon to identify the cause and effect relationship, (3) to analyse an event or process or phenomenon to identify the cause and effect relationship, (4) to develop new scientific tools, concepts and theories to solve and understand scientific and non-scientific problems, (5) to find solutions to scientific, non-scientific and social problems, and, (6) to overcome or solve the problems occurring in our everyday life (Rejasekar *et al.*, 2013: 1).

There are different types of scientific research: exploratory, explanatory, descriptive and applied. Explanatory research focus on seeking explanations for observed phenomena, problems or behaviour, whilst exploratory research deliberates new areas of inquiry, where the goals of the research are to scope out the magnitude or extent of a phenomenon, problem, or behaviour (Bhattacherjee, 2012). It seeks to generate some initial ideas (or suppositions), explore conventional presuppositions about that phenomenon, and finally test the feasibility of an undertaking through more extensive study regarding that phenomenon (Bhattacherjee, 2012). For descriptive research, the idea is to make careful observations and detailed documentation of a phenomenon of interest to the researcher. Applied research primarily seek out solutions to an immediate problem facing a society, government, and industry or business organization. It is more practical in approach (Bhattacherjee, 2012). The ideas on research raised so far, demonstrates and highlights the rather broad scope and aspect as well

as nature of research itself. In short, research is used for different purposes depending on the phenomena being investigated. This research is both exploratory and explanatory; this can be garnered from the research question, aim, objectives and research findings and the analysis.

Methodology is usually defined as the philosophical stance or worldview and the science of studying how research is done scientifically (Punch, 2005). It is an account of the various steps undertaken by a researcher in dealing with a research problem, as well as justifying the logic of research approach. It is different to research methods, which describe those methods/techniques that are used for carrying out research. Research methods or techniques refer to the approaches researchers use to address the research questions- that is data collection methods.

Methodology is the philosophy of methods that encompasses both the epistemology and the ontology. According to Rejasekar *et al.* (2013:5), 'research methodology is a systematic way to solve a problem. It is a science of studying how research is to be carried out. Essentially, the procedures by which researchers go about their work of describing, explaining and predicting phenomena are called research methodology. It is also defined as the study of methods by which knowledge is gained. Its aim is to give the work plan of research'. According to Kothari (2004:7) research methodology is a way to systematically solve the research problem and a science of studying how research is done scientifically. Kothari (2004:7) reiterate that the domain of research methodology is about the need for researchers to understand the assumptions underlying various techniques, and the need for them to know the criteria by which they can decide that certain techniques and procedures will be applicable to certain problems and others will not. For a researcher, the choice to select a method, such as qualitative, quantitative, cross sectional, longitudinal, case study, etc, is largely influenced by the research question, availability of data and, at times, the researcher's

own skills and preferences (Gilbert, 2008). Research questions may be considered from different angles. From an external point of view, they should address socially relevant issues. Answering research questions should lead to progress- through for example, providing new insights or new suggestions for how to solve problem under study. A research question should be suitable for study through the methods of social research (Flick, 2011: 24). A research question should be formulated in such a way you can apply one or more of the available methods for answering them- if necessary after adapting them or modifying them (Flick, 2011: 24). Important qualities of research questions are their specificity and their focus. That is, you should formulate your research questions so that they are (a) clear, and (b) goal directed, to facilitate the exact decisions to be made concerning who or what should be investigated. Research question define not only exactly what to study and how, but also which aspects of an issue may remain excluded (Flick, 2011: 23-24). The research question is the roadmap for research in that: it helps to guide literature to be examined, who the focus of the inquiry should be, what kinds of questions might most usefully be asked in the research instruments (Becker and Bryman, 2004:6).

The research questions themselves are central to the outcome, whether they are prescribed or whether they unfold during the project as they help structure the project in terms of giving it direction and coherence, limit the project by showing its boundaries, maintain researcher focus, provide the framework for writing up and point to the data that will be needed (Punch, 2005; Gilbert, 2008). This research is qualitative in nature. Qualitative methods' is a broad term that can be applied to a range of research approaches that have their theoretical origins in a range of disciplines including anthropology, sociology, philosophy, social psychology and linguistics (Murphy *et al.*, 1998). According to Murphy *et al.* (1998) the field of qualitative research is a highly contested one in which there is extensive disagreements about the nature, purpose, status and practice of its methods.

Qualitative methods were used in this research, and the decision was influenced by the research question. According to Gilbert (2008) qualitative research designs, creates an account or description, investigates aspects of social without numerical scores or quantitative measurements. It is concerned with exploring the subjective meaning through which people interpret the world, the different ways in which reality is constructed contexts. It is often based upon interpretivism, constructivism and inductivism, and this is discussed in more detail below (Sumner, 2006; 249). Qualitative research is concerned with qualitative phenomenon involving quality (Rejasekar *et al.*, 2013:5). Some of the characteristics of qualitative research/method are: it is non-numerical, descriptive, applies reasoning and uses words, its aim is to get the meaning, feeling and describe the situation, Qualitative data cannot be graphed, it is exploratory and It investigates the why and how of decision-making (Rejasekar *et al.*, 2013:5). Qualitative research is characterized by its aims, which relate to understanding some aspect of social life, and its methods which (in general) generate words, rather than numbers, as data for analysis (Green, 2007). Merriam (2009:13) note that 'qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, that is, how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world'. To Denzin and Lincoln (2005:3) 'qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world'. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them'. These are more reasons why qualitative research is to be considered

as a form of phenomological research both in its approach and methodological philosophical underpinnings.

Also, qualitative research aims to understand the experiences and attitudes and answer the What? How? and, Why? of a phenomenon rather than how many or how much, as answered by quantitative methods. As such, it is aimed at understanding some aspect of social life and its ways which (in general) generate terms, rather than numbers, as data for analysis. In the context of this research, the aim is to understand the behaviour of a New Public Management Agency type and qualitative methods offers the best approach to addressing the research aim and question.

It is important to consider the various philosophical underpinnings and paradigms associated with research. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994: 107) paradigms are basic belief systems based on ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions. The qualitative paradigm is based on interpretivism (Farrelly, 2013). Tracy (2013:38) sees paradigms as preferred ways of understanding reality, building knowledge, and gathering information about the world. Thus, it is inevitable that the, 'researcher's paradigm can differ based on ontology (the nature of reality), epistemology (the nature of knowledge), axiology (the values associated with areas of research and theorizing), or methodology (strategies for gathering, collecting, and analyzing data,' (Tracy, 2013:38, see also Howell, 2013). There is the positivist paradigm (also referred to as *realist or functional paradigm*) which according to Becker and Bryman (2004) is a school of thought that posits that social life can and should be studied according to the canons of the scientific methods with emphasis on directly observable entities. The positivist research believes that there is one single reality which is already out there in the world waiting to be discovered by researchers (Howell, 2013; Tracy, 2013). Farrelly (2013) notes that it is a paradigm that tilts towards quantitative research.

Tracy (2013) believes researchers, who use this paradigm, 'strive for research to mirror reality – to represent clearly what is being examined'. Porta and Keating (2008:23) reiterate that within the positivist school, the world exists as an objective entity, outside of the mind of the observer, and in principle, it is knowable in its entirety. Therefore, the assumption within this school, is that the researcher can be separated from the object of his/her research and therefore observe it in a neutral way and without affecting the observed objects (Porta and Keating, 2008:23). Howell (2013) postulates that positivism is based on aspects of empiricism and identifies how this involves an adherence to natural science perspectives of reality and methodology.

There is also the neo-positivist and post-positivist which has some similarities with positivist, but they emphasise that although there could be what is called the reality out there, yet it is partial. Therefore, within the neo-positivist and post-positivist, the assumptions on objective reality are more relaxed. Within this school of thought, reality is still considered to be objective (external to human minds), however it only imperfectly knowable (Porta and Keating, 2008:24). As such the positivist trust in causal knowledge is modified by the admission that some phenomena are not governed by causal laws, but at best, by probabilistic ones (Porta and Keating, 2008:24). Tracy (2013) note that post positivist claims that human researcher and their methods are laden with weaknesses and bias, hence capturing the reality out there is an impossible project. Post-positivist paradigm claims that the approach should be about limiting or eliminating errors in research processes by staying objective. According to Howell (2013), the methodology for the post- positivist position is about falsifying standing scientific laws and the ontology concerned with criticising existing reality.

The interpretative paradigm (constructivist or constructionist) position differs both in methods and methodological underpinning to the positivist and they question the idea of objective reality (Tracy, 2013). They argue that knowledge and reality are constantly

99

negotiated, produced and constructed within the world, shaped by situations, circumstances or even cultural interpretations and understandings (see, e.g. Becker and Bryman, 2004; Porta and Keating, 2008; Farrelly, 2013). Therefore, constructivist researchers believe there is no one reality, but multiple realities and truths which are usually influenced by one's on perception of reality (Farrelly, 2013). Events, situation etc., are socially constructed and are subject to constant changes. That is why in research in the social constructionist approach it is said that the investigator, and the object of study, are interactively linked (that is they co-exist), so that findings are mutually created within the context of the situation, which consequently shapes the inquiry methods as well as outcomes. On the epistemological level, there is no access to reality independent of our minds they argue (Farrelly, 2013). This paradigm is based on interpretivism, and the aim is to go out and discover reality rather than if there is a reality somewhere. Some argue that interpretivists can draw from hermeneutics, which aims at a holistic understanding (Tracy, 2013). A qualitative method of research is often associated with such epistemological stance.

The critical paradigm is associated with the work of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse (Howell, 2013). The critical paradigms challenge preconceived ideas about what is considered normal and natural- it is about questioning the *status quo ante* (Howell, 2013). The central idea of critical paradigm is how it is important to explore events from the lens of social and historical processes, and according to Howell (2013) that is why this paradigm is defined as historical realism.

Postmodern/ poststructuralist perspective is also considered part of the critical paradigm which draws attention to issues of power relations in the society. According to Tracy (2013) the post-modern paradigm to knowledge is different to that of modern scholar, in that they are more dispersed, unstable and plural. To Howell (2013), post-modernism is a form of

scepticism. It is an approach that considered issues of domination, self-subordination as well as avenues for resistance and chances. The post-modern perspective questions the idea of totalizing truths and certainty; reject grand theories and master narratives (Tracy, 2013). Tracy (2013) postulates that post-modern researchers view reality and knowledge as fragmented, multiple, situated, and multi-faceted. On these premise, reality is thought to be nearly impossible to know or represent. According to Howell (2013), modernism and aspects of structuralism relate to positivism whereas postmodernism may correspond with aspects of idealist phenomenology, critical theory, constructivism and participatory paradigms of inquiry. Scholars associated with this school of thoughts are Levi-Strauss, Jacques Derrida, Micheal Foucault, Baudrillard, etc., (Howell, 2013).

Method is associated with a variety of theoretical perspectives and paradigms; for instance, qualitative research uses a range of methods to focus on the meanings and interpretation of social phenomena and social processes contexts in which they occur (Sumner, 2006: 249). According to Rejasekar *et al.* (2013:5) 'research methods are the various procedures, schemes and algorithms used in research'. All the methods used by a researcher to gather information during a research study are termed as research methods. They are essentially planned, scientific and strive to be value-neutral. They include theoretical procedures, experimental studies, numerical schemes, statistical approaches, etc. Research methods help us collect samples, data and find a solution to a problem. Particularly, scientific research methods call for explanations based on collected facts, measurements and observations and not on reasoning alone (Kothari, 2004). They accept only those explanations, which can be verified by experiments'.

Qualitative research is not a single set of theoretical principles, a single research strategy or single method (Silverman, 1993). According to Punch (2005: 134), qualitative research

methods are complex, often changing and contested field of multiple methodologies and research practices. This can be linked to the fact that it developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries across a range of disciplines, based on varied and sometimes conflicting philosophical and theoretical bases, including cultural anthropology, interpretative sociologies (such as symbolic interactionism), phenomenology and, more recently, hermeneutics, critical theory, feminism, post-colonial theory, cultural studies, post-structuralism and post-modernism (see e.g. Moriarty, 2011:2). Therefore, qualitative research is not a single entity, but an umbrella term, which encompasses enormous variety, (Punch, 2005). Consequently, this diversity often leads to differences and disagreements regarding the nature of qualitative research, paradigms, the role of the researcher, and the use of various methods and the methods for analysis of data, (Punch, 2005:134; Sumner, 2006: 249). The core characteristics of qualitative research have been identified thus: (1) aims which are directed at providing an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social world of research participants by learning about their social and material circumstances, their experiences, perspectives, and histories; (2) samples that are small in scale and purposively selected on the basis of salient criteria; (3) data collection methods which usually involve close contact between the researcher and the research participants, which are interactive and developmental and allow for emergent issues to be explored; (4) data which are very detailed, information rich and extensive; (5) analysis which is open to emergent concepts and ideas and which may produce detailed description and classification, identify patterns of association or develop typologies and explanations, and, (6) outputs which tend to focus on the interpretations of social meaning through mapping and 're-presenting' the social world of participants (cited in Moriarty, 2011: 2-3). According to Flick (2011:12), 'Qualitative research sets itself other priorities. Qualitative research is not modelled on measurement as found in the natural sciences. Qualitative research addresses issues by using one of the

following three: it aims (a) at grasping the subjective meaning of issues from the perspectives of the participants, (b) latent meanings of a situation are in focus, (c) social practices and the life world of the participants are described. The aim is less to test what is known (e.g. existing theory or hypothesis) than to discover new aspects in the situation under study and to develop hypotheses or a theory from these discoveries. Therefore, the research situation is not standardised; rather it is designed to be as open as possible'.

On the methods used in qualitative research, at times in combination, are those which are open-ended (to explore participants' interpretations) and which allow the collection of detailed information in a relatively close setting. A key advantage of qualitative methods in exploratory research is the use of open-ended questions to probe, which equally gives participants/ interviewees the opportunity to respond in their own words, rather than forcing them to choose from fixed responses, as in quantitative methods. With the open-ended questions, comes the opportunity to evoke responses that are: meaningful and culturally salient to the participant/interviewee, unanticipated by the researcher and rich and explanatory in nature. This provides a rich data set and context for the research. Also, qualitative methods allow the researcher the flexibility to further probe initial participant responses and raise further questions around the why or how of the phenomenon under investigation. It is therefore imperative for the researcher to listen carefully to what participants say, engage with them according to their individual personalities and styles, and use investigative questioning to encourage them to elaborate on their answers.

The data collection methods and techniques in qualitative research include in-depth interviewing, ethnography, participant observation, case studies, life histories, discourse analysis, focus groups, participatory action research, and conversational analysis, to mention but a few. Qualitative research offers an in-depth detailed understanding and interpretation of

situations or events (Sumner, 2006). However, qualitative research is accused of lacking rigour of quantitative research in that it produces 'soft data' that is subjective and difficult to replicate, because it is often based on small sample sets- which is difficult to generalise (Sumner, 2006). Despite this criticism, the selection of a qualitative research design for this specific research project is based on the research aims and objectives, research questions and the nature of this research, this is done with the knowledge that each method has its own shortcomings. This research complimented the qualitative data gathered with other sources such as documents, academic literature and data from other research projects that have been done on agencification – to triangulate the data.

4.2. Case Study Method

Case study research has become in social and scientific inquiry, used in both qualitative and quantitative forms of research (Casey *et al.*, 2013). Case study research has definitional controversies. The problem with the term 'case study' is that it is not used in a standardised manner and the use of the term has overlapped substantially with other methods - such as ethnography, participant observation, fieldwork, qualitative research and life history over time, as well as its deployment in research inquiry which is quantitative in nature (Hammersley and Goom,2006:1). Problem with defining case study arise from its usage in various fields and disciplines (e.g. sociology, anthropology) (Moses and Knutsen, 2007; Simons, 2009). It is defined as an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives, of the complexity and uniqueness of a project, policy, institution, programme or system, in a 'real-life context'. It generates an in-depth understanding and knowledge and/or inform policy development, professional practice and civil or community actions (Simons, 2009). Also, it is a detailed examination of one setting or a single subject, a single depository of documents or one event (Bogdon and Biklen, 1992). However, Yin (2003:13-14) considers the case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (or problem) within its

104

real-life context, when boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clear. According to Bhattacherjee (2012), case study research is an in-depth investigation of a problem in one or more real-life settings, (which are sometime called case sites) over an extended period, and it can either be positivist in nature, (for hypothesis testing), or interpretative (for theory building). A case study provides the opportunity for the research to discover a wide variety of social, cultural, and political factors potentially related to the phenomenon of interest that may not be known in advance (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Indeed, case study be an umbrella terms for a family of research methods having in common the decision to focus an inquiry around an instance (Adelman *et al.*, 1984: 94). It is an enquiry which uses multiple sources of evidence to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evidence (Johnson, 1994: 20).

According to Keddie (2006), a case study is an approach that uses the in-depth investigation of one or more examples of a current social phenomenon, by utilizing a variety of sources of data. In addition, a 'case' can be an individual person, an event, or that of a social activity group, organisation or institution. It can either be a single case, (for example, a community study or a 'socio-biography' of a member of a deviant sub-culture), or multiple, (possibly quite large) of cases, (for example, in the analysis of the conflict behaviour of different types of work groups or different organisations) (Keddie, 2006). The main thrust of a case study can be descriptive, exploratory or explanatory (Yin, 2003) and the data are usually more detailed, varied and extensive (Neuman, 2006). Indeed, case studies play a key part in policy research because they are frequently undertaken to provide examples of good practice in the delivery of a specific policy or programme; they may also be undertaken as part of an evaluation project, providing examples of the impact of a policy (Keddie, 2006). A case study uses the logic of analytics, instead of enumerative induction (Neuman, 2006).

According to Vaughan (1992), case studies help researchers connect the micro-level, or the actions of individual people, to the macro-level or large-scale social structure and processes. Nisbet and Watt (1984:73) note that case study is not simply an example or an anecdote but involves systematic collection of evidence.

Bhattacherjee (2012) noted that the decision to use a case study by a researcher is contingent upon four key questions: (1) is this the right method to use?; (2) what is the appropriate unit of analysis for a case study?; (3) should the researcher use a single case study or multiple case design?; and, (4) what sort of data collection method should be used in case study? These questions are pertinent, as they provide the scope for the research and give the researcher the opportunity to identify different variables necessary for the investigation the unit of analysis. In the context of this research, the case study method is considered appropriate for several reasons. Firstly, this research is exploratory in nature and as such it provides the opportunity to answer the why and how questions, in relation to TETFund; these are relevant to addressing the research question. To Bhattacherjee (2012) the case study method is appropriate for exploratory studies where the experiences of participants and the context of actions are critical, as well as for studies aimed at understanding complex, temporal processes (why? and how? of a phenomenon) rather than factors or causes (what?). As a method, it is well-suited for studying complex organizational processes that involve multiple participants and interacting sequences of events, such as organizational change and large-scale technology implementation projects (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Secondly, it offers the opportunity to acquire meaningful, robust and rich data on issues and problems of agency. Therefore, as a method, it provides a rich and deeper understanding of a phenomenon - in this case the concept of agencification. Thirdly, it offers an opportunity for triangulation. Bhattacherjee (2012) note that the use of case study provides an opportunity for the researcher to use a range of data collection methods and techniques, which offer greater

opportunity to the researcher to triangulate or validate observed data by comparing responses of the interviewees.

Basey (2002: 115-120) set out seven stages in case study research: (1) identifying the research as an issue, problem or hypothesis; (2) asking research questions (3) drawing up ethical guidelines, (4) collecting and storing data (5) generating and testing analytical statements, (6) interpreting or explaining the analytical statements, and (7) deciding on the outcome and writing the case study report. This thesis has followed the seven stages suggested by Basey (2002).

In academic research, it has been identified that there are two types of case study: single and multiple case studies. The use of single case studies may be appropriate under the following circumstance: (1) the case is unique and as such there is no need conducting additional cases; (2) the scale of the research is such that undertaking additional cases would mean sacrificing depth to achieve breadth; and (3) there are few examples relevant to the enquiry and other potential cases are inaccessible. The choice of using a single case study for this thesis is based on the fact the research questions aims to examine the behaviour of an NPM agency- in this case TETFund, as well as the impact of NPM on a developing nation and on its public sector, in this case, Nigeria. The researcher believes using a multiple case studies would impact on the outcome- as the different agencies within Nigeria operate under separate mandates and were set up for different reasons.

Case study research has often been criticised because its findings are not generalisable, in particular single case studies (Goom *et al.,* 2006). It is argued that case study is about developing knowledge on a topic area or event, and that generalisation does not necessarily apply (Stake, 2006). As Lincoln and Guba (2006) argue that the only generalisation is that there is no generalisation. This argument says that there is no need to call for generalisation

in all cases of research, and that this is usually informed by the scope of the research in the first instance. It is also argued that the scope of qualitative research is not about generalisation but rather a method of inquiry that seeks to understand in detail what is being studied by the research. Therefore, generalizability can usually be established through additional studies (Bhattacherjee, 2012). In addition, as Silverman (2000) adds that purposive sampling (as used for this research) helps to provide potential for generalisation. The researcher believes that this research, although specific to TETFund can be generalised because the nature of it public sector reforms in Nigeria. The strength of single case study research on in-depth understanding of phenomenon, impressed on the researcher to adopt this method, based on the research aim and objectives. The need to understand the organisational behaviour (in this case- agency behaviour) offers a more plausible reason for using a single case study. This case study will focus on understanding the dynamics present within a single setting which for this research is TETFund. Through data analysis, the researcher aims to develop theoretical positions on agencification particularly in a developing country setting. As such the main aim is not to generalise, but to provide knowledge that is transferable to the study of agencies in developing countries. Case study research is a valuable approach to management research and it provided the potential for rich data and in-depth analysis of real situations, phenomenon and events.

4.3 Data Collection

Since case studies are empirically omnivorous, data collection is typically multi-method and multi-source. This research used semi-structured interviews and documents. Interviewing is a method of data collection, information or opinion gathering that specifically involves asking a series of questions. According to Gary (2006) an interview is a conversation between people in which one person has the role of researcher. The choice of interview in a research will depend on the focus of that research. Interviews are associated with both quantitative

and qualitative social research and are often used alongside other methods. Although interviews can be generally defined and have some commonality of meaning, they can vary enormously in terms of the context, or setting, in which they are carried out, the purpose they serve, as well as how they are structured and conducted, and this gives rise to many different types of interviews (Davies, 2006), ranging from structured to unstructured, (Patton, 1990, Neuman, 2006). Also, interviews are described in different ways as a meeting or a dialogue between people where personal and social interaction occur, (Davies, 2006), 'guided conversations,' Rubin and Rubin (1995) and conversations 'with a purpose,' (Burgess 1982). Similarly, research interviews are based on the conversations of everyday life - with structure and purpose that are defined and controlled by the researcher. According to Kvale (1996), interviews allow people to convey to others a situation from their own perspective and in their own words. There is no common procedure for research interviews, but an interview investigation can be outlined in seven method stages: thematising, designing the study so that it addresses the research questions, the interview itself, transcribing, analysing, verification, and reporting. The research interview is characterized by a methodological awareness of question forms, a focus on the dynamics of interaction between interviewer and interviewee, and also a critical attention to what is said, (Kvale, 1996). Interviews provide an avenue to access people's perceptions, meanings, definitions of situations, and constructions of reality (Punch, 2005). In case study research, interview is one of the most important sources of information (Yin, 2003). According to Cohen and Manion (1997), the interview can serve a number of distinct purposes. First, it can be used as the means of gathering information about a person's knowledge, values, preferences and attitudes. Secondly, it can be used to test out a hypothesis or to identify variables and their relationships. Thirdly, it can be used in conjunction with other research techniques such as surveys, to follow up issues. Arguably, interviews are also preferable to questionnaires where questions are either open-ended or

109

more complex, or where the logical order of questions is difficult to predetermine. Whether an interview is successful in eliciting the range and depth of answers required will depend to a large extent on the skills of the interviewer. Essentially, semi-structured interview is the favoured approach, where there is a need to attain highly personalised data and there are opportunities for probing further issues that come up during an interview. The research uses the semi-structured interview as it allowed for both follow-up and also probing of the responses to which enriched or clarify the qualitative aspects of the data gathered. Semi-structured interviews are non-standardised and are often used in qualitative analysis. The order of questions may also change, depending on which direction the interview takes. Indeed, additional questions may be asked, including some which were not anticipated at the start of the interview as new issues arise, (Gary, 2006).

The semi-structured interview allows for probing of views and opinions where it is desirable for respondents to expand on their answers. This is vital when a phenomenological approach is being taken. That is, where the objective is to explore subjective meanings that respondents ascribe to concepts or events. Such probing may also allow for the diversion of the interview into new pathways, which were not originally considered as part of the interview, help towards meeting the research objectives (Gary, 2006; 216). Accordingly, data obtained from semi-structured interviews is generally rich and in depth, giving the researcher a fuller understanding of the informants' perspective on the topic under investigation, and the reasons behind the views and opinions expressed (Simons, 2009).

The use of semi-structured interview in case study research allows the researcher to explore the 'why' questions which will in turn enrich the data. Yin (2003) noted that in most situations, case study interviews must be open-ended in nature, so that the researcher can ask respondents about the facts of the matter as well as their opinions about events. The researcher believes that the use of probes, prompts and a flexible questioning style that semi-

110

structure interviews provide, (both in terms of the ways in which questions are asked and the order in which they are delivered), will give the researcher a great opportunity to explore and encourage respondents to give their detailed views on the issues raised or mentioned in the process of interviewing. According to Henn *et al.,* (2006), the use of probes and prompts in qualitative interviews enable the researcher and the respondent to enter into a dialogue about the topic in question, and this can be helpful in that the researcher and the respondent are given the opportunity to query questions and answers, and to verify that they have a shared understanding of meaning. In this sense Yin (2003) argued that this will turn the respondents into 'informants', thus making them crucial to the success of the case study. By using semi-structured interviews, respondents are also encouraged to provide examples in order to ground their narrative.

The interviewees included stakeholders, beneficiaries, official and staffs of the Fund. The interviewees were contacted by phone and the details of the research forwarded to them afterwards. The interviewees were asked to pick the time convenient for the interviews. Initially, it was anticipated that the number of interviewees will be 30, however 33 people were interviewed. For some of the interviewees, the interviews took place in their own offices, and for others it was done via the telephone. All interviews were recorded with the participants' permission and transcribed *verbatim*. The interviews ranged from 1 hour to 1 hour 30 minutes. This was to ensure accuracy of reportage of the interviews, add to the veracity of the reporting. The recording provided an opportunity for the researcher also to take notes. This provided the researcher with an avenue to concentrate on the interviewees' answers and prompt effectively (Bryman, 2008; Simons, 2009). Recordings are essential for accurate transcription as they provide the researcher the opportunity to re-listen to the interview in order to review and highlight points missed during the first time of listening.

The interviews were conducted in line with the requirements of the Northumbria University ethical guidelines. The interviewees were advised in advance of the issues to be addressed in the interview and the ethics form and consent form was sent to them in advance. The researcher provided the interviewees with an information sheet detailing the aims of the research and the structure the interview will take, before actually conducting the interview. Before the interview, the interviewees were asked whether they were still willing to take part in the interview and informed that they had right to withdraw their participation. In addition, to been provided with a consent form they were supplied with a summary of the research aims and objectives and an introductory letter from the researcher's university. In addition, the privacy right of the interviewees was explained to each of them as they are also of paramount importance to the researcher. Most importantly, the interviewees were assured that the information gleaned from the interviews will be anonymised and confidentiality will be maintained in terms of disclosure, autonomy; respect the rights of individual, beneficence; doing good, non-maleficence; not doing harm, and justice; particularly equity are key principles of ethics in research (Munn and Drever, 1991; Gillham, 2000). Everyone who participates in a research study should have freely consented to participation, without being coerced or unfairly pressurized. This means they should be well- informed about what participation entails and reassured that declining will not affect any services they receive. While written consent may in some situations frighten the individuals you are talking to, you should at the very least obtain verbal consent. Confidentiality allows for the protection of the identity of the person from whom a researcher gathers information. If collected, the identity of the participants must be protected at all times and not be left lying around in notebooks or un-protected computer files (Gillham, 2000).

4.3.1. Sampling

Sampling refers to strategies for assuring that you have the 'right' cases in your study (Flick, 2011:77). All research including qualitative research involves sampling (Punch, 2005). Sampling is a technique used to select groups from a wider population and this is done because it is not usually possible to include the whole populations in the research, (Davidson, 2006). It is important to note that qualitative and quantitative researchers approach sampling differently (Neuman, 2006). However, it has been noted that qualitative researchers focus less on a representativeness of the sample than on how the sample or small collection of cases, units, or activities, illuminate social issues. As such, the primary purpose of sampling is to collect specific cases, events, or actions that can clarify and deepen understanding.

Turning now to probability and non- probability sampling, probability sampling is one in which every unit in the population has a chance (greater than zero) of being selected in the sample, and this probability can be accurately determined. With non-probability sampling, qualitative researchers rarely draw a representative sample from a huge number of cases to intensely study the sampled cases. For this research, non- probability quota sampling was used to identify the interviewees. Non-probability sampling is often used where it is not feasible, practical or theoretically sensible, to otherwise undertake random sampling. Quota sampling is a non- probability method of selection that aims to make the sample representative of the target population by setting controls on sample composition to make it match known population characteristics, (Sturgis, 2006). In the case of Nigeria, there are 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, which are then grouped into 6 geo-political zones. Due to the size of the country and the number of beneficiaries it will be difficult to use the probability sampling technique.

A major drawback of quota sampling is that, since it is not a probability sample, it is not possible to estimate the standard error and so the researcher cannot calculate confidence intervals or use inferential statistics. A further limitation of quota sampling is that the researcher must know the proportion of people with each characteristic in the population in order to specify the quota controls, (Sturgis, 2006). Nevertheless, non-probability sampling is adequate for case studies because the aim is not to use the results as a basis for wider generalizations, nor to infer from the sample to the general population. The aim is, rather, to learn something from the behaviour of the case being studied (Flyvberg, 2006).

Based on the research question, purpose sampling was used to identify the interviewees. Purposive sampling is defined as the selection of participants who have knowledge or experience of the area being investigated. Purposive sampling is virtually synonymous with qualitative research (Palys, 2008). According to Punch (2005: 187), purposive sampling means sampling in a deliberate way, with purpose or focus in mind. It is about identifying and selecting individuals or groups of individuals that are especially knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest (Cresswell and Plano Clark 2011 cited in Palnikas *et al.*, 2013). However, it is sometimes argued that non-probability methods such as purposive sampling are not free from bias as informants or interviewees may be chosen out of convenience, or from recommendations, from knowledgeable people. However, despite its inherent bias, purposeful sampling can provide reliable and robust data (Tongco, 2007). The strength of the method actually lies in its intentional bias, (Bernard 2002; Lewis & Sheppard 2006). This research uses the stakeholder purposeful sampling, which is particularly useful in the context of evaluation research and policy analysis. As an approach, it involves the identifying of the major stakeholders who are involved in designing, administering programme or service being evaluated (Palys, 2008).

114

4.3.2. Documents

According to Punch (2005), printed and archival documents are both a rich source of data in social science research. For this research, documentary data will be used for (triangulation. Documents are important in triangulation, where an intersecting set of different methods and data types is used in a single project, (Denzin1989). Also, documents can help verify the correct spellings and titles or names of organisations that might have been mentioned in the interview and can provide specific details to corroborate information from other sources (Yin (2003).

Documents are important tools for social researchers as they can provide context to what is been researched in a number of ways, including but not limited to timelines and historical perspectives. This of course, can help the researcher understand how things have progressed over the years and how questions for fieldwork can be framed. Sometimes documents provide somewhat an insight into a range of issues- both in terms of scope and reach of the topic under investigation. The more reasons why Yin (2003) argued that documents provide enormous ideas about questions or other areas to explore in data analysis. That been the case, it is important for a researcher using document pays particular attention to that selection of documents in order to avoid bias. Some scholars have been very critical of the use of documents in qualitative research, because it is assumed that documents contain unmitigated truth, however, Yin (2003) argued that the case study researcher is less likely to be misled by documents because they are intended to provide supplementary details to other information that has been gathered through other data collection techniques, and in this case, it is semi-structured interview. Documents used were Ministry of Education Reports, TETFund publications, public sector reforms and reports and other government reports in the area of public sector management, etc. The use of these documents has helped significantly in providing contextual data gathered through the semi-structured interviews with key

115

stakeholders and employees of the TETFund. The researcher also did archival research to locate documents of historical importance, especially the military decrees and the evolution and growth of the Nigerian Civil service.

4.4. Ethics

Ethical issues are very important in all types of research. Ethical issues are about access, consent, ownership of data, confidentiality and anonymity. It is about careful negotiation of access to the case study (the organisation- people), seeking informed consent from participants, agreeing a protocol for the ownership of data (e.g. asking participants to confirm the content of interview records before using them in the research), ensuring confidentiality of data collected during the research, and ensuring anonymity for all participants and key stakeholders.

According to Northumbria University Research Ethics and Governance Handbook (2014-15) informed consent is one of the core ethical principles of conducting research with human participants and named data. Informed consent is important in research because it respects the autonomy of the participants and protects their welfare. The three main elements of ensuring consent: are (1) adequate appropriate information to make an informed decision; (2) Voluntariness (with no coercion or undue influence); and (3) competence and/ or autonomy (Northumbria University, 2014). The author provided the interviewees with content form (Sample of this is in Appendix 11). In addition, author provided the interviewees with information on what the research is all about and mentioned to them the importance of confidentiality. According to the Northumbria University Research Ethnic and Governance Handbook (2014-15, p14) information about the study should be presented to the participants and it must include: the study title and an invitation to participate; the purpose of the study; why the participant has been chosen, the voluntary nature of participation, including the right

to withdraw from the research at any time etc. This procedure was adhered to in the process of carrying out the semi-structured interviews.

In addition, the issue of confidentiality was mentioned to the participants/ interviewees in relation to the presentation of the findings. In the process of interpreting the data from the findings, the interviewees were anonymised. According to the Northumbria University Research Ethnic and Governance Handbook (2014-15, p24) the publication of personal data must be done in accordance with method described when consent was provided by the individuals. In relation to the recording of interviews with both the beneficiaries and staff of the Fund as well as other government officials (as mentioned above) the author asked their permission for the interviews to be recorded. Whilst some of the interviewees acceded to the request, others declined and preferred notes to be taken.

4.5. Data Analysis

According to Attride Stirling (2001), if qualitative research is to yield meaningful and useful results, it is imperative that the material under scrutiny is analysed in a methodical manner. In analysing the data, this research uses thematic approach - in particular, on the themes relating to the concept of agencification. Thematic analysis seeks to unearth the salient themes in a text, though at different levels. There are six steps to thematic analysis and this is the approach that has been used in this thesis: (1) coding of material - this has involved the dissecting of the text from the interview into different segments; (2) identifying the themes - for this there are different themes that are important to the understanding of agencification, apart from the three core elements that have been identified above which link to both theories and practice, such as corruption, governance, etc.; (3) constructing of the themes - identifying both internal and exterior histories as they apply to the research questions, aims and objectives; (4) describing the networks and connections between the various themes and

issues relevant to the research question; (5) summarise the main themes, and, (6) interpret patterns (Attride Stirling, 2001).

According to Cope (2014, p89), common criticisms are that qualitative research is subjective, anecdotal, subject to researcher bias, and lacking generalizability by producing large quantities of detailed information about a single, unique phenomenon or setting. The criteria that are used to develop trustworthiness in qualitative research are credibility, dependability, confirmability and transferability (Lincoln and Guba, 1994). Credibility is defined as the truth associated with the data or participant's views and the interpretation and representation of them by the researcher (Polit and Beck, 2012). According to Cope (2014), credibility is enhanced by the researcher describing his or her experiences as a researcher and verifying with participants. In addition, to support credibility when reporting a qualitative study, the researcher should demonstrate engagement, methods of observation, and audit trails (Cope, 2014, 89). For this research credibility was established through the process of asking the participants to examine the transcripts of the interview in order to ensure that it captured their views. In addition, the researcher performed two roles: first as a researcher and second as a participant observer, being an employee of the Fund.

Dependability is about the data, that is, the extent at which there are constancy over similar conditions and this can be achieve when another researcher concurs with the decision trails at each state of the research process (Cope, 2014, p89). According to Koch (2006), through the researcher's process and descriptions, a study would be deemed dependable if the study findings were replicated with similar participant in similar conditions (cited in Cope, 2014, p89). The researcher is of the opinion that the research process and findings have strong elements of dependability. However, the issue of dependability may be questioned further as participants used in research process can either retire or move on to do something else and the setting may change as well. For instance, as TETfund was established through an Act and

118

a change in government can alter the operations of the Fund. More profoundly, my position as both a research a participant cannot be easily replicated, as external researchers wouldn't be participant and other participant will probably not be trained as social science researchers.

Conformability refers to the researcher's ability to demonstrate that the data represent the participants' responses, not the researcher's biases or view points, and this can be displayed by the researcher describing how conclusions and interpretations were established and exemplifying that the findings were derived directly from the data (Cope, 2014). In the presentation of the data and findings for this research, the researcher presented the accurate information supported by the anonymised source. Transferability refers to finding that can be applied to other settings or group (Lincoln and Guba, 1994). However, the position on this issue aligns with that of Sandelowski (1986) which states that the criterion of transferability is dependent on the aims of the qualitative study and may only be relevant if the intent of the research is to make generalizations about the subject or phenomenon (cited in Cope, 2014, p89). As stated in section 4.2.2, the researcher did not set out to generate a data that will be generalizable; the purpose of this research is to provide a rich data and findings on a single case, which can serve as a point of research for other researchers to explore, and for generating potentially transferrable knowledge.

4.6. Summary

This Chapter has discussed the data collection techniques and the philosophical underpinnings that guided this research work. Positivism, constructivism and postmodernism have been discussed. Although these paradigms differ, they have been able to add to discussions on research methods and methodology in social sciences. Issues around validity and reliability of data, as well as limitations of the research, are explored in Chapter Six as part of the conclusion to the work. Despite controversies regarding the use of single case

study, the author considers this method as the most appropriate given the research question. Methodological discussions on the richness and density of data, which are essentially of good value in qualitative research, were also discussed. The field questions (attached) focused on the behaviour of the Fund, drawing on issues raised in Chapter Three in terms of autonomy, performance contracting and structural disaggregation, identified by scholars as the three core elements of agencification. Pollitt and Talbot (2004) note that depending on the reform the three may not be present at all, or may not occur at the same time, or may be in pairs. However, they observed that when this three come together that the full force of the 'agency' concept becomes most apparent. In addition, the concept of strategic management is explored in relation to the operations and behaviour of the Fund, as well as how it connects to the contextual issues addressed in Chapter Five. This brings to light the argument made by Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) on the importance of strategic management in understanding contemporary public services organisations in any given context.

On reflection, the researcher is of the opinion that his position falls within the social constructionist paradigm. Being staff of the Fund, my colleagues and I by interacting daily build an interpretation of TETFund as an NPM Agency, at least partly irrespective of whether such claims may be 'objectively' appraised. The fact that I work for the agency TETFund (the case study for this research), which is discursively created as an NPM Agency, impacts on my very stance: indeed, I would mentally want it to be an NPM Agency – I am acting to make it be (come) such an organisation – and knowledge generated about it to be potentially transferred for making other Agencies develop in similar ways. This position was negotiated by ensuring that there is validity and reliability in the collection as well as the interpretation of the research data (as described in section 4.4.). Chapter Five presents that findings and the analysis of the field work.

Chapter Five

Research Findings and Analysis

5.0. Introduction

In Chapter Four, the research methodology and data collection techniques and methods used for this research were discussed. It was stressed that the use of qualitative research method was triggered by the research questions: what is the behaviour of an NPM Agency in a non-NPM context? What influence does NPM have on public management in a developing country, with Nigeria as case study? Is the TETFund an NPM Agency? Therefore, the objectives focused on the concept of agencification and whether the operations and behaviour of the Fund reflects what is mentioned in academic literature on concepts of agency practices and NPM infusions, as well as NPM reforms and its impacts on public sector management in Nigeria. Accordingly, the researcher utilised semi-structured interview as the principal data collection method and the protocol (in terms of the questions) was organised and structured in such a way to address the research question and bring out the pertinent issues on Agencification, Agencies and the central focus of the research, that is the behaviour of the Fund, alongside perceived impact of NPM in public sector management. As such interviews were conducted with key government officials, stakeholders, beneficiaries and personnels of the Fund. The data from the interviews are presented and analysed in this chapter, comparatively to concept of agencification and the operations and behaviour of the Fund. As discussed in Chapter Three, Agencification is a concept that has gained currency across the world, used in both developed and developing countries as a panacea to a range of public administration problems created by global changes in the twenty first century. As underlined in Chapter Three, Agency is used in different contexts and forms, thereby making interpretations of successes and failures respectively difficult. Indeed, whilst there are no universally accepted definitions of Agencification and Agencies; there seem to be

121

congruence in both policy and academic circles of the existence of three key Agency components: autonomy, structural disaggregation and performance contracting. In Verhoest *et al.*'s (2012) *Government Agencies: Practices and Lessons from 30 countries*, it was discussed how the implementation of agencification varies from country to country, shaped by governance philosophies and structures, socio-economic conditions and cultural settings, and the *modus operandi* of public sector in these respective countries. The outcome of these has covered extensively in this book. However, what is particularly striking is how this book reflects only on one African Country, which is Tanzania, thus opening up a number of questions, one of which how Agencification and Agencies in Africa and developing countries are receiving less attention in research and scholarly activities (as also in 'C. Pollitt and C. Talbot (eds.) (2004) Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation'). That being the case, worthy of mention, of course is how New Public Management has received considerable attention and research in developing countries, in the 20th and early 21st centuries, as opposed to the concept of Agencification and Agencies. In cases where Agency was assessed in literature, the dominant arguments tend to oscillate between NPM tools and Agencies, and the post-NPM narratives which tend to focus on the 21st century forms of public management. In addition, most literature on Agencificiation tends to focus on OECD Countries. Therefore, in order to address the second research question, the semi-structured interview also deliberated the impact of NPM, the drivers, the public-sector management, and some of the doctrines of NPM that have been adopted not only by the Fund, but by the Civil Service in Nigeria. It is interesting to note at this stage that, although this is explored further below, NPM doctrines and methodologies are now prominent in different forms and guises in the Public Sector in Nigeria. These ideas and doctrines are apparent in the various privatisation agenda, private-

122

public sector partnership, citizen participation and target setting, and downsizing of organisations (see, e.g., the principles of NPM distilled in Chapter Two).

In this chapter, using thematic analysis the author explores the operations and behaviour of the Tertiary Education Trust Fund, in order to ascertain whether it conforms to the three key elements of agencification, that is autonomy, structural disaggregation and performance contracting identified by Pollitt *et al.* (2004) and other academic and policy literature on agencies and agencification. Also, the chapter explores the strategic management policies of the Fund that is the operations and behaviour. As Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) note, strategic management in public services organizations is both contingent (models of strategic management have nowadays enhanced applicability to many contemporary public sector organizations compared to what they had in the past) and perennial (strategic management is part and parcel of managing public services organizations, or at least managing them where improving performance is one goal). Also, the chapter presents findings on contextual issues and NPM mainstreaming agenda in Nigeria. There are two main focuses for this chapter, which of course is central to this thesis: first, it would demonstrate how and why TETFund is an NPM Agency and second, demonstrate the actual behaviour of TETFund.

To answer the first part, the author used the three key elements identified in the literature on agency, which are structural aggregation, autonomy and performance contracting as the framework work of analysis. In the second part, on behaviour, the author presented the findings in relation to how the fund operates, ranging from issues of budget to recruitment etc.

5.1. Structural Disaggregation and TETFund

It has been discussed in Chapter Three that structural disaggregation is about the splitting up of large bodies into a 'parent' body and various subordinate 'Agencies'- mostly applied to

123

splitting up 'Ministries' into a core central body and several Agencies carrying out specific tasks (Talbot 2004). Indeed, structural disaggregation is one of the key management strategies of New Public Management Principles. For an Agency to be structurally disaggregated, it means that it is at arm's length (or further) from the main hierarchal 'spine' of Central Ministries/ Departments of State (Pollitt, 2004; Talbot, 2004; Noordegraff, 2015). To Fedele *et al.* (2007), institutional distancing between agency and parent Ministry is defined through statutory provision furnished by a Corporate Board; nonetheless this is not always the case as evident in the work of Verhoest *et al.* (2012). It is also about performing specific task in policy formulation or implementation with some degree of autonomy from the parent Ministries (see Fedele *et al.*, 2007). Another element of structural disaggregation is the presence of a Chief Executive who is responsible for management and reporting and the person is usually appointed through an open process, separate from what obtains in the Civil Service recruitment policy. Also, there is the idea of drawing up formal reporting arrangements and putting in place separate accounts for the new body as well as the existence of staff separate from the mainstream Civil Service, most often by changing their formal employment status (Talbot *et al.*, 2000). The following subsections will explore the ideas of agencification in relation to whether TETFund is structurally disaggregated. The data here are drawn from both semi-structured interviews and documents and this offers more the opportunity for the triangulation of the data.

Administrative Structure of TETFund

According to Ferlie and Ongaro (2015: 54), the Board formally sits at the apex of many organizations, especially private limited companies, and increasingly has (at least formally) a governance role in many public services organizations. There are variations in the basic structure and composition of a Board and is dependent on the nature of the organisation (e.g. private organisations, executive agencies and regulatory bodies). The Board takes

124

responsibility for the overall governance of the organization, reporting to shareholders/ constituents at an AGM (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). Chambers (2012 cited in Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015:54) categorizes the role of a Board into three: (1) To determine strategy (direction), (2) Assess performance (control), and (3) shape organizational culture (values, rules, tone etc.). Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) also added that the Board should have a leading role in: (1) The handling of any mergers or acquisitions; (2) Ensuring overall financial control and probity; and (3) Deciding dividend policy (in private limited companies). According to McGauran *et al.* (2005) the Board functions in terms of strategy development and this is done in conjunction with the Senior Management team of an Agency. In addition, they also ensure direction and accountability of an Agency. It also plays a key role in setting targets for the Agency. Other responsibilities of Agency Board that have been identified in the literature are that of advisory, representation of a sector or of the social partners and they provide a layer of political accountability between a CEO and the Minister.

In the case of TETFund, the Board of Trustees (BOT) which is the highest administrative organ in the administrative structure of the Tertiary Education Trust Fund, has vested in it, the management of the Fund and is headed by a Chairman, who as stipulated in the Fund's enabling Act, apart from having a good knowledge in finance and administrative matters, must also have the qualifications and experiences required to perform the functions of that office as contained in the Act. Other members of the Board of Trustees are made up of 6 persons each representing one of the six geo-political zones in the Country, a representative each from the Federal Ministries of Education and Finance respectively who are not below the rank of a Director and a representative each from the Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Education (these are represented by the Executive Heads of their respective Regulatory Bodies) and the Executive Secretary of the Fund, who is the Secretary to the Board and the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of the Fund. However, the Act

establishing the Fund allows for the Board of Trustees where it desires to obtain the advice of any person on a particular matter to co-opt him to the Board of Trustees for such a period as it thinks fit. Such a person who is in attendance by this provision however, will not be entitled to vote at any meeting of the Board and will not count towards a quorum. On the strength of this provision, the Board of Trustees of the Fund co-opted the Federal Inland Revenue Service which by law is charged with the responsibility of collecting the Education Tax on behalf of the Fund.

The Membership of Board of Trustees aside from the Chairman, must at any given time, reflect the six geo-political zones of the country (North Central, North East, North West, South West, due South and South East) and are supposed to be persons with considerable experience from both the public and private sectors to represent the business, financial and education sectors of the country. The Chairman and other Members of the Board, apart from the *ex-officio* Members are appointed for a period of 4 years, at the first instance, by the President on the recommendation of the Minister of Education and renewable for a further final period of 4 years but at the discretion of the President. The President may from time to time determine the remuneration paid to the Board of Trustees and it must meet at least four times in a given calendar year for the conduct of its ordinary meetings. However, the Act also allows that the Board of Trustees meets to conduct such other business as exigency demands. This it does through its various committees such as, Finance and General Purpose Committee, Projects Committee, Project Monitoring Committee, Tenders Board, Appointments, Promotion and Disciplinary Committee, Audit Committee, Strategic Planning Committee, National Research Fund Committee, Book Development Committee, Legal Matters Committee, Fund Generation Committee, Project Evaluation and Impact Assessment Committee, Academic Staff Training and Education Development Committee, Research Committee, Special Projects Committee, Committee on Needs Assessment of Nigerian

Tertiary Institutions (CNAONTI) and Committee on Information, Communication Technologies (ICT) and Corporate Affairs Committee.

Indeed, these committees evolved as the programme, structure and activities of the Fund were reviewed or expanded in line with the provisions of its enabling Act which gives the BOT the powers to appoint one or more committees to carry out on its behalf any of its functions. Such committees could have members (not necessarily members of the Board of Trustees) as may be determined by the BOT and such person other than a member of the BOT may hold office on the committee in accordance with the terms of his appointment. The decision of a committee of the Board of Trustees will be of no effect until it is confirmed by the BOT.

While the Act allows that a member of the Board of Trustees other than, the ex-officio members, may resign from his/her appointment by a notice to the President in writing under his/her hand, it also has a proviso that a member, including the Chairman, can cease to hold office if it is established that the person is of unsound mind, bankrupt or makes a compromise with creditors, convicted of a felony or any offence involving dishonesty, is guilty of serious misconduct in relation to his/her duties. The President effects the removal of such a member after being satisfied that it is not in the interest of the Fund or Public that the member should continue to be in office. In a situation where a vacancy occurs in the membership of the Board, the President appoints another person to hold the remainder of the term of office of his/her predecessor so that the successor will represent the same interest.

The functions of the Board of Trustees as spelt out in the Act include monitoring and ensuring collection of the tax and ensuring that the collections are transferred to the Fund, managing and disbursing the tax imposed by the Act, liaising with the appropriate Ministries or Bodies responsible for collection or safe keeping of the tax, receiving requests and

127

approving admittable projects after due consideration and ensuring the disbursement of funds to various public tertiary educational institutions in Nigeria.

Furthermore, the Board of Trustees is saddled with the responsibility of monitoring and evaluating the execution of projects and investing funds in appropriate and safe securities. It is mandatory by the enabling Act that the Board updates Federal Government on its activities and progress through annual and audited reports respectively and review the progress and suggests improvement areas within the provisions of this Act as well as do such things as are necessary or incidental to the objects of the Fund under the Act or as may be assigned by the Federal Government. Similarly, the Board of Trustees is expected to make issue guidelines, from time to time, to all its beneficiaries on the disbursement of monies from the Fund, on the use of monies received from the Fund and generally regulate the administration, application and disbursement of monies from the Fund as spelt out by its enabling Act.

Also, the Board is required to administer the tax imposed by the Act and disburse the amount in the Fund to Federal and State tertiary educational institutions specifically for the provision or maintenance of the following: essential physical infrastructure for teaching and learning; instructional material and equipment; research and publication; academic staff training and development; and for any other need which, in the opinion of the Board of Trustees is critical and essential for the improvement of quality and maintenance of standards in the higher educational institutions.

The allocation of funds to all public tertiary educational institutions by the Board of Trustees is done on the basis of equality among the 6 geopolitical Zones of the Country in the case of special interventions and equality among the States of the Federation in the case of normal interventions. The distribution of the funds to the beneficiaries is to be done in the ratio of 2:1:1 as between Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Education. Similarly, the Act

confers on the Board of Trustees the power to consider the peculiarities of each of the geo-political zones when disbursing the funds between the 3 tertiary levels of education mentioned above. On the recommendation of the Board of Trustees, the Minister of Education who supervises the Fund can make guidelines for the disbursement of the funds but with the approval of the President.

The Board of Trustees in addition to the responsibilities stated above also has the powers to employ either directly or on transfer or secondment from any civil or public service in the Country as many people as in its opinion feels will be required to assist it and the Executive Secretary in the discharge of their various functions as specified by the Act. It also has the powers to determine the remuneration, including allowances, of persons so employed but with the approval of the National Salaries, Income and Wages Commission of the Federation.

The day-to-day Administration of the Fund is overseen by the Executive Secretary who is the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of the Fund and whose appointment the President makes based on the recommendation of the Minister of Education. He must possess a good knowledge and cognate academic and administrative experience in tertiary education as specified by the enabling Act and will hold office for a period of 5 years in the first instance and may be eligible for reappointment for another period of 4years only with the terms and conditions for emoluments and service may be specified in the letter of appointment of the person. In addition to such person being responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Fund subject to the general direction of the Board of Trustees, he is expected to keep the books and proper records and proceedings of the meetings of the Board of Trustees, the administration of the secretariat of the Board and the general direction and control of all the employees of the Fund.

The Executive Secretary of the Fund is assisted in the day to day administration of the Fund by a management team made up of All Head of Departments, Head of Directorate and heads of some specialized Units under the office of the Executive Secretary. The Fund has 11 departments and 4 specialized units under the office of the Executive Secretary with their various duties and functions clearly established. The departments are: Academic Staff Training and Development, Corporate Planning and Development, Public Relations, Executive Secretary's office, Education Support Services, Finance and investment, Human Resource Management, Information and Communication Technologies, Monitoring and Evaluation, Research and Development/ Centre for Excellence, and Project Management. The specialized Units are: Audit, Servicom (Service Compact with citizens), Legal and Board Matters and Anti-Corruption. The Fund also has Zonal Offices in each of the six geographical zones of the Country (North East, North West, North Central; South East, South West and due South- as mentioned above). Zonal offices did not exist at the inception of the Fund, but it was introduced by the Second Board of Trustee (1999- 2007). When it was introduced, the objectives then were that the zonal offices should be able to operate from the zone making the activities of ETF to be closer to the beneficiaries. This was to make the beneficiaries at the various sub sectors like the primary, secondary and tertiary institutions closer to the Fund in terms of monitoring of projects, submission of project proposals to be executed, in terms of bid of qualities etc. It was also considered expedient that with the Fund being closer to the beneficiaries through the zonal offices, there was no need for the beneficiaries to travel to Abuja (head office). However, the Zonal Offices were phased out in 2003 for reasons of internal tensions amongst some departments in terms of roles and functions. Interviewee G, who is part of the management team provides the administrative rationale for the phasing out of Zonal Offices. The reasons provided was that:

> *'The Board and Management realised that the objectives of setting it up the Zonal Offices were not attained. In addition to monitoring of education tax collections taking place at the zonal level by the officers of the Fund, the Revenue Officers visit the integrated tax offices (LTO) of the Federal Inland Revenue Service regularly. Over time it was realised that all these objectives were not attainable because most of the beneficiaries still preferred to leave their zones to come down to the Head Quarters for every of their activities.'*

Interviewee G also mentioned contingency reasons and lack of effective delegation of some roles meant for the Zonal Office by the headquarters. The interviewee was of the opinion that this poor delegation could be seen as a way of ensuring beneficiaries reported to the headquarters, an unspoken or unwritten form of management strategy to monitor the beneficiaries.

The interview quotation above identifies some of the management strategies, as underlined in the literature on the governance and administrative strategies of Agencies. Possibly, it has been observed that administratively, an Agency can take independent decisions as it affects its operations without consultation with the Principal Ministries. Also, the above quotations points to some of the NPM doctrines of efficiency and effective management strategies.

The Zonal offices were re-introduced in 2014, following approval from the Board of Trustees and it is contemplated as one step to fully support the Fund's mandate of ensuring increased revenue growth and an effective monitoring and evaluation of intervention projects. According to TETFund (2014) the establishment of Zonal Offices is seen as a way of decentralizing the Funds monitoring activities and bringing its other activities closer to its target beneficiaries. Each Zonal office is headed by a Zonal Coordinator and supported by physical projects monitoring officers, revenue monitoring officer, education project monitoring officers, I.C.T. monitoring Officers, R & D/CE monitoring officers, Zonal Admin Officers, Confidential Secretary, Office Assistant and Drivers. In terms of administration the Zonal Coordinator reports directly to the Director, Executive Secretary's Office (DESO). The

Zonal office has the following mandate: increased revenue growth, timely/ quality delivery of TETFund physical intervention projects through effective monitoring and evaluation duties/ activities, and timely/quarterly delivery of TETFund education intervention projects through effective monitoring and evaluation duties/ activities. The Zonal Coordinator roles are: Funds monitoring/ mobilization, Physical Project Monitoring, and education project monitoring.

The Service in the Fund is an approved service for the purposes of pension and the employees of the Fund are entitled to pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits as approved for persons holding equivalent grades in the Civil service of the Federation. On pension, any power exercisable by a Minister or other authority of the Federal Government other than to make regulations under the Pension Reform Act is vested and exercisable by the BOT.

Recruitments of staff are done through interviews conducted either by independent recruitment consultants or in-house after vacancies are advertised. Even though merit is the criteria for appointments to the service of the Fund due consideration is given to the Principle of Federal Character which stipulates that staff recruitment must reflect equality in the representation of each State of the Federation without compromising merit. Currently the Fund has 402 employees.

5.1.2. Findings on Structural Disaggregation

As discussed in Chapter Three, according to Fedele *et al.* (2007), there are three core aspects to structural disaggregation: first, there is institutional distancing between agency and parent administration, which is often based on legal imperatives and features. It is about creating an identifiable, separate, organizational structure with its own name (see, e.g. Talbot *et al.,* 2000). Relating to the legal aspect, the focus is on the workings of Agencies, particularly its

power to determine the content of its own statue, furnished by the presence of a Corporate Board representative, which highlights the plurality of stakeholders (Fedele *et al.* 2007); Second, the complexity of the task transferred to the Agency in terms of heterogeneity of its activities and outputs. As Talbot *et al.* (2000) note the body is usually given a single or small set of functions. Third, the Agency specialisation on operational tasks is an indicator of the existence of clear-cut distinctions between the responsibility of policy formulation and the responsibility of policy delivery. All Agencies have legal status, unsurprising given the fact that in legalistic systems it is almost a pre-condition for disaggregation (Fedele *et al.*, 2007).

As stated in Chapter Three, other elements of structural disaggregation that have been identified in literature are: functions usually are primarily about delivery, execution or provision and not about policy-making; the body is given a clear 'constitution'- in the form of some sort of legislation or at least a formal (if not statutory) 'framework document'- which sets out its purpose, powers, and governance arrangement; it has a single, named individual - usually a Chief Executive (CE) responsible for managing and reporting on the new body. Such a person is, or can be, appointed usually- actually or potentially- through an open process, separate from the normal civil service recruitment; the staff of the new body are usually different in some ways from mainstream civil servants, most often by changing their formal employment status, and there is a drawing up of formal reporting arrangements and putting in place separate accounts for the new body (Talbot *et al.,* 2000).

Based on these definitions and elements identified above (as well as the key details of agencification and NPM discussed in Chapter Two and Three), the author will explore how TETFund Act disaggregated the Fund structurally from the parent Ministry (the Federal Ministry of Education) by a provision contained therein.

The TETFund by its enabling law of 2011 is already structurally disaggregated from its supervisory ministry- the Federal Ministry of Education, Nigeria. The Tertiary Education Trust Fund Act 2011, Section 3 subsection 1 states that the Fund is established for the rehabilitation, restoration and consolidation of tertiary education in Nigeria, to be managed by the Board of Trustees established under section 4 of the Act. Also, the Act established the Fund as a corporate body with perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be sued in it's a corporate name. To determine the extent at which structural disaggregation exist in the relationship between TETFund and the Federal Ministry of Education, questions were directed at the key stakeholders in order to unravel and to challenge what already exists in both the literature and statutory Act that established the Fund. Talbot *et al.* (2000:9) note that the separation of Agencies is usually one of degrees rather than absolutes, with some being clearly far more separate but with none being entirely independent. Also, most Agency 'separations' are more often movements along a spectrum (or multiple spectra) rather than 'quantum leaps' (Talbot *et al.*, 2000:9). Going by the Act establishing it, the Fund is supposed to have a degree of distancing from the Federal Ministry of Education in its operations. In an attempt to seek clarity on the relationship between the Fund and the Ministry, questions were raised in relation to this. Interviewee B, who is part of the Management team note that:

> *First, the Fund is under the Federal Ministry of Education. Secondly, we were*
> *expected to render a report and audited account to the Ministry so that they play*
> *their role as a supervisory body'.*

Interviewees B's comment corresponds with what is in the literature - that Agencies are accountable to a Ministry but have some elements of administrative distancing. That is why Talbot (2004) argues that the separation of Agencies is usually that of degrees rather than absolutes. The Federal Ministry of Education is the parent Ministry and, as stipulated in the

www.manaraa.com

enabling Act, corroborated by the interviewee B, the Fund has a high degree of Ministerial distancing. The extent at which this is reflected in the literature in terms of supervisory roles is clear, for example in De Jong et al, 2002, Talbot, 2004. That TETFund is a Parastatal under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Education, which exercises supervisory responsibility, was also reinforced by Interviewee C.

Although the formation of Agencies across the World differs, whether you look at it from the viewpoint of nation states or international bodies, Agencies report to a Principal Organisation or Departments within an organisation, or Ministries, as in the case of a nation state. For instance, in the European Union, there are varieties of Agencies serving different purposes for EU institutions and member Countries, which are set up to achieve a specific purpose either on a long term or short-term basis. The remits of these Agencies are usually defined by the principal, in this case the European Unit. The key point is that structurally disaggregation is important to the effective functions and operations of agencies.

In addition, the existence of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer is also indication of structural disaggregation, as their roles and functions highlights. Interviewee B describes the role of the Executive Secretary of the Fund and this corresponds with what is acknowledged in the literature on Agencies and Agencification in terms of structural disaggregation. The position of interviewee B is also captured in the enabling Act which states that the Executive Secretary, who is appointed by the President with the recommendation of the Minister, is the Chief Executive and the Accounting Officer of the Fund. The Chief Executive heads the administration of the Fund and takes charge of the day to day administration of the Fund under the supervision and control of the Board of Trustees. According to the Act, the Executive Secretary reports to the Board of Trustees, that superintends on the entire activities of the Fund.

In most literature (e.g. De Jong et al.,2002, Christensen and laegreid, 2006), the presence of an Executive Secretary is seen as imperative to understanding structural disaggregation. The Chief Executive superintends an Agency. According to McGuaran *et al.* (2005) CEOs of Agencies play an important function of determining the direction of an Agency, and the extent to which it delivers on its functions. This indeed is a crucial and important feature of an Agency.

However, it is the President's prerogative to appoint and renew or otherwise the tenure of the Executive Secretary and this is corroborated by interviewee W:

> *where the appointment was done by the President I did not know that I was going to the Fund. I was called once to Abuja and told that I will be going to TETFund for President xxxxxx and after the first three months in the Fund, I had the opportunity to brief him.*

Whilst this is the case, of paramount importance is the structure of political administration in each Country where the Agencies are used as part of governance structure. In the case of the United Kingdom, where the form of government is Parliamentary, the appointment is made by the supervising Ministry (e.g. the Department of Education). However, whereas they are appointed by the Ministry or the President, the running of the organisation is principally done by the CEO and the Board. According to Talbot (2004), the Chief Executive should be such a person that is, or can be, appointed usually- actually or potentially- through an open process, separate from the normal Civil Service recruitment, nonetheless it is worth identifying that the appointment and renewal of tenure of such an officer in the case of TETFund is the prerogative of the President, without any advertised formal competition or application processes. McGuaran *et al.* (2005, p5) note that in addition to structural separation from Ministers and Government Departments, they are also accountable in some way to a Minister/Government.

Talbot *et al.* (2000) note that an element of structural disaggregation is for the Agency to have in place a separate account. In the case of TETFund, a separate account exists in the Central Bank of Nigeria, where the Education Tax is deposited by the Inland Revenue after collection as mandated by the enabling laws of the Fund. Initially, the Fund was drawing budgetary allocation from government for payment of salaries and other recurring expenditure, but with the 2011 amendment to its Act, a provision is made for the Fund to utilise not more than five percent of the collection in a given year for the management and administration of the Fund, which includes payment of salaries and allowances and monitoring of diverse projects. As an example, prior to the amendment of the act, some of the income generated were used to fund monitoring but following the amendment of the Act we do not do that, a special fund not exceeding 5% of collection is set aside for the funds expenses including payment of salaries and allowances (comment attributed to Interviewee F).

Reflecting on the comments of the interviewees above and literature review, it is claimed TETFund to some extent exhibits a certain degree structurally disaggregated from the parent Ministry (Federal Ministry of Education) and other bodies that regulate its activities (which have been mentioned earlier). Structural disaggregation is about creating an identifiable, separate organisational structure with its own name, which is clearly grafted into the structure and operations of the TETFund. According to the principle of agencification, a public organisation is given name as well as single or small sets of functions and usually these functions are about delivery, execution or provision and not about policy making (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; Christensen and laegreid, 2006). Evidently, TETFund shows this character of performing the function of interventions in areas such as restoration, rehabilitation and consolidation of tertiary education in Nigeria, as stipulated in its enabling law. Likewise, an Agency is based on some form of legislation, or at least a formal document- which sets out its purpose, power and governance arrangements (see also, Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; Christensen,

and laegreid, 2006). For an Agency, the Members of Staff are different in some way from mainstream Civil Servants, and this occurs usually by changing their formal employment (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). TETFund has its own Staff Conditions of Service and its Staff Members are Public Servants recruited from the Public and Private Sectors. However, Members of Staff are bound by the General Civil Service Rules and some aspects of its Conditions of Service or Employment, e.g. pension, health insurance, promotion processes and tenure of service.

To further Justify that the Fund is structurally disaggregated, the Tertiary Education Trust Fund Act, Section 3 (2) a and b states: The Fund (a) shall be a body Corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal; and (b) may sue and be sued in its corporate name (TETFund Act, 2011). This provision shows that the Fund is formally structurally disaggregated from the parent Ministry (The Federal Ministry of Education).

5.2. Autonomy and TETFund: Findings

Recognised in the literature on autonomy and Agency (as discussed in Chapter three) are issues such as discretion that organisations or individuals have in taking decisions as well as how much they can be circumscribed by specific rules or even just standard operating procedures which are the norm (McGauran, *et al.*, 2005). According to Verhoest *et al.* (2004), autonomy is the level of decision-making competency (discretion) of an organisation. Equally, they argued that there are two types of autonomy, which can be located at strategic or operational level, that is managerial autonomy and policy autonomy. Managerial autonomy entails the right of an agency to take decisions on managerial issues, e.g. things that relates to personnel and financial management independently without recourse to the parent Departments or Ministries at the level of individual transactions or employees (operational) or at the level of general rules and criteria that apply regarding the use of these

resources (strategic). Policy (implementation) autonomy implies the discretionary authority of agencies to decide on certain aspects of the initiation and implementation of policies without particularly needing the approval of parent Departments or Ministries, e.g. prioritization of activities to be performed (operational), the delineation of the target group of the policy implementation, the quality and quantity of outputs and the policy instruments to be used or deployed (strategic). Reflecting on the previous explanations, the subsection below will scrutinise the activities and behaviour of TETFund with the principal purpose of unpacking the concept of autonomy.

Financial autonomy: Collections, Sharing Formula and Scope of Operations of the Fund

The two key types of autonomy are managerial and policy autonomy. The provision of the Act has already given the Fund both managerial and policy autonomy in the operations, sharing and disbursements of collections to beneficiaries. Interviewee B notes that:

> *In addition, the Act that established the Fund's specified roles for all of the stakeholders and the Federal Ministry of Education is one of the stakeholders and it cannot do beyond what the law says really.*

What the above quotation show is how the principal Ministry cannot interfere with the sharing, allocation and disbursement of Funds to beneficiaries as the Funds enabling law has already stipulated the parameters for doing such. As the Fund has within its mandate, the generated funds, these are used principally for the various interventions, and the supervising Ministry has no control over how the Fund manages its financial activities. This, to a large degree, is what is called financial autonomy, and this is one of the key elements of an agency.

The 2 per cent annual Education Tax paid by all registered companies in Nigeria is collected on behalf of the Fund by the Federal Inland Revenue Service which is responsible for Federal Tax Administration. The tax collected is deposited in a dedicated account set aside for that purpose in the Central Bank of Nigeria, from where it is disbursed directly to the beneficiaries

on the advice of the Fund. The sharing formula for the disbursements in the ratio of 2:1:1 as between Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Education. The TETFund Act 2001 stipulates that fairness and equality must be the guiding principle in the distribution of funds to the beneficiary institutions (TETFund, 2014:2). However, it should be noted that prior to enactment of the TETFund Act 2011, the tax was disbursed between all Public Tertiary, Secondary and Primary institutions in Nigeria as well as to Monotechnics, Colleges and Inter University Centers. The scope of operations of the Fund before the amendment of its enabling Act covered 57 Universities, 3 Inter University Centers, 50 Polytechnics, 64 Monotechnics, 61 Colleges of Education, 102 Unity Schools and 36 State Primary Education Boards. With the amendment to the Act the beneficiaries of the Fund now are as follows:

Table 3: Benefiting Institutions

Institutions	Number
Universities	68
Polytechnics	50
Colleges of Education	62

The sharing Formula for disbursements of the Fund before the 2011 amendment was as thus:

Table 4: Sharing Formula

Institutions	Percentage
Higher Education	**50 %**
Universities	25%
Polytechnics	12.5%
Colleges of Education	12.5%
Secondary Education	**20%**

140

Primary Education	30%

The new sharing formula with the enactment of Act 2011 is as thus:

Table 5: Sharing Formula Based on TETFund Act 2011

Institutions	Percentage
Universities	50%
Polytechnics	25%
Colleges of Education	25%

Unlike previous years, the Fund changed its policies on sharing, allocation and disbursements when it discovered that some state governments were setting up tertiary institutions more than others in order to draw more funding from education tax which contravened the provisions in the Funds enabling Act that emphasized equality amongst states in terms of sharing, allocation and disbursements to state owned beneficiaries. Therefore, the Fund decided to intervene only in one category of tertiary institution owned by State Governments e.g. if a state has a University, a Polytechnic and a College of Education the Fund will only intervene in one category of such institutions in a given year as decided by the benefiting State Government. This is in line with the provision in the Fund's enabling Act, on furthering equality and fairness amongst States in its allocations/ interventions. Also, it is imperative to state that all public institutions benefiting from the TETFund interventions have their proprietors and the Fund only complements their sources of funding. In the case of Federal Tertiary Institutions, they are owned by the Federal Government, while the institutions in States have their various State Governments as their proprietors. This point is reiterated by interviewee K:

> *For instance, after the collection it is equally the responsibility of the BOT to allocate the funds to the three levels of the tertiary education sector in Nigeria. That is to say Universities, Polytechnics, and Colleges of Education, both Federal and States; and in doing so the Board of Trustees is guided by the sharing formula, which is imbedded in the law on the ratio of 2:1:1. which is 50 per cent of what is collected is allocated to the Universities and 25 per cent to the Colleges of Education while the other 25 per cent is allocated to the Polytechnics*

Furthermore, the Board of Trustees is equally mandated by law to invest the tax collected in appropriate and safe securities. The objective of this is to earn an additional income for the Fund which is ploughed back into the project account for further interventions to the three tiers as mentioned earlier. This point also highlights some of the functions of the BOT identified in section 5.1.1., which is to provide direction and advisory role. It is part of the organisation's mandatory functions to monitor the activities of beneficiaries in the management of funds provided. After the disbursement of the fund, the Board of Trustees is equally mandated by the law to monitor the funds allocated to the institutions to ensure judicious use and much more importantly to ensure that no diversion under whatever guise is made without recourse to the BOT for appropriate decisions. In a nutshell that is what the BOT does and the functions of the BOT revolve round the three key areas which the BOT is mandated by law to intervene that is, in the areas of restoration, rehabilitation and consolidation of the educational infrastructure in Nigeria (comments above by interviewee K).

Responding to the question whether the allocation, sharing and disbursements of funds to beneficiaries by the Fund have ever been politicized, interviewee M noted that:

> *to an extent I will say 'no', because there are laws regulating our operations so whether a politician or not they cannot change the sharing formula, they cannot change the equality and fairness enshrined in the law.*

This point by interviewee M, further reiterates the extent of autonomy of the Fund.

In the literature on developing countries, particularly in Africa (as discussed in Chapter Two), the arguments oscillate around the notion of ethnic divisions and its impact on public management. This is particularly so in the case of Nigeria, where there are issues of ethnic group affiliation and favouritism in public sector management. Though this point was raised by the interviewer, however, evidence show that TETFund, has been able to manage its affairs without much political interference. This is interesting as it offers more light on issues of corruption and accountability in the management of public sector. In addition, this raises fundamental questions: Is Agency approach the best way forward to addressing the problems of corruption? Is this level of accountability peculiar to TETFund? These questions are explored more in detail in the section on context and strategic management in this chapter, where ideas of corruption and accountability in relation to agencification and strategic management issues are covered in more details located in the notion of context.

Utilization and Management of Allocations

The Fund has established a clear guideline for enlisting an institution as a beneficiary. An Institution must be enlisted by approval of the Board of Trustees of TETFund to qualify as a beneficiary of TETFund intervention funds. To be enlisted as a beneficiary of the Fund, prospective Institutions must fulfill the following: (1) it must be a public tertiary Institution; (2) Recognized by the relevant regulatory body: NUC, NBTE or NCCE; (3) Established by law via an Act of Parliament or Edict of the State House of Assembly and signed into law by the president or state governor; (4) Academic activities, that is, student admission, teaching and learning , must have commenced at the institution; (5) Institution shall formally apply to the Fund to be enlisted as a beneficiary of the Fund; (6) TETFund shall visit to verify that academic activities have commenced and thereafter recommend to the Board of Trustee for enlistment as a beneficiary; and (7) Following approval by the BOT, the Institution shall be enlisted and formally notified (TETFund, 2014: p3-4).

The funds disbursed to beneficiaries are used for provision of physical infrastructure e.g. students hostels, lecture halls and auditorium, class rooms, transportation, buses and boats for students library development, academic staff training and development, research funding, journals, student's desks, electricity (generators and solar panels), computer centers and IT development, water tankers, teacher training and capacity building, staff training and development, bore holes and book publication and conference attendance. The Fund does not allow its beneficiaries to use funds disbursed to them for building of Municipals like Road networks on campuses, as the proprietors of the Institutions are expected to do that.

The interventions of the Fund are categorized as normal (regular), special and special high impact interventions. Normal Interventions as specified in the enabling act providing Funds for the relevant government institution for revision of curriculum for schools, library development, book development, national research grants, training and development, conference attendance, teaching practice, academic manuscripts development, academic/ research journal development, institution-based research, curriculum and programme contents development. In the area of Academic staff training and development programme, TETFund provides a wide range of support in staff academic improvement by funding post-graduate studies in Masters, PhD and research and development (TETFund, 2012). The above are examples of academic interventions. For example, the library intervention is carried out in different forms in the institutions and can be grouped into: procurement of books, supply of library infrastructure, shelves and reading carousels and procurement of library equipment. Infrastructure interventions include for instance construction of classroom blocks and offices, laboratory and multi-purpose halls, boreholes, water treatment tanks, rehabilitation of hostel block buildings, renovation of lecture halls and auditorium, as well as equipment and supplies (TETFund, 2012: 19).

Special interventions are usually at the discretion of the Board of Trustees, but allocations are zonal based and are done equitably by decision of the Board of Trustees as contained in the enabling Act (TETFund, 2014). Special High Impact projects are embarked upon to cover areas of critical educational needs such as building of Central Zonal Teaching/ Research Laboratories (which are facilities that are jointly used by Institutions), programme upgrade and improvement in the Teaching and Learning Environment. Beneficiaries are selected by the BOT, based on the age of the institution per geo-political zone, amongst other criteria. The conventional Universities were first beneficiaries of the Special High Impact Intervention Programmes, which started in 2009 (TETFund, 2014). The Fund is specific about deploying resources to core areas of academic needs and selection of projects to be executed by each beneficiary are need driven as long as they fall within its mandate and are in line with the guidelines stipulated by the Fund.

Worthy of mention is how the Fund does not award contracts for the execution of these projects as this is done by the beneficiaries through their internal mechanisms and the selection of such projects to be executed are done by the beneficiaries based on their needs. The Fund only scrutinizes project proposals submitted to it by the beneficiaries and once they met the stipulated guidelines and due process, approval is given in principle for commencement of tendering processes, which must be advertised in three National Newspapers one of which must be a publication of the Federal Government 'The Tenders Journal'. This is meant to ensure transparency and competitiveness in the bidding process. The costing of all projects is however vetted by the Fund to ensure that they are not inflated. Similarly, the Fund does not in any way accept variation of costing once it has given an approval for a project.

The disbursements of funds to benefiting institutions from the Central Bank are done in tranches at different stages of a project so as to avoid project abandoning by contractors and

145

are transferred into a dedicated account in a commercial bank opened for that purpose by each beneficiary. From time to time the statement of accounts of the beneficiaries are scrutinized and matched with the stage of work on a project. If any beneficiary institution defaults in the execution of its projects, it will not receive additional funding until it meets the required expectations from its previous disbursement. The Fund, as specified by its enabling act, invests by placing funds in commercial banks which have strong financial standing, these are on a short-term basis and for the purposes of generating interest which are ploughed back into its account with the Central Bank of Nigeria.

The above are elements of autonomy on how the agency manages and ensures transparency with its dealings with beneficiaries.

In addition, there is direct intervention based on general needs of all beneficiary institutions, such as information technology and this is done through outsourcing. This supports significantly some of the doctrines of New Public Management. Government outsourcing can be defined as the delivery of public services by agents other than government employees (Minicucci and Donahue, 2004). Governments can outsource the provision of public services in two main ways: they can either purchase goods and services from the private sector, or non-governmental organizations in order to include them in their own production chain, or, they can hire a company to directly provide public goods and services to the final consumer or citizen (OECD, 2011). Interviewee G provides some insight into how the Fund outsources some of its interventions.

> *With the beneficiaries we started in 2001 when the ICT deployment was very low. Even schools did not have enough computers because their operations were based on typewriters. So we introduced to them concepts of e-library, e-solutions and other ICT activities to help them get their operations automated. In addition, we worked with the technical partners to develop the internal infrastructure and set programs to achieve the activities outlined in the road map and at the same time we used the same partners to enhance the capacity*

of our beneficiaries. But for the past 4 to 5 years we have not had internal consultants to help us not because we are 100% sufficiently advanced but we have developed our internal capacity to work with or without external help.

However, direct and indirect interventions are interlinked. For instance, some initiatives come from beneficiary institutions that come up with a proposal. In this case, the Department in charge of projects reviews the submission to gauge the feasibility of implementing such project. The projects Department will then forward this to other Departments for their input. Following this, recommendations could be made to the BOT to seek its approval to implement such a programme in phases as a pilot in some selected institutions. During implementation monitoring process is set up and impact assessments done. When the agency is sure of its sustenance and workability then it can be deployed to other Institutions.

For example, a couple of projects have been done using this method, like the electronic document management system, which was deployed to about six Institutions across the six geo-political zones in the Country. Through this method the Fund introduced the net library that contains journals and many books as well as the computer-based testing solutions, which were all deployed to some Institutions. The Fund conducted a series of capacity building programmes for lecturers in Nigerian Universities on auto card on security, project management, Microsoft Office amongst others (comment by Interviewee H)

Indeed, the Fund has some degree of financial autonomy, as its enabling Act allows it to invest in appropriate and safe securities. The Department in the Fund in charge of all financial transactions is called Finance and Investments. The interests generated from these investments are ploughed back into the intervention account in the Central Bank. It is important to note that the Board decides on issues of investment. The above is confirmed by interviewee H:

The money is coming from the private sector we need to grow the money so that we can fund more projects. So the law says that the Fund should be invested in an appropriate and safe security and this has been done before but the problem with this investment is that it is always short termed you cannot invest for a long term because if an institution has collected maybe 50% of its own annual allocation for physical infrastructure, it will be unfair to turn around and say wait till the end of the year until the investment would have matured, for the next tranche. The tenure for the investments is not more than ninety days in the bank because each time the beneficiaries ask for their money; the money must be made available to them.

The management process of the investment of the Fund is coordinated by the BOT, Executive Secretary and Director of Finance and Investments. This is done through selection of the banks for investment. One of the aims of this is to grow the funds for profit and plough same back into the accounts at the Central Bank. The rates of investment are monitored by the BOT and are reflective of what is going on in the market. For example, the Fund has rates fixed by the BOT and these are based on the goings on in the market and the rates for all the banks are the same. The Fund does not allow multiple rates so that no bank can cut corners, and this is done by giving letters to banks to inform them upfront what the incomes are and ask them to pay to a separate account. As interviewee C notes '*We monitor that they make the payment by checking every month to ensure that the figures agreed on have come to the bank'*.

The above comment from interviewee C is in line with some of the arguments in the literature on agency autonomy on financial matters. For example, McGauran *et al.* (2015) observe that the issue of financial autonomy is crucial. The extent to which an agency relies mainly on income from its Parent Department, from other government sources, or from commercial activities, will clearly influence its autonomy to decide and act, (McGauran *et al.*, 2015, p15). By its enabling Act, the TETFund has financial autonomy, which is, of course, important to the management of the operations of the Fund as well as effective

Ministerial distancing. Therefore, through the enabling Act and the operations of the Fund, it can be said that the agency has financial autonomy, e.g. generates, disburses and manages, its funds.

Human Resources and Recruitment

Autonomy of Agencies is linked to human resources management. The question on recruitment was part of the questions in the interview protocol and the process of recruitment was discussed by some interviewees. According to Interviewee K, Certainly, the enabling Act determines the processes of recruitment. There is a Federal Character Commission whose Act determines how recruitment is to be done and makes it compulsory for advertisements to be made in respect of vacancies available. They also follow up to ensure that federal character is reflected in the appointments in all government Ministries, Parastatals and Agencies.

In the Fund, the recruitment of the staff is done independently of the parent Ministry (the Federal Ministry of Education). By its enabling Act, this power is vested in the Board of Trustees. As such, TETFund does not recruit through the Federal Civil Service Commission, but rather through its own recruitment procedures. In spite of this, the Conditions of Service does not differ completely from that of the Public Service; it is very similar to that of the Federal Civil Service of Nigeria. According to Interviewee F

> *The Human Resources Department is entrusted with this responsibility. It identifies the vacancies and seeks approval through the Executive Secretary from the Federal Character Commission to fill in those vacancies. Once they receive approval, they advertise and receive applications from applicants and invite them for interview and also select those that are competent to fill in those vacancies. In the last recruitment drive, most of the Departments were asked to identify their vacant positions and the required number of staff to fill them.*

The level of autonomy from the Ministry is reflected in the appointment panel. For instance, the panel for the recruitment is usually as outlined in the Conditions of service of the Fund. For

junior staff, there is the Junior Staff Committee on Appointments, Promotion and Discipline and for Senior Staff there is a Committee on Senior Staff on Appointments, Promotion and Discipline which is chaired by the Executive Secretary. After selection interviews, the report of the exercise is usually submitted to the Board Committee on Appointments, Promotion and Discipline. If the committee is satisfied with the processes carried out, it will present it to the BOT for approval. As to the process involved, it is the act of compiling the applications, short-listing the candidates and presenting the list to the Committees to conduct interviews and selections. As regards advertisements of positions the Conditions of Service for the organisation, gives guidelines on which positions can be advertised and also those areas that selections can be done, based on available applications on ground for that particular position that is to be filled (above comment by Interviewee N).

Literature on the Agency, its Autonomy and Human Resources say the Members of Staff of the Fund are different from Civil Servants, in some employment conditions, although they are also bound by Civil Service Rules and Regulations. However, the Fund has separate Conditions of Service for its Members of Staff where these special employment conditions are outlined. This point was raised with one of the interviewees from the Human Resources Department. The interviewee noted that there are financial packages that are readily available to the Members of Staff which are not offered to Members of the Civil Service. According to interviewee N;

> *'There are lots of special allowances enjoyed by members of staff such as overtime allowance, and what is called Fund management allowance. The Federal Government because of the volume of funds this organisation is saddled with to manage, approved this and we do not want people to start developing the culture of theft or corruption. The fund management allowance is paid quarterly to each and every staff. Besides that, we also pay education allowance to enable officers pay the school fees of their own children'.*

Interviewee N also noted that the employees are not Federal Civil Servants and their grading is different to that of Federal Civil Service, and this is in line with the various academic literatures on Agency and Autonomy: The officers employed here are considered as staff of the Tertiary Education Trust Fund but, by extension, are employees of the Federal Government of Nigeria, because the Fund is an Agency of the Federal Government established by an Act of Parliament of 2011, (Interviewee N). As such, the grading system is not based on levels 17 to 1, which is, of course, the Civil Service Grading Structure. For TETFund, the grading system is based on what is called the Consolidated Salary Structure of the Research and Allied institutions (COSRI) and this is obtainable in other regulatory Agencies under the Federal Ministry of Education and it is graded from level 1 to 15. So COSRI 15 is the position of the Director (Interviewee N)

Remarkably, formal autonomy given to the Fund in its enabling Act is evident in the activities and operations of the Fund. Such formal autonomy granted by the Act in Sections 6 and 7(1e & 4) to the Fund that has been identified by this research can be summarised as follows: (a) Monitoring and ensuring collection of Education tax by the Federal Inland Revenue Service and ensuring transfer of the same to the Fund; (b) Managing and disbursing the tax imposed by this Act; (c) Liaising with the appropriate Ministries or Bodies responsible for collection or safe keeping of the tax; (d) Receiving requests and approving admittable projects after due consideration; (e) Ensuring disbursement of funds to various public tertiary educational institutions in Nigeria; (f) Monitoring and Evaluating execution of the projects as well as collection of Education tax; (g) Investing funds in appropriate and safe securities; (h) Reviewing progress and suggesting improvement within the provisions of this Act; (i) Doing other things as are necessary or incidental to the objects of the Fund under the Act or as may be assigned by the Federal Government; (j) Making and issuing guidelines,

from time to time, to all beneficiaries on disbursement from the Fund on the use of monies received from the Fund; and Regulating the administration, application and disbursement of monies from the Fund under this Act; and (k) giving due consideration to the peculiarities of each geo-political Zone in the disbursement and managing of the tax imposed by this Act between the various levels of tertiary education.

In this section, the dimensions of Agency autonomy have been vetted. We now turn to the third dimension of analysis of an Agency: the relationship with the supervising authorities and with the other stakeholders. The author will first discuss whether, and the question of how, influential performance contracting works for TETFund, and then examine the interactions with key stakeholders more broadly.

5.3. Performance Contracting

Performance contracting is a predominant of NPM inspired Agencies. Government- Agency relationships are frequently governed by a contract or the like, (Thynne, 2004). It is about expectations, commitments, rewards and sanctions and these underline and influence their relationships in terms of accountability and control, and this can also impact on degree of autonomy of an agency (Greer, 1994. pp.13-20; Greve, 2000; Lane, 2000). According to Lidbury and Petrie (1999), performance contracting is a way of setting targets for organisations and reforming on the activities of an Agency, which is, at times, loose. That is, it does not necessarily mean a formal contract, but any self-generated, agreed or imposed set of performance targets for Agencies, formulated into a specific agreement, contract plan, or statement of some sort. It is a system of setting targets for, and reporting on, even though not necessarily publicly, the activities of an Agency (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). It is used more as a management tool between superiors and subordinates, rather than as a contract between independent bodies, (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). For Agencies, to some degree, performance

contract usually forms the basis of judgement about the Agency's performance by its parent's Department, Minister and other stakeholders. Nonetheless, it is an idea that has been said not to be crucial, but rather a new way of management (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015).

According to Cheche and Muathe (2014), performance contracting is a complex concept with many variables that interact. Notwithstanding their assertion, they were able to identify six key variables from existing literature that can help illuminate the scope and understanding of performance contracting: performance management, performance measurement, stakeholder and employee involvement, commitment, and, performance targets (Cheche and Muathe, 2014:67). 'Performance management is concerned with encouraging behaviour that leads to attainment of the organisational objectives, also a management tool that aims to align goals of the Principal and the Agent in a manner that creates a shared vision,' (Cheche and Muathe, 2014:67). On the other hand, performance management is focused on the process of establishing achievements and gaps in order to provide feedback (Armstrong, 2006 cited in (Cheche and Muathe, 2014: 67). Commitment within performance contracting context occurs at two levels: top management and the level of employees. Targets is about the organisation meeting the Vision, Goals and Objectives set to measure standards of service delivery (Cheche and Muathe, 2014: 67). Cheche and Muathe (2014:69) note that there is considerable evidence that shows that performance contracting has had a positive impact on service delivery in public service across the world.

Nzioki (2011) see performance contract as an agreement between the Government and a Public Agency that requires the Agency to establish goals based on its mandate, set target to achieve the goals and measure performance and provide incentives for achieving the targets. Usually, the contract is signed by the Chief Executive of the Agency and the Secretary to the cabinet for the Government. The contract is countersigned by the Minister or the Chairperson of the Board. It is also endorsed by the Prime Minister as the supervisor and coordinator of

153

government business. Nzioki (2011) is of the view that Performance Contract would contain the Agency's Vision and Mission, Mandate and Core Functions, Strategic Objectives, Core Values, Policy Priorities, Focus for Action, Commitments and Responsibilities of the Chief Executive, Commitments and Obligations of the Government, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Performance Evaluation Targets (matrix) (Nzioki,2011).

Performance Contracting was introduced to the Nigerian Public Service for the first time by President Jonathan on August 22, 2012 and this was signed by his Ministers. It was introduced against a backdrop of disagreement between the Presidency and the National Assembly over the perceived poor implementation of past budgets (especially the 2012 budget) and it was developed by the Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the National Planning Commission in conjunction with Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) (Bello, 2012). The contracts prepared by the National Planning Commission (NPC) was to serve as a benchmark performance indicator upon which each Minister will be monitored, evaluated and assessed in relation to the implementation of the President's Transformational Agenda (Ojameruage, 2012).

In addition, all Heads of Department and Agencies under each Ministry were mandated to sign portions of the Performance Contract with their Ministers. Upon signing it, President Jonathan noted that, 'these contracts would improve performance and deliver quality and timely services to the citizens, improve productivity and instil a greater sense of accountability for effective service delivery,' (Ojameruage, 2012). The President also reiterated that he would expect the process to serve as an instrument for the realization of the objectives of Government, as enumerated in the Vision 2020 Document and the Administration's Transformation Agenda by the year 2015, (Ojameruage, 2012).

The introduction of Performance Contracting system in Nigeria is informed by two main reasons: (1) enabling the Federal Government of Nigeria measure performance of MDAs in a fair, objective and comprehensive manner, and, (2) creating results- oriented public service delivery mechanism (Darma, 2013). In the context of Nigeria, performance contract concerns: promoting transparency and accountability in governance through public display of performance results measured against performance commitments of the agency (Darma, 2013). It promotes responsiveness of Agencies through the design of its Service Delivery Charter and thus holding the Agency accountable for implementing its charter. Performance Contract focuses on transforming administration with the development of an Agency Specific Strategic Plan to specify the correct direction to be followed within a defined time-frame; increasing efficiency and focusing resources on key national policy priorities as well as institutionalizing performance- oriented culture in the Public Service through introduction of an objective Performance Appraisal System for staff (Darma, 2013).

According to Bello (2012) contracting will serve as a new evaluation tool for measuring the performance of key Public Officials such as Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, Directors and Heads of other Government Departments and Agencies beyond the traditional method of how they utilise their budgetary provisions.

Prior to the introduction of Performance Contracting, the National Planning Commission developed in 2011, the Half Year MDA scorecard as a data collection and analysis tools for Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). This was implemented to track the performance and contributions of Sectors and Federal/ State MDAs towards achieving the Nigerian Vision 20: 2020 during President Yar'adua's administration (National Planning Commission, 2011:2). The administration reinforced the Performance Management System with the inauguration of an integrated Performance Management System comprising institutional and individuals' framework by the Office of the Head of Service of the Federation (OHCSF) and the

establishment of a National Monitoring and Evaluation Department in the National Planning Commission in 2010 (National Planning Commission, 2011). It was envisaged that it would serve as a consistent format that can be applied to all MDAs, to capture the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for outcomes and outputs in their Strategic Sectors, and thereby ascertain their progress against annual targets (National Planning Commission, 2011:2).

The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) provided a set of suggested KPIs for Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) purposes, covering each of the Federal Ministry and it was the natural starting point for MDAs wishing to understand what kinds of data were expected in MDA scorecard submissions (National Planning Commission, 2011:2). The criteria for measurement were set against the standard in Nigerian Vision 20: 2020. After the introduction of the PMS, the public service recorded improvement and clarity in the alignment of institutional and individual performance. Activities implemented for the institutionalization of the system were development of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that were used to track the delivery of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), the development of Performance Agreements with Mr President cascading down to the Permanent Secretaries, Head of Parastatals and Agencies, and, the development of a reporting template for the MDAs, (Usman 2013:24). The 2012 Performance Contract agreement between the President and Honourable Ministers of the Federal Republic led to regular Ministerial Performance Reporting at the Federal Executive Council (Usman 2013:24).

On 22nd November 2012, the acting Executive Secretary of Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) signed a Performance Agreement with the Minister of the Federal Ministry of Education. Following this, the Executive Secretary then set up Performance Agreement for Heads of Department of the Fund. The Fund, as of then, was structured as- Education Support Services, Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation, Corporate Planning and

Development, Finance and Investments, Information and Communications Technology, and Human Resource Management. Each Director by this Performance Contract was expected to draw up clearly defined duties and responsibilities as well as targets for each staff under his supervision against which he or she will be appraised for performance. This appraisal forms part of the criteria for biannual staff evaluation, promotion, demotion or termination of appointment as the case may be.

Before the introduction of Performance Contracting in Public Service in Nigeria, the National Planning Commission was charged with the responsibility of the physical Monitoring and Evaluation of MDAs programmes and activities based on key performance Indicators outside any form of contracting as mentioned above. In one of such Reports on TETFund published in July 2012, the Commission stated that: This Report is intended to be a resource to enable Government Executives and Leaders to track the effectiveness of TETFund in defining and improving programmes and projects required to accomplish their Mandate. It is designed to identify whether projects carried out have yielded the desired outcome to the beneficiaries. This will further assist Government and the Management of the Fund, strategize appropriately on projects to be funded and the efficient use of funds available to the institutions. In essence, this will lead to a better means of learning from past experiences and demonstrating results, as part of improving service delivery and accountability to stakeholders. The objective of the Monitoring Exercise is to support the TETFund and beneficiary organisations, institutionalise and reinforce Results Based Management across all levels of their operations. Although, several internal processes for assessing projects may exist in TETFund and its partner organisations, the use of "external and independent" assessors enhance decision making and accountability.

The report is aimed at determining the outcome of projects funded by TETFund in the respective institutions. It determines the success factors of the intended projects, the

constraining factors and reasons for such, which will, in turn, help in future policy design and implementation. In the same vein, the report's objective also aims at finding out the levels of commitment, transparency and effectiveness on the part of the various institutions administration in the judicious use of the intervention funds in implementation of proposed protects in their institutions within the agreed timeline. Hence, the report comes in hand as a testimony to the findings of the inspection team on these projects in order to ascertain their level of completion or otherwise, the constraining factors as the case may be and what efforts that need to be made to ensure achievement of targets.

This subsection has been able to establish that performance contracting is in operation in TETFund. The next subsection will examine the agency behaviour.

5.4. Agency Behaviour

The TETFund Act 2011 states that the Board of Trustees shall be responsible for monitoring and ensuring collection of education tax by service and ensure transfer of same level of Fund, manage and disburse the tax imposed by the Act, liaise with the appropriate Ministers or Bodies responsible for collection or safe keeping of the tax, receive requests and approve admittable projects after due consideration, ensure disbursement of funds to various public tertiary educational institutions in Nigeria, monitor and evaluate execution of the projects, invest funds in appropriate and safe securities, update the Federal Government on its activities and progress through annual and audited reports, review progress and suggest improvement areas within the provisions of the Act, make, and issue, guidelines, from time to time, to all beneficiaries on disbursement from the Fund, on the use of monies received from the Fund. It is illustrative to point out that from the foregone paragraph the Fund has some degree of autonomy and contractualism. These points to the fact that it is controlled and steered by submission of annual and audited reports to the Federal Government, through the

Federal Ministry of Education in addition to the previous practice of submitting the Funds annual working budget to the National Assembly for approval. The current directive, that the Fund submits its budget to the President through the Federal Minister of Education for approval, is another form of steering and control. Although, this change, which took effect from 2013, was considered another effective approach to expedite disbursement to beneficiary institutions by removing the Funds budget approval from the usually rigorous and overly bureaucratic processes of the National Assembly, nonetheless it could be viewed as another form of steering and control by the Government. Interviewee E noted that the Board of Trustees never took any budget approval to the Federal Ministry of Education or to Mr. President, but of recent, the 3rd BOT before its tenure came to an end did start seeking the approval of the Fund's budget from the Mr. President through the Honourable Federal Minister of Education. However, whilst, this can be seen as some form of involvement, there is still the administrative autonomy. This approval being sought is consistent with the provisions of the Funds enabling Act.

In addition to the detailed description of the Fund's role and responsibilities in terms of how it is being steered and controlled through provisions of its Act of 2011, there is also the Service Charter which was introduced to the public sector under the 2007 Obasanjo's Reforms as part of the instruments for Measuring and Evaluating Performance of Ministries, Departments and Agencies of Government by the National Servicom Office. In compliance with this directive, TETFund drew up its Service Charter, which encapsulates its Vision, Mission, Services and its Customers against which its performance, responsiveness to its customers and service delivery are measured. According to interviewee U

> *The Servicom Unit entails an all in all service delivery. The main goal is that, if there is any grievance from outside or inside the Fund, people come to us to seek redress, the Unit will take up the matter and see that justice prevails. We also go around to see what members of staff are doing, what they are supposed to do and in*

good time. The members of staff of Servicom go around to see that members of staff of other Departments are doing their work appropriately. The Unit is to ensure that files and other related matters are dealt with timeously, in order to meet targets and that organisations are meeting the demands and expectations of both the Government and the Public in terms of service delivery (Interviewee U).

Particularly, the Directors of the Fund are also required to key their staff into the Performance Contracting Action Plan. In trying to know how this was achieved, questions were raised about the evaluation and supervision of staff performances, for instance, Interviewee J noted that;

all the members of staff working with me are given schedules of duty, so I hold a particular staff responsible for a failure in the core functions of the division. That way I am able to appraise them. By giving them specific responsibilities, I am able to measure their performance and rate them. I also discuss performance indicators with my staff. Similarly, each Monday every member of staff submits a report of what they did in the past one week so that we could appraise them. Initially we use to give schedule of duties to staff without time line. But with time, this was introduced because we wanted to measure how effective and efficient they had been.

Responding to a question from the interviewer on whether the Fund has a mechanism in place for Staff Appraisal, interviewee J stated that;

there is the annual performance appraisal which is done twice in a year covering periods from January to June and July to December. However, more through management approval, we have introduced what is called weekly performance reporting system. This involves the officers below a Unit Head or Department reporting on weekly basis on their schedule of duties. The decision was taken in order to improve performance and also to see that officers really justify the various incentive packages given to them.

The interviewer also inquired whether the appraisal system has been the practice overtime, interviewee J maintained that:

Before we joined the organisation the appraisal we met on ground was the common appraisal of the mainstream Civil Service of Nigeria which is once a year. Apart from modifying the annual appraisal mechanisms we have put in place the corporate appraisal which involves receiving a monthly report from each Department in respect of duties performed, what is anticipated to be done

for the next month, their challenges and expectations and what relationship they expect to forge in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Relationship with the Presidency, the Federal Ministry of Education, the National Assembly and other Government Regulatory Bodies

Although as stated above the Funds enabling Act gives it some degree of autonomy, the provision of the same Act also gives the President the powers to intervene in the operations of the Fund, in the event of a national need. Under Section 6 (j) of TETFund Act 2011, which spells out the functions of the Board, it is stated that the Board could, 'do such other things as are necessary or incidental to the objects of the Fund under this Act or as may be assigned by the Federal government, (TETFund Act 2011). For instance in 2010, the Fund was given a Presidential directive for the sponsorship for higher Degrees of 8 NYSC Members (National Youth Service Corps) who were awardees of a Special Presidential Scholarship and this was implemented by the Fund in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Education. Though this intervention is outside the Fund's Mandate there is a Provision in its Act which allows for the Federal Government to give the Fund directives as it concerns the educational policies of government when the government felt that it needs to intervene. A further example is, while setting up the National Open University of Nigeria. There was no budgetary appropriation by the National Assembly for its establishment. The Federal Government of Nigeria had to direct that the Fund provide funding for the initiation of the University. It is clear that the President can, by the Act direct the Board of Trustees of the Fund; develop a project in a University in any part of the Country, as long as it is done in the interest of the Country. The power of the President to give directives to the Fund in areas of intervention in the aspect of national needs is contingent on a range of issues. For instance, the President might decide to build a lecture theatre in a University or College of

Education or build a Central Research Laboratory anywhere in the Country. This the President can do by directing the Management or Board of Trustees to go ahead and allocate a sum of money to that project and ensure its delivery.

Questions were raised on whether the Federal Ministry has tried to interfere in the operations of the Fund, which generated tensions in their relationship. Empirical evidence shows that in some instances, there have been attempts by the Federal Ministry to intervene or instruct on areas of interventions. However, the Board of Trustees has been able to resist the pressures, thus making the funding to operate independently in line with the provisions in its enabling Act (Interviewee A).

As described above, the Federal Ministry of Education is the supervisory Ministry of the Fund and as such the Fund reports to the President through it. It means that the Ministry does not have the discretionary power to challenge how the Fund should be managed. It only provides directions and national policy guidelines on education to the Fund, similar to the Ministry's relationship with other agencies it supervises. Referring to situation where the ministry wanted to interfere in the operations of the Fund, Interviewee A noted:

> *that the Ministry wanted a situation where they could control how the Fund undertook its intervention policy, in areas where we should invest money in the sector. In line with the mandate of the Fund, this was resisted by the Board. To counter or minimise these interference, the Fund annually set up certain percentages (approximately 10%) for the Federal Ministry of Education, to cater for pressures and unexpected request from the Ministry.*

Consequently, one could argue that the Fund has a degree of autonomy based on its structure and operations. There are situations where cultural factors have influenced its operations, though not particularly challenging its independence. Such challenges are handled at the discretion of the Board of Trustees. For instance, as mentioned earlier there are six

geopolitical zones in the country and they are all represented on the Board of Trustees. The author raised this point with Interviewee A as to whether there were overbearing pressures that arise from issues of federal character and cultural/ ethnic affiliation as well as political manoeuvring that challenge the independence of the Fund. Interviewee A retorted that it is not an issue of overbearance, but that of ethnic sentiments, whereby members want certain projects probably sited in their constituencies and thus to some, yes, they would insist, and they would put pressure that we site projects in their constituencies

The researcher explored the relationship between one of the Funds Departments, the Federal Ministry of Education and other government supervisory bodies. Interviewee J noted:

> *Our relationship was through TETFund Management. The TETFund has had cordial relationship with all Federal Ministry of Education although it did all it could to make us look like a department in the Ministry. The attitude of the Ministry in the past was like the Minister had a say because the Minister's nominee was on the Board of Trustees. The Federal Ministry of Education saw the ETF as a department of the Ministry of Education. Whereas the Act established the TETFund as an agency of government and if possible on the same pedestal if not higher than the ministry because what we do is beyond what the Ministry of Education does. The Federal Ministry of Education's impact is in the area of formulation of the National Policy on Education and to mid-wife it. But we are involved in direct interventions.*

Based on the above comment by interviewee J, the interviewer asked how the Ministry was showing its superiority over the Fund. The response from interviewee J indicates that in some cases there have been situations whereby the Fund's intervention procedures have been disregard. Interviewee J also mentioned that the Federal ministry does not maintain a line of communication that would establish a proper documentation of interventions, as such a considerable number of its projects have been inconclusive. The interviewer however is of the opinion that since the Fund exited from funding Primary and Secondary education, there has not been any project opening up a relationship with the Ministry. Currently, there is no

direct project relationship with the Federal Ministry of Education except where the President so directs or gives instructions.

A follow-up question to ascertain whether the Federal Ministry ever made the Fund change its internal or external processes was posed to the interviewer. Interviewee J retorted that this has not happened and any attempt to do so would comprise the work of the Fund as well as go against the law that established the Fund. Further probing questions were asked in relation to whether the Federal Ministry of Education was not successful in super- imposing decisions on the Fund as it affects day to day administration and implementation of programs.

> *Interviewee J retorted that although there have been various attempts, but this has not worked.*

Further, reference was made to the enabling Act by the Interviewee in relation to the relationship between the Board of Trustees and the Federal Inland Revenue as well the Federal Ministry of Education, in relation to the representation on the Board of Trustees and how they are all equal stakeholders. Thus, the Federal Ministry cannot impose its own decision on the operations of the Fund as well as the implementation of programmes.

Interviewee J was asked whether the Fund is more powerful than the Ministry. This was to ascertain if there was some level of autonomy and its behaviour. It is clear from the interviewee that the Fund is not more powerful than the Federal Ministry of Education, as the TETFund is an interventionist agency and a service delivery agency.

> *The Fund operates in line with the policy of the Federal government in terms of intervention, as such; it takes directions not solely from the Federal Ministry of Education, but from the Federal Government of Nigeria. For example, the enabling Act gives the Board of Trustees absolute authority over the management of the Fund and not the Ministry of Education; this gives the Board of Trustees and management committee to draw up the policies not the Federal Ministry of Education* (Interviewee, J).

Administratively, the Fund has a collaborative relationship with the National Assembly and some regulatory bodies such as the Central Bank of Nigeria, Office of the Account General of the Federation, Federal Inland Revenue Service, Office of the Auditor General of the Federation, Economic Finance and Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt and Other Related Practices Commission (ICPC), Federal Character Commission, National Salaries and Wages Commission, the National Planning Commission and the National Civil Service Commission. The accounts and books of the Fund are regularly checked by the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation and the Office of the Auditor General respectively, to ensure that all Federal Government financial guidelines and regulations are adhered to. Similarly, the Committees on Education for the Senate and the House of Representatives, which are the legislative arms of Government, undertake oversight functions over the Fund with the view to knowing the various programs and activities of the Fund and also to have information on collections, allocations and disbursements made by the Fund. Other agencies that check the books of the Fund are the Federal Character Commission and the National Income Salaries and Wages Commission. They ensure compliance with recruitments as it affects the Principle of Federal Character and issues affecting Wages and Salaries respectively. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission as well as the National State Security Services also scrutinize the books and accounts of the Fund whenever the need arose. The Accounts Committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives respectively, also check financial activities of the Fund to ensure compliance with budgetary provisions. The National Planning Commission monitors and evaluates the impact of the interventions of the Fund across the Country annually and submits report to the Federal Government in this regard.

The Fund organizes annual workshops with the regulatory agencies of its beneficiaries, that is, the National Universities Commission, National Board for Technical Education and the

National Commission for Colleges of Education with a view to strategically planning and reviewing areas of intervention to beneficiary. The Fund also collaborates with International Organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, such as UNESCO, Carnegie, Intel Corporation, Foundation and MacArthur Foundation with the view to drawing up synergies with them to avoid duplication of interventions to its beneficiaries. It also exchanges ideas with other similar Funding agencies in Africa like Tanzania, Sierra Leon and Ghana.

It is pertinent to mention here that all these oversight functions do not have direct bearing on the operations of TETFund; as such, the independence of the Fund is not compromised. This point was emphasised by Interviewee A, who noted that,

> '*the National Assembly played an oversight function on the Fund just like any other government agencies…They will come and make sure that we are operating in accordance with the rules and regulations, we are following due process, we have laid down procedures and guidelines that we must adhere to and that is their role; that is their constitutional responsibilities'.*

In order to capture the degree of independence of the Fund from other agencies and committees, questions were asked on whether there were attempts to checkmate the independence of the Fund. Response from Interviewee B indicates that it is difficult to checkmate the independence of the Fund because of the law that established it. According to Interviewee B:

> *Nobody checkmates you because the Fund was established by law and also the other agencies were also established by law. No agency has the statutory right to check mate as such, but you have collaborative relationship with the regulatory agencies to enhance not only the allocation of resources but also the management of what you have disbursed and the impact that you have achieved. For instance, to qualify to be enlisted as a beneficiary, a university has to submit a request to the Fund but part of the requirement for enlisting a new university is that NUC has to give an attestation that it is recognised as a University in the Country the same thing with the NBT for polytechnics and NCC for the Colleges of Education because the Fund is not responsible for recognition of institutions and conferring legitimacy on them. But each time*

they request that they are now established as a University or Polytechnic and or College of Education and therefore should benefit from the intervention funds, we now request the necessary agency for instance, to, confirm. But secondly, as a government agency and under the executive branch we are also subject to the oversight responsibility of the National Assembly which is another arm of government. So, we have the House Committee on Education and the Senate Committee on Education. They could invite us at any point in response to a request from the general public or from members of the National Assembly for clarification on certain matters. But as a matter of course they also visit the agency at least once in a year for what they call oversight so that they look at our books, how we have done, what we have done and what we have achieved and then we tell them also areas where we think we need improvement that may require legal provision.

Interviewee B further added that:

There are the House and Senate Committees on Public Accounts. Because we disburse public funds they also perform their oversight responsibility in terms of checking the books and checking the annual audited accounts. If there are issues or questions, they will raise the question we respond, and we proceed from there. Then again, the National Assembly also has a special relationship with the Fund in the sense that not only were the laws made by the National Assembly and also amended by the National Assembly they also provide resources for payment of personnel salaries and overhead because the Fund from the education tax will go straight into the intervention project of the university. We do not use the fund to pay salaries and we do not use the funds to pay for overhead. We draw these as an agency of government from the regular budget. So, the National Assembly performs that role. Then of course the usual agencies of government like the Office of the Auditor General of the Federation and the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation come at the end of the year to look at our books and also, we have the External Auditors taken from the list provided by the Auditor General of the Federation and retained for a period, who examine our books and submit the accounts. By law we are supposed to submit our account to the Minister and then an annual report on the activities of the intervention fund to the President.

The relationship with other agencies are based on collaborative approaches ranging from the resources generation (in the case of the Federal Inland Revenue Service) and the impact the various programmes and projects are having (in the case of the Federal Ministry of Education). For instance, in the case of the Federal Inland Revenue and its relationship with the Fund, Interviewee A noted that the through the Federal Inland Revenue, the Board

ensures that the Education Tax is collected, assessed, and remitted to the Fund through the Central Bank. Interviewee A also added that:

> *The one that will readily come to mind is the Federal Inland Revenue Service. It was the function of the Board to make sure that Education Tax was collected; in fact, assessed, collected and remitted to the Fund through the Central Bank. So, it had a very crucial role to play. We didn't just sit down and wait for them to do whatever they wanted or tell us at the end of the day this is how much they had collected. We tried to play a role in monitoring the assessment, collection and remittance of these funds at the end of each financial year*

On the relationship with the National Assembly and the Fund, interviewee M is of the opinion that the relationship is based on the Law, therefore the way the Fund collects its fund is not subject to the National Assembly. In addition, the interviewee noted that the disbursement of fund by the agency is based on equitable distribution in relation to the geo-political zones. Although, the interviewee noted that on several occasions the National Assembly has tried to appropriate some of the agency's funds, (Interviewee M).

As mentioned earlier, the Federal Ministry of Education is the parent Ministry of the Fund; as such this could impact on the operations and independence of the Fund in terms of setting policies and agenda. However, findings from the field research demonstrate that the independence of the Fund was not compromised by this relationship. According to interviewee A, who was a member of the BOT;

> *Throughout my stay my Board kept complaining that the Ministry is not providing that roadmap because don't forget ETF is supposed to be an interventionist agency that is the Ministry will pave the policy and then we come in, support them, compliment their efforts towards achieving Government goals. But we had problems with that. What the Ministry used to do was to say they were going to- areas that cannot be said to be directly relevant to our mandate – you transfer teachers of Federal Colleges or Unity Schools and you say the Fund should pay for their allowances, for their movements and all that. My Board wanted a clearer direction. This is where we are focusing on. For instance, when the Ministry said look Government wanted French to be adopted as a second National language so to say we said fine, what do you want us to do? How do we intervene*

and I remember there was a proposal about establishing French Language laboratories in Schools and my Board was ready and willing to provide funding so that, that policy is implemented successfully but it vanished from the table.

In addition, Interviewee B also noted that the Fund had a degree of independence from the supervising ministry:

The Fund has a Board, so much is done within the Fund and not all that matters are referred to the Ministry each time you want to say call a meeting, to allocate available resources ever year or in terms of implementation, we do not need approval of the ministry, but the ministry is also represented on the Board of the Fund. Issues that require clarification by the Fund will now be channelled to the Ministry through the representative and each time the Board meets the representatives of the Ministry submits a report to the Ministry itself. In other words, the Ministry is playing the supervisory role, but it does not intervene in the day to day administration of the Fund and to a very large extent the Fund has no reason to be referring to the ministry on a daily basis. But as the need arises of course because it is a parastatal under the ministry it can seek clarifications.

Interviewee B reiterated that following the transition from ETF to TETFund, there was never a time that the ministry interfered in any major way apart from areas where there is a cross over in terms of policy making at the ministerial level or at the level of Federal Executive Council of the Government. Where interventions are made at these levels they are considered incidental and do not compromise the mandate of the Fund. Interviewee B also observed that there were no overbearing issues on the part of the ministry:

There was no overbearing influence as such because we streamlined a lot. At least for the period that I served we streamlined from the ETF to TETFund and the Ministry never interfered in terms telling you what to do which is inconsistent with the provisions of the enabling law. But as the supervising Ministry of course there were issues that may arise in the cause of making policies at the ministerial level or even higher at the level of Federal Executive Council of the Government where you will be requested to discharge specific responsibilities which is again consistent with the law

because the law also says that the Fund can do other things as may be assigned by the Federal Government, but these other things are only necessary or incidental. They are not really key or they do not dilute the core mandate of the Fund, but they are just incidental to the objectives of running or providing education system.

Similarly, Interview K, mentioned that there is a good working relationship between the agency and the Ministry, with very limited amount of meddling. The interviewee K likened the relationship between the BOT and the Federal Ministry of Education as that of a child and a father. The responsibility for regulating education in Nigeria as enshrined, by law, in the Federal Constitution of Nigeria is domiciled in the Ministry of Education and the Fund is under the Ministry of Education. On administrative relationship, functionally, the law places the responsibility of doing everything that I had mention under the Act with the BOT, but we relate administratively. Because the Minister is the supervising Minister of all agencies under the ministry and being an agency under the Federal Ministry of Education, the Fund submits to the authority of the Minister on all administrative matters and all matters that have to go through to the level of the political leadership of the country for discipline, orderliness and in conformity with the structure the BOT does not relate with the Federal Executive Council. It goes through the Minister to the Federal Council. It goes through the Minister to the President.

As the Fund reports to the President through the Federal Ministry of Education, question was raised in the interview whether this impact on the operations and independence of the Fund and whether in the first instance the Presidency and or Ministry gets meddlesome in the Funds activities, Interviewee A, noted that interventions or meddling only happens in the case of projects, where approved projects from International Organisations such as the UNESCO is referred to the Fund for execution. However, the Board of Trustees would have to decide in

this case whether to implement in line with the context of its mandate. According to Interviewee A:

> *I don't know whether it is meddling but one thing I know is that Government maybe sometimes for lack of Funds will say oh this is a UNESCO approved project and we are asking ETF to provide the Funds. Now it is left for my Board, yes, it is from Federal government no doubt, to look at it viz a viz our mandate and sometimes in fairness to the Board they cannot not say no to the Presidency, so they will look at it and see how it can be fixed or considered within the context of our mandate and justify it otherwise it will be like going out of our mandate.*

To determine whether or not issues of steering and control have been features in appointments of managers and operations of the Fund from inception, a former Executive Secretary was asked whether there was any checklist or contract provided verbally or in writing by the Federal Ministry of Education or the President when he was appointed, and he responded as thus:

> *No there was none in terms of check list. I think it is implied in the kind of people appointed that you have the capacity and the knowledge to think and transform the agency. But remember I said earlier the appointment was done by the President so, I did not know that I was going to the Fund. I was called once to Abuja and told that I will be going to TETFund for President Yar'adua's seven-point agenda and after the first three months in the Fund, I had the opportunity to brief him. I told him about what I saw and the direction in which I believe the Fund should go. He later invited me alongside the Minister of Education and we had a lengthy discussion in his office and so he had his own ideas, but in all it was not written. So, in other words yes, I had a check list of things to do but it was not contained in my letter of appointment but of course government said as principal I want you to do this and brief me regularly. So, we are doing so through the Minister.*

From the narratives above, though the Fund enjoys some degree of autonomy, it is regulated by other agencies of government through various overseeing functions and it is controlled and steered by the executive through rules and regulations in respect of Salaries and wages, budget, employment criteria (Federal Character principle). Furthermore, Presidential

directives on interventions operate through a clause in the Act which says that the Fund's interventions can cover anything incidental and any other matter as directed by the government. Other forms of control, steering and regulation of the Fund by Government is through Civil Service Rules and Regulations, appointments of BOT and Executive Secretary, representation of Federal Ministries of Education and Finance respectively on the Board, annual budget approval of the Fund by the President rather than through the National Assembly appropriation, overseeing by the Accountant General and Auditor General of the Federation, respectively, and representation of regulatory bodies of beneficiaries on the Board and submission of annual and audited reports to the Federal Government.

The Agency in Action:

In this section, we start to examine the behaviour of the TETFund […] – Indeed, in part, this has already been done in the previous sections, addressed in the level of autonomy the agency enjoys as well as the relationships it establishes with the parent administration as well as the other stakeholders who are themselves co-determined by the agency behaviour, and not just by the institutional design of the agency, (however influential it is).

Monitoring and Evaluation of Projects

All projects being executed by the beneficiaries are monitored, inspected and evaluated from time to time by the Members of the Board of Trustees, Staff of the relevant Departments of the Fund and in exceptional or rare occasions outsourced Consultants who are members of their relevant professional bodies. Any consultant so engaged but found to have misled the Fund in respect of the status of a project is reported to his professional body for sanctions. Similarly, members of staff of the Fund form the relevant Departments and Units as well as outsourced professionals on a quarterly basis, audit the financial accounts of the beneficiary to ensure compliance with financial regulations. It should be noted that all projects being

executed by beneficiaries have their completion periods or project circles. Reports of all monitoring and evaluation activities are submitted to the Fund through the Executive secretary who forwards same to the Board of Trustees.

Both direct and indirect monitoring and evaluation involve different approaches. For direct interventions, interview G retorted that the Fund monitors and documents the effect of interventions and this is done through a process of internal evaluation. The monitoring process has helped the Fund make substantial changes to interventions in particular in the area of providing solution. Describing the process of ICT project evaluation, Interviewee H noted that after the project has been executed, the ICT Department in conjunction with all the Departments evaluate the impact. Some members of staff are selected from different Departments as part of the evaluation team. After, the evaluation, a report will be sent to the Management with recommendations and where there are grey areas identified during the evaluation the management intervenes, (Interviewee H).

Aside funding projects, the Fund also provides funding for library interventions, academic staff training development, conference attendance, teaching practice, research grants, book development and others, through the Departments of Academic Staff Training and Development and Education Support Services respectively. According to Interviewee I,

> *'the evaluation and monitoring of these areas is done through institutions (beneficiaries) and visits to the Universities where the scholars are registered and studying. This is to ensure that the institutions are utilising the money for the purpose for which it was released'.*

He further contended that the Fund has an approval process that establishes credibility and accountability in the monitoring of projects. For instance, approval is granted as soon as the vetting process confirms that a project had adhered to the intervention guidelines of the Fund and it is within the budget and it is realisable. The beneficiaries according to interviewee I,

are granted approval in principle to go ahead and seek for qualified and competent Companies that can to deliver the projects in line with the provisions of the Public Procurement Act. Once this is done with evidence provided, the funds are released to them to begin direct execution of the project.

Interviewee I further stated that

'the Institutions execute the projects themselves. What we do is to ensure compliance of the set rules of public procurement at that level and following to that, we do monitoring. Also, there is another department which also evolved called Monitoring and Evaluation Department. This department's central role is to follow the money. This is just to ensure that the money the beneficiaries have collected delivers the project they proposed and got approved.

In situations where there are problems of non- compliance or low capacity utilization by beneficiaries, the Fund organizes what is called Sensitization Workshop or Strategic Planning Workshop, whereby the Agency interacts with its beneficiaries to Plan and review its activities and those of the beneficiaries in terms of their executing projects and utilization of funds released to them in line with the Fund's guidelines. According to Interviewee J,

'Equally, the agency also does what is called micro- managing of some projects, where we know that they have critical challenges by jointly visiting and addressing the issues and see how we could navigate the challenges faced by the institutions concerned'.

In addition, to the above comment, interviewee J noted that

'Where issues are made, you communicate the issues to beneficiaries for remedy and where issues are not raised we demand our staff to raise the necessary certificate then we await audit certificate clearance that they are in healthy conditions for the release of subsequent fund'.

In response to questions on monitoring to ensure accountability interviewee O,

> *'stated that the Fund monitors how beneficiaries spend the money allocated to them. This is done through auditors, who consult the accounts books of beneficiaries to check if the money disbursed to them have been utilized judiciously. In addition, the office of the Accountant General monitors disbursed funds to beneficiaries every year on behalf of the Fund, and where there are issues of disparities, a query is raised to challenge the problem. In relation to the Fund, external auditors equally monitor the accounts on a yearly basis'.*

Relationship with Beneficiaries

As it has been mentioned, the beneficiaries of the Fund are Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Education. The author explored the relationship between the beneficiaries and the Fund. Interviewee C, a former Bursar at a college of Education, one of the beneficiary institutions, had this to say:

> *'The relationship was very nice and one thing I knew was that the Fund's procedure was wonderful. Funds were released to you as a beneficiary based on the level of execution of projects you were given money for. After you get approval for your project to be executed from the Fund it would not release any money to you unless it was satisfied with the work done with the previous allocations to you'.*

Unlike other interventionist agencies in the country in the past, where monies were provided or made available without adequate monitoring and accountability, the Fund has in place a proper procedure and processes for monitoring and evaluating all its allocation to beneficiaries. Unlike in the past where interventionist agencies decide for their beneficiaries on areas of intervention, the intervention of TETFund is need driven. Based on the allocation to them in any given year, beneficiaries send proposals to the Fund for indicating areas of need. Once the fund is satisfied that such proposals are within its core mandate, it gives approval to the beneficiaries for execution. Based on the above, Interviewee C was asked whether the process of allocation is cumbersome. The interviewee proposed that the Fund provides strict supervision of various projects executed. In addition, the Interviewee C noted

that, once proposals were submitted to TETFund it will go through it, check the bidding documents, and once it was satisfied with the submission it would approve the project.

However, it has been noticed in some of the comments of the beneficiaries, on the issue of cumbersomeness of the Funds process is related to the issue of accountability and transparency by the beneficiaries. They have now been made to understand that it is, 'no more business as usual,' to utilise public funds without being accounted for. In addition, Interviewee D described the process of fund utilization which supports the above points on allocation.

> *After a proposal had been approved if it is a capital project 50 per cent of the project cost will be released to you at the 1st instance. Then you need to work to a certain level that will be supervised by TETFund experts and once they are satisfied with whatever you have done they now release another 35 per cent and if the job is done to a required level, you will inform them again, they will look at it and another 15 per cent will be given after the project is completed.*

Furthermore, Interviewee D was asked whether the process is cumbersome:

> *It depends on your relationship and your knowledge of project execution. If you don't have serious knowledge of how to package your project you would have a problem. But once you knew how to package your projects and execute them to the Fund's satisfaction the process was not cumbersome. But the moment you made a weak submission from the start your proposal would be returned back to you.*

On whether the Fund has made a difference to the beneficiary institutions, the beneficiaries are of the opinion that the public tertiary institutions in Nigeria had been helped tremendously by the Fund. The beneficiaries note that the Fund has contributed to improvement of infrastructures, especially those for teaching, learning and research. 'It has also helped in areas of academic training and development in the institution as it has been sponsoring our academic and non- academic members of Staff to attend conferences. They have also benefitted from the Fund as far as teaching practice is concerned. Most of the buildings on

campuses such as ICT building, lecture theatres, major students' halls of residence were those that were constructed by TETFund' (Interviewee E).

The relationship of the Fund with beneficiaries was also explored from the perspective of the staff of the Fund; both senior and middle level management. The finding corroborates what the beneficiaries highlighted. According to Interviewee F, who was at some point the Executive secretary of the Fund, the relationship was that both the Fund and the beneficiaries are stakeholders who are concerned about improving the quality of education in Nigeria. The situation is that of correcting the decay that was evident in most institutions prior to the establishment of the Fund. Thus, the relationship was considered imperative to providing a solution to a range of problems confronting higher education institutions in the country from issues of staff training to development and lack of adequate facilities for teaching and learning (Interviewee F). Although at the inception of the Fund, there are issues of implementation of projects by beneficiaries, this however, as noted by Interviewee F, was resolved through close monitoring of the implementation of projects and as such there were no major cases of abandoned projects, other than some delays in the implementation. This was such that benefiting institutions that had delays in the execution of projects are precluded from accessing their allocation in a given year until those pending projects are completed. This has actually helped the Fund to ensure the success of its interventions, (Interviewee F). The research also explored the relationship between the Board of Trustees and stakeholders. As Interviewee K said, the relationship can be defined into two broad categories. The First, category is the beneficiaries of our allocations, which are the Universities, the Polytechnics and the Colleges of Education, whilst the Second category is the Institutional Stakeholders; the National Assembly and the Executive Arm of Government.

General Administration within the Fund

177

From inception till 2011, when the Fund's enabling Act was amended, it received yearly budgetary allocations from the Federal Government for personnel and recurrent expenditure. No budgetary allocations were made to the Fund for any Capital expenditure. But, with the 2011 Amendment of the Act, the Fund does not draw anymore budgetary allocations for personnel, recurrent and capital expenditure. The new amendment empowers the Fund to set aside an amount not more than 5 per cent of its yearly collections to meet up with these expenditures, which are approved by the Board of Trustees. Although the salaries of Staff of Fund are comparable to those paid in other agencies in the Federal public education sector, there are allowances, which the Fund pays them, which are outside the approved allowances for Federal Civil Servants in view of the nature of work, they undertake. However, the relevant regulatory bodies of the Federal Government approved such allowances for implementation. For its annual intervention budgets, the Board of Trustees is mandated to submit guidelines to the President through the Minister of Education for approval.

The approval limits of the Chairman of the Board and the Executive Secretary for any financial transaction (procurements and expenditure) are specified in the financial guidelines of the Federal Government and any amount exceeding that has to be approved by the Minister of Education. If the amount involved is beyond the approval limit of the Minister of Education approval must be sought and obtained from the Federal Executive Council after it has been vetted and approved by the relevant Committees of the Board and the Federal Bureau for Public Procurements (if it involves procurement) on the recommendation of the Minister of Education.

All procurements and external services required by the Fund must be advertised to the general public if they exceeded the specified limits and tenders received are opened in the presence of the general public including members of the civil liberties organizations who must be invited.

The Executive Management Committee of the Fund meets weekly to consider issues relating to the day to day administration of the Fund, proposals from Departments and Units, as well as for evaluation of targets set for each department and Unit of the Fund. The Fund also holds quarterly General Meetings with all staff where they are expected to discuss issues relating to their welfare, duties and the general directions of the Fund in line with its goals, mission and objectives and strategic plans. Each Department and Unit of the Fund is expected to meet weekly to brief Staff on the activities of the Fund, assess Staff performance of their scheduled responsibilities, plan targets in line with the goals and objectives of the Fund and to consider issues to be tabled to the Management. The sanctions, behavior and conduct of the Staff of the Fund are guarded by its Staff Conditions of Service and core values, with time limits for meeting day to day duties and responsibilities by staff clearly specified. The Fund conducts staff appraisal twice a year to review the performance of each staff, which usually forms part of the basis for their promotion or otherwise apart from other conditions for promotion like time in rank and written and oral examinations. The Fund engages the services of external auditors on a yearly basis to look into its financial records and some relevant professionals to evaluate its performance as it affects its interventions and day-to-day activities.

The Staff of the Fund are continuously trained within and outside the Country with back to office reports on such trainings submitted by each benefiting staff through his/her head of department /unit to Management on return.

All approvals for the day-to-day expenses must be sought, and obtained, from the Executive Secretary based on the advice of the Internal Audit and the Department of Finance and Investment of the Fund. Similarly, all correspondences coming in or out of the Fund go through the Executive Secretary's Office who gives directives on what to do or requests the relevant head of department/unit for advice.

The researcher also explored the management of the finances of the Fund, of which three stages were identified. Interviewee O, contended that, the first stage is how the agency keeps the fund and manages it, the main aspects of the funding agency is the issue of providing and managing funds. The agency keeps the fund and manages it in such a manner that funds are available as at when necessary and are put in the appropriate instruments. Second, the agency is into the processing of payment to the beneficiaries, because they are the major issue. It is all about how the beneficiaries collect their money and we are also in the value chain of reaching the beneficiaries to get their money. The agency is a primary and important contributor in getting the money across to them, and third, after the agency keep the money, and disburse them to the beneficiaries we also maintain books of account which will show the stewardship of the Fund. The purposes of this approach are to ensure that the agency need to show how the funds have been used and how they are recorded properly to enable the BOT and Management take informed decisions. The essence of these approaches is to provide information to the Board and provide statistics. This somewhat is a show of stewardship to government on how the funds are being used and we need to show to other agencies of government either the Accountant General of the Federation that the fund is being used for its purpose, (Interviewee O).

To determine further the level independence and autonomy of the Fund, Interviewee K responded that because the Fund is managed by a BOT, it has a high level of autonomy and this is reflected in its activities. For instance, Interviewee K highlighted that the highest policy making body in the Fund is the BOT. They make policies for the day to day management and guidance of the Fund's operations and the Executive Secretary and Management are directed by the powers of the BOT to implement those policies on a day to day basis. So, the relationship is not different from that of an agent and its principal and that is basically what it is. The Executive Secretary and Management do nothing that is not

delegated by the BOT. They derive their powers from the BOT because what we are managing is a trust and that is what makes the BOT distinct in both character and form with other conventional Government Boards because while others are performing normal Boards or Council management functions as per the practise everywhere in the world, the BOT is fulfilling its mandate through the collection, management and disbursements of funds as well as for the monitoring of collection of education tax which have been placed by law under it. But the BOT functions through the management which is the technical team that helps the BOT to actualise its major policy decisions by breaking them down to the nitty-gritty, (Interviewee K).

Furthermore, in articulating the relationship between the BOT and the Federal Ministry, as well as separating national broad policy making by the Federal Ministry of Education and implementation by the Fund, the interviewee contended that: The executive arm of government for us here is represented by the Federal Ministry of Education on the Board of Trustees. In addition, the agency also develops policies and pursue actions and all strategies that will further the cause of government in terms of keying in to the transformational initiatives of the President at all times. As such the agency in a way we are more like the foot soldiers of the government always working in tandem with what the broad policies of government are (Interviewee K).

Central to the notion of agency, and agency behaviour, is the idea of policy formulation and implementation. The interviewer also explored policy processes within the Fund from the activities of the Board to that of the Executive sectary and executive management committee. Findings from the field work show that policy making takes on different processes within the agency. For instance, it was uncovered that the Board makes its own policy sometimes and also provides guidelines on how the funds are to be utilized by beneficiaries and also monitors the implementation of same. In addition, findings from the fieldwork identified that

the Executive Secretary is involved in all sorts of policy initiatives before they are tabled in front of the Executive Management Committee, which after seeing the usefulness of such proposals or policy ideas forwarded same to the Board of Trustees for consideration and possible approval, (Interviewee B).

The interviewer also explored the operations of the Fund under both the military and democratic regime, taking into consideration changes in the name from Education Tax Fund to Education Trust Fund in 1999 shortly after the democratisation process. This was to ascertain whether this was done independent of the Fund or was there any sort of consultation. Findings show that there was a mix up in terms of how the Fund was referred to and what the actual name was, and this is due to transition and changes in forms of governance. For instance, at inception, the correct name of the Fund should have been Education Trust Fund but somehow people kept referring to it as Education Tax Fund, so we had to do a letter to government to correct the anomaly. So, the Fund's name was then changed from Education Tax Fund to Education Trust Fund and then recently to Tertiary Education Trust Fund, (Interviewee C)

Legal Issues

It is imperative to note that the operations of agencies are based on statutory recognition. In terms of autonomy, agencies have the mandate for legal matters, especially that which applies directly to the functions and operations of the Fund. The Legal Board Matters Unit is a service unit in the Fund and it provides legal services to the Board of Trustees and Management of the Fund. It provides legal opinions, draft contracts agreements, prepare all the instruments that are required to give legal effects to the operations of the Fund and also supervise the staff working in the unit. The legal officer provides legal advice to those aspects of the operations of the Fund that had legal implications and ensures that we adhered to all the

laws affecting the operations of the Fund. In 2007 the Unit was renamed Legal and Board Matters Unit. The Board secretarial aspect was assigned to the Legal unit and as such the Unit is involved in managing the affairs of the Board of Trustees (Interviewee L).

One of the key points highlighted in the literature on agency is the idea of autonomy in terms policy implementation and initiation. This issue came up in the interview in terms of exploring the behaviour of the agency in relation to legal matters. It is clear from Interviewee K that there is limited intervention from the government and principal in terms of policy implementation and initiation and that the legal boundaries are well established and enshrined in the enabling Act. Interviewee K notes that the Board makes its own policies sometimes and also provides guidelines to beneficiaries on how the funds are to be utilised and how the Agency will monitor its implementation. However, the interviewee observed that there has been situation where the parent Ministry has tried to control how the Fund channels the various intervention policy and the areas to invest. The interviewee noted that the Board was able to resist this meddlesomeness. In addition, to this the Agency decided to set aside certain percentage of Funds for the Federal Ministry of Education, to cater for any request outside the remit of the coverage of the agency. This is to also cater from unexpected requests from the Ministry (Interviewee A).

5.5. Summary of the Findings on Agency Behaviour

In this first section, a description of the functions and behaviour, as well as the operational strategies of TETFund, was provided, through a narrative supported by findings and data from the interviews conducted with key stakeholders and beneficiaries. The research question focuses on understanding the behaviour of an NPM agency within the context of a developing country, thus, some of the interview protocols focused on the three key principles of agencification- that is structural disaggregation, autonomy and performance contracting. It has been established that these three key elements are present in the behaviour

of TETFund at varying degrees. It has been established from the research findings presented above that the separation of an agency from a parent ministry is not absolute, but rather a question of degrees, considering the fact that the enabling law of the Fund clearly delineates the functions, reporting parameters, and responsibilities of the Board of Trustees, Management of the Fund, *vis-a-vis* those of the Federal Ministry of Education and other central government agencies. Also revealed is the fact that the agency earned increased autonomy based on the provisions in the Amendment Act of 2011 which gives the Fund the leverage to set aside any amount not more than 5 per cent of its collection in a given year for its capital, recurrent and overhead expenditures as against such been provided for by national budgetary allocations, which was the practice before the amendment. Indeed, in various literatures, the issue of re-regulation has been understood as another way of cutting increased autonomy of agencies. In the case of TETFund, with earned autonomy following the amendment of the Act as mentioned above, the agency is now mandated to send to the President its intervention budget guidelines/ templates for approval since it does not draw any budgetary allocation that will require approval from the National Assembly. From the research data, there is less interference in the recruitment of staff, policy making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, from the parent ministry and other central regulatory agencies. Also, the findings unveil that the Fund is not over burdened with much regulatory activities and regulations that would impede its operations.

With performance contracting, in as much as there is an oscillation between written and unwritten rules in academic literature, in the case of TETFund- its activities and operations are reported and monitored through its annual and audited reports to the President through the Minister of Education as stipulated in the enabling Act? Similarly, the evaluation and monitoring of its activities and interventions by the National Planning Commission, the overseeing functions of the National Assembly, supervision and policy direction from the

Federal Ministry of Education, adhering to rules and regulations of the National SERVICOM Office as well as some regulatory agencies of government like the Offices of the Auditor General and Accountant General of the Federation respectively and the Bureau for Public Procurements are some of the ways of monitoring the performance of the Fund which also have elements of steering and control. Furthermore, a report on the activities of the Fund is usually submitted to the Federal Minister of Education by the member representing the Ministry on the Board of the Fund.

The implementation of agencification, through the establishment of Agencies does not operate in a vacuum, as it is subject to a range of contextual issues which have often led to a range of controversies both in academic and policy circles. According to Pollitt (2013a), context is crucial- as contextual features such as constitutions, cultures or political systems have major effects on stability and change- and even what is considered as good governance. As mentioned in Chapter One and Chapter Two there have been various public-sector reforms in Nigeria and these reforms were undertaken under different forms of administrations. This raises fundamental questions in relation to NPM guided reforms. The following section will explore the various contextual issues on the New Public Management and Agency in Nigeria, reflecting on the findings from the research.

5.6. Contextual Issues and Agencification in Nigeria

5.6.1. State and Political Context

> "*Power is the lifeblood of administration,*" *Norton Long (1949; 1952)*

O'Toole and Meier (2013) say political context is always the starting place for a theory of context in relation to public management, due to the fact that public organisations are expected to be responsive to the demands of political sovereigns. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) observe that within the political context, the question should be about understanding

the vertical and horizontal dispersions of authority and power. With vertical dispersion, the focus is on how authority is shared between different levels of government. Horizontal dispersion entails how far central executives are able to 'get their acts together,' by ensuring that all ministers act collectively and this dimension ranges from highly coordinated to highly fragmented (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 51). O'Toole and Meier (2013) reiterate that political power can be fragmented, either in formal structures or via rule-governed processes. Formal structures of fragmentation include the separation of powers and federalism, and this allows power to be dispersed amongst political institutions, autonomous or semi-autonomous, regional or local government, (e.g. United States, Nigeria). A unitary political system, on the other hand, concentrates power in a single political institution (e.g., the United Kingdom). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011:54-55) argue the state structure and nature of government combine to exercise significant influence on the speed and scope of public management reforms and interventions.

While some political systems have consensual, or concentrated, political power structures, others operate as an adversarial and fragmented political power. In the case of adversarial political systems, the onus is on the public managers to find a political consensus regarding the bureaucracy and its programmes, whereas in the fragmented political system, public managers rather have to become political actors by seeking to forge a coalition that supports agency actions, (Long, 1949; see also O'Toole and Meier, 2013). Importantly, the variations in political context, or in the concentration of political power, can have two influences on management and organizational performance. First, it can change the mix of managerial activities that are likely to pay off, that is, it enhances some management skills but devalues others. Second, it can increase or decrease how much management itself matters in affecting performance, (O'Toole and Meier, 2013). With TETFund, its enabling Act (2011) gives the BOT and Management a clear mandate to operate. In addition, the Act gives room for both

BOT and Management to be creative and innovative in their management of the Fund, through the creation of programmes of intervention, the creation of Departments in line with the changing needs and demands of beneficiaries.

Associated with political context analysis are the roles, functions and influence of ministers and mandarins. In some countries, executive politicians and senior public servants are involved in the public management reforms and implementations; however, the relationship between the two varies from country to country (jurisdictional interpretations) (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011:54-55). To Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011:54-55), the top civil servants constitute that main part of the elite that makes crucial decisions about reforms. This also raises some fundamental questions: What kind of relationships, bargain or deals are agreed between top politicians and top civil servants?; Are there consensual agreement on the behavior amongst them?; Are political careers separate from, or integrated with, the careers of the mandarins?; Are senior civil service positions themselves politicized in the sense that most of their occupants are known to have, and have been, chosen partly because they have specific party political sympathies or affiliations?, and finally, How secure are senior civil service jobs? These questions are particularly important when exploring the success or failure of public sector reforms. However, in the case of TETFund, the Executive Secretary must have a professional background in education. So far, no politician has been appointed as the Executive Secretary of the Fund since its inception. Section 8 (c- e) of the Fund's enabling Act states that the Executive Secretary should be a person with a good knowledge of, and with cognate academic and administrative experience in, tertiary education, having the qualifications and experience appropriate to performing the functions of that office under this Act. In addition, they should hold office for a period of 5 years, in the first instance. They may be eligible for re-appointment for a further term of 4 years only, and on such terms and

conditions as to emoluments, and conditions of service as may be specified in his letter of appointment.

The structure and functions of political institutions are shaped by the philosophy and culture of the administration and governance in any particular country. Rechtsstaat's model and the Anglo-Saxon models have been identified as two models within public administration. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) note that very few systems fall between these two models which appear to be inherently inconsistent and irreconcilable. However, Ongaro, 2009: 252-63) argues that the 'Napoleonic' states, (including France and Italy), constitute an important sub-family in the Rechtsstaat model (Ongaro, 2009: 252-63). From the Rechtsstaat perspective, it is said that the state is a central integrating force within society, and its main concerns are with the preparation, promulgation and enforcement of laws, (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 62). As such, most senior civil servants will be trained in the law and, indeed, a large and separate body of specifically administrative law will have been created. In such a culture, the instinctive bureaucratic stance will tend to be one of rule-following and precedent, and the actions of both individual public servant and individual citizen will be set in the context of correctness and legal control, (Pollitt and Bouchaert, 2011: 62). By contrast, the 'public interest model' – the Anglo- Saxon model - accords the state a less extensive or dominant role within society, as the term government is preferred above the state. Government (rather than the state) is regarded as something of a necessary evil, whose powers are to be no more than are absolutely necessary, and whose ministers and officials must constantly be held to public account by elected parliaments and through other means. Arguably, whilst the law is an essential component of governance within the Anglo-Saxon model, it is not dominant in comparison to the Rechtsstaat model, (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 62).

In Nigeria, the structure and functions of political institutions are stated in the Constitution. As such, the model of Federalism that the Country follows provides a format for execution of

roles and duties of the three tiers of government- namely executive, legislative and judicial. The appointment of ministers is done by both the executive and legislative arms of government, whilst the appointment of the Boards and Chief Executives of agencies is the exclusive prerogative of the executive arm of the government. The political context in which the Fund operates is in accordance with the guidelines set by the Federal Government and the laws establishing it as passed by the National Assembly.

In comparative public management literature - political context is viewed as important foundation to understanding contextual issues. As mentioned in the Chapter Two, according to the 1999 constitution, Nigeria is a Federal Republic with three tiers of government: Federal, State and Local. There are 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, which has an autonomous status and is the seat of government, (Otobo, 1999). According to ECA (2010), the form of government is a Federal Presidential System of Government. The President exercises executive powers, combining the roles of Head of State, Head of Government and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Within this Federal republican framework, there is the distribution/separation of powers between the federal, state and local governments - what Pollitt and Bouchaert (2011) call the vertical dispersion of power. The Nigerian Public Service is made up of government ministries, extra ministerial departments, statutory agencies and corporations.

To Ekaete (2007:13) the structure of the government of any nation is a result of the complex interplay of its socio-economic aspiration and development objectives, cultural influences and political considerations on the one hand, and the state of evolution of the country's public service administration on the other. Chapter Two addresses section 13 to 23 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigerian which prescribes the objectives and directive principles of policy of the state covering political objectives, economic objectives, social objectives, educational objectives, foreign policy objectives, and environmental objectives, obligations

of the mass media, national ethics and directives on Nigerian cultures. Nigeria comprises diverse ethnic groups and this has led to controversial debates on the structure of the civil service. In order to address this, the 1979 and 1999 constitutions enshrined the concept of federal character. This is a principle that aims to promote and ensure that appointments to public service institutions fairly reflect the linguistic, ethnic, religious and geographical diversity of the country. According to Section 11, No 3 of the 1999 constitution, the composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies, and the conduct of its affairs, shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity. It also commands national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there will be no predominance of persons from a few states or ethnic or sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies. Section 11, No 4 focuses on the recognition of diversity, the composition of the government of a state, a local government council, or any of the agencies of such government or council, and the conduct of the affairs of the government or council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognise the diversity of the people within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the people of the Federation. According to the ECA (2010), the practice has resulted in a confused balancing of the merit principle and the quota systems with a heavy dose of arbitrariness.

The principle of Federal Character which states that selection for appointment must be based on equality without sacrificing merit, however its application has generated a lot of tension as in most cases limited attention was given to merit in filling vacancies in the public service. In respect of TETFund, there was strict compliance to the principle of Federal Character without subjugating merit to selection based on quota system. Due to this, TETFund has qualified staff employed on merit and the staff composition reflects the Federal Character in terms of geographical spread of the country. This has had positive impact on the performance

of the Fund. This point was mentioned by interviewee L, who noted that recruitment into the Fund has been guided by the provisions for the law and appointments to the Fund, is regulated by the Federal Character Commission. The process is such that the Agency has to submit list of those to be interviewed for jobs to the Federal Character Commission in order to obtain what is classed the Certificate of Compliance. Thus, appointment has been such that the Agency creates a balance between the professional cadre and technical staff (Interviewee L). Further it is noted that the recruitment process has been dynamic and based on very innovative ways of advertising and this can be further gleaned from the current work force.

The Nigerian Federal Civil Service Commission is a constitutional body, established under Section 153 (1d) of the 1999 Constitution. It is empowered to (i) appoint qualified candidates to staff the different Ministries/Extra Ministerial Departments in the federal civil service, (ii) make recommendations to government on personnel policies aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the civil service and ensure that personnel decisions reflect the stated policies and interests of the government (Nigeria, Federal Republic of 1999; cited in ECA, 2010). Moreover, the powers, objectives and composition of the Commission are to firmly establish Nigeria as a "united, strong and self-reliant nation, a great and dynamic economy, a just and egalitarian society, a land of bright and full of opportunity for all citizens and a free and democratic society," (Nigeria, Federal Republic of 1995:10) through non-partisanship, adherence to rules and regulations and best practices (ECA, 2010).

In the data collection process, some contextual issues were raised in the interviews. The interviewer raised the question of what led to the establishment of the Fund in order to ascertain whether it was based on political issues. Interviewee C noted that the Fund was established as a matter of policy expediency against the backdrop of unrest amongst the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), mainly against the military rule in the 1990s.

The Military Government headed by General Babangida, came up with the suggestion of additional funds for higher institutions in the country. Thus, what followed was a negotiation between ASUU and Federal Government which resulted in the idea of taxing all registered Companies doing business in Nigeria, 2% of their accessible profit as Education Tax for the purpose of funding higher educational institutions. As such the Federal Inland Review was mandated to collect the 2% Education Tax and transfer at the beginning of each year to TETFund account with the Central Bank of Nigeria (Interviewee C).

Some of the public sector reforms literature in Nigeria, in particular, and Africa, in general, had mentioned these external pressures largely responsible for the various reforms. However, in order to confirm this, the interviewer raised the question of whether the creation of the agency - the TETFund - could be seen as a result of other factors and not only the pressure from the Academic Staff Unions of Universities. Interviewee C notes that in the case of Nigeria, the creation of the Fund was basically influenced by internal pressures following negotiations between the government and ASUU. Indeed, the Fund was seen as a solution to a range of issues that led to the strike actions by ASUU, such as poor facilities and infrastructure and poor remuneration of the academic and technical staff of the universities (Interviewee N). The Fund also was seen as a way of addressing the challenges of learning and teaching as well as research (Interviewee, N). The above points from interviewee C and N, was further corroborated by interviewee F:

> *I am not too sure if international agencies were involved in the setting up of Education Tax Fund. As I said before, it was basically ASUU that clamoured for it. The union felt that since government revenue cannot meet all the demands from all the sectors of the economy particularly the education sector which was grossly underfunded, it was necessary to rely on another source outside government for regular funding of the educational sector and that was how the private sector was brought in to support government in funding the educational sector. However, that is not to say that the sector is not receiving regular grant from government.*

Attempt was made to unravel some of the other issues associated with the emergence of the Fund. Interviewee K noted that the creation of the Agency could be linked to a protest against the Structural Adjustment Programme, as this was part of the reasons for the strike by the members of ASUU. The structural adjustment programme was questioned in terms of how it was impacting on the economy negatively in general and the education sector in particular, (Interviewee K).

The quotation above raises a fundamental question in terms of what has been stated in academic literature - that the reforms did not take into consideration contextual issues and actually worsened the already precarious situations in most Countries.

The interviewer also explored the role of the Executive Secretary in order to understand the extent of distribution and dispersion of authority and power, although enshrined in the Fund's Enabling Act, to see whether it actually operates in reality. Interviewee C noted, the Fund was established by law and the law clearly stated in the mandate under section 7 sub-section 1 as to what to do with the resources and that the Executive Secretary is the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of the Fund, and works with the Board of Trustees on the basis of delegated powers of the BOT. In other words, there is a Board of Trustees that manages the Fund, but the day to day management of the institution rests on the Executive Secretary and the Management (Interviewee C).

After establishing the role of the Executive Secretary, the researcher sought to identify how Executive Secretaries were appointed in order to ascertain whether there were issues of political patrimonialism in the appointment of Executive Secretary. From the comment from Interviewee C, the appointment of the Executive Secretary is enshrined in the enabling law of the Fund and the law stipulates that the appointment of the Executive Secretary as the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer is done by the President on the recommendation of the

Minister of Education. The Executive Secretary is appointed for a term of 5 years in the first instance and renewable under the TETFund Act for another term of 4 years which sums it to 9 years. Interviewee C retorted that reappointment is always at the discretion of the president.

The activities of the Fund are overseen by Board of Trustees, which is made up of the Board of Trustees from the six geo-political zones of the country, representatives of the Federal Ministry of Education, Federal Ministry of Finance, Federal Inland Revenue and representatives of Regulatory Agencies of benefiting Institutions, namely the National Universities Commission, the National Board for Technical Education, and the National Commission for Colleges of Education. It was imperative to explore how the BOT has changed over the years, in order to identify any form of political issues or context. Interviewee B noted that following the Amendment of the enabling Act in 2011, the previous composition of the Board of Trustees which comprised the chairman and representative from the six geo-political zones of the country and representatives of Federal Inland Revenue Services, was expanded to include representatives of, the National Universities Commission, the National Board for Technical Education and the National Board for Colleges of Education.

How the composition of the Board affected decision-making in the Fund was also examined in attempt to identify whether there are political interferences. In particular regarding whether there have been attempts to enforce decisions of their various ministries on the Board of Trustees at its meetings, given the inclusion of representatives of the Federal Ministry of Education and Federal Ministry of Finance. Interviewee B observed that the essence of having representatives of the Federal Ministry of Education and Finance on the Board of Trustees is to ensure that the Fund is aware of various government policies, comply with the laws and regulations in relation to its interventions and activities. It is clear, that these representatives did not interfere in decision making processes, but only assisted in

terms of providing quick and relevant information that could allow the Agency take precise decisions on its interventions.

It was considered imperative to explore whether tension existed between the Board of Trustees and Executive Secretary who are all appointees of the President. Comments from Interviewee H captured the rather complex relationship between the Board and the Executive Secretary;

> *Well, I worked under two Chairmen. One xxxxx and for a considerable period I had no Board as provided for by law. But government said in the absence of the Board, the Ministers will perform oversight responsibilities or perform the functions of the Board in their absence. So in all, I think I have worked with 5 Boards. xxxxx regular Board, 3 Ministers of Education and then xxxxx Board... I think my experience in the last four years is generally speaking you have no frictions or conflicts as such. What I did was to confine myself to the provisions of the TETFund Act. We were all there to serve the public interest and the public interest was defined in the enabling law. So, I had no encroachment of role. Nobody tried to play the kind of role that he or she was not supposed to play. I don't think the Board was overbearing because it was also a democratic process in the sense that the Board also had committees. So, I worked with not only the Chairman but all other Board members not only at the level of the Board but also at the level of Board committees.*

Since there have been three Board of Trustees, questions were asked about the qualities of the appointees, in order to ascertain whether they were politicians. Interviewee G noted, the 1st Board was in office for a short period of time and not a lot was achieved in terms of staffing. However, while Members of the 2nd Board of Trustees were all technocrats, the 3rd Board of Trustees were mainly politicians.

The point raised by the researcher whether issues of neo-patrimonialism, as its affects the appointees of the BOT who were politicians affected the mode of recruitment into the Fund. Interviewee G was of the opinion that this sort of thing is inevitable as the way politicians view things would be very different to that of technocrats.

According to Ayee (2008), neo-patrimonialism is an important, non-coercive form of consolidating power that relies on patronage. Therefore, political incumbency, public benefits and opportunities have been distributed along political lines. Thus, in their quest for self-preservation, state elites have dispensed government-controlled resources — jobs, licenses, contracts and credit to select political allies. They have mediated access to economic opportunities in favour of close associates, so as to enhance their hold over state power, (Ayee, 2008: 26). However, it should be noted that the Funds Enabling Act clearly specifies the disbursement ratio of funds to beneficiaries, so it was impossible for BOT of the Fund be they politicians or technocrats to favour one beneficiary over another. More so the education tax collection every year is made public and the beneficiaries can easily calculate or determine what they are expected to get from the Fund at any given intervention year.

Corruption and lack of accountability have been identified as problems within public sector reforms. Since the 1990s, levels of corruption have been attracting considerable attention in both developing and developing countries, (World Bank, 2008). According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) *Handbook for Fighting Corruption* (1999), corruption can assume various forms, "It encompasses unilateral abuses by government officials such as embezzlement and nepotism, as well as abuses linking public and private actors such as bribery, extortion, influence peddling and fraud. Corruption arises in both political and bureaucratic offices and can be petty or grand, organized or disorganized," (cited in ICHRP, 2009). Corruption is the abuse of power for private gain, (ICHRP, 2009). Whilst grand corruption is used to encapsulate high level corrupt practices involving people in high places such as government officials, petty corruption, also called "low" and "street" corruption, describes corruption that people experience in their encounters with public officials and when they use public services, (ICHRP, 2009:15). According to

Kofi Annan, corruption is an insidious scourge that impoverishes many Countries, and affects us all. It creates discrimination between different groups in a society, feeds inequality and injustice, discourages foreign growth and it is indeed a major obstacle to political stability, and to successful social and economic development of any nation, (cited in Obasanjo, 2007: 2).

In addition, there is political, administrative, corporate, and institutional corruption. Political corruption involves politicians such as law-makers (monarchs, dictators, legislators) acting in their role as creators of the rules and standards by which a polity operates. In the course of their responsibilities, such officials seek bribes or funds for their political and personal benefit and provide favours to their supporters at the expense of broader public benefits (ICHRP, 2009). Administrative corruption includes the use of bribery and favouritism to lower taxes, escape regulations and win low-level procurement contracts, whilst corporate corruption occurs between private businesses and suppliers or private service providers. It also involves illegal behaviour by corporate officials for private monetary gain. Institutionalised corruption identifies the behaviour of those who exploit institutional positions to influence institutional processes and actions, such as law enforcement personnel and members of the judiciary; operational corruption, narrower, describes specific activities and goals, (ICHRP, 2009).

In Africa, corruption has been identified as one of the major impediments to successful public sector reforms. In Nigeria, corruption in the public sector has been a challenge for various governments. The performance of public organisations can be affected if corrupt practices are left unaddressed. In his speech titled moving on: the significance of reform and change in Nigeria by (then) President Olusegun Obasanjo, (2007:3), who noted that: One of the greatest tragedies of military rule in recent times is that corruption was allowed to grow

197

unchallenged, and unchecked, even when it was glaring for everybody to see. The rules and regulations for doing official business were deliberately ignored, set aside or by passed to facilitate corrupt practices.

The researcher explored the issue of corruption in relation to the Fund and how accountability is maintained and sustained in its operations. The interviewer raised the question on how the Finance and Investment Department operates, in such a way that corruption is avoided. Interviewee O is of the opinion that the main aspects of the funding agency are the issue of providing and managing funds. The interviewee noted that the agency keeps the fund and manages it in such a manner that fund is available as at when necessary and are put in the appropriate instruments. The way the agency processes the payment to beneficiaries allows for transparency. According to Interviewee O, once the fund is disbursed to the beneficiaries, we keep account in order to show good stewardship of the Fund. The purpose of this process is to show how the funds have been used and how they are recorded properly to enable the BOT and Management take informed decisions. Interviewee O noted that the Finance and Investment Department provides the information to the Board, supported with statistics. The process used by the Agency will allow the Federal government and other Agencies such as the Accountant General of the Federal know how the funds are being used in terms of various interventions (Interviewee O). The comments from Interviewee G also indicates the level of transparency that exists in the Fund. For instance, the process of payments to the beneficiaries was explored in relation to the issues of corruption. Interviewee G states that the process starts from when the beneficiary sends a proposal to the Fund through the Executive secretary, which is then sent to the Project Management Department for vetting and other considerations after which recommendations are sent to the Director of Finance for release of Funds by the Executive secretary. Even the structure of the Finance Department allows for transparency (Interviewee G). For instance,

the Director of Finance has three Assistant Directors working with him. One is in charge of Treasury, another in charge of Management Accounting and the last in charge of Final Accounting. Interviewee G details the process of approval: The Finance Director sends recommendations and approvals for payments on proposals from beneficiaries from the Executive Secretary to the Assistant Director in charge of Management Accounts who will look into these and send them to staff under his supervision who will thereafter raise a payment voucher. A payment voucher will be raised in the name of the Institution concerned and sent to the Internal Audit (who will look at the voucher, the payee, the amount in words and figures), for vetting and auditing and thereafter, if satisfied, the voucher is stamped and sent back to the Finance Department for disbursement via e-payment. Disbursements and payments are only made after final authorisation by the Executive Secretary. Since 2009, the Nigerian government stopped cheque payments for all financial transactions in the Country so all our payments to our beneficiaries are electronic payments (e-payment) through the Fund's designated banks, (Interviewee G).

In addition, question was also raised in relation to how payments are processed. Interviewee G discussed the various systems ranging from beneficiary payments, consultant payments, staff loan payments, book development payments, research grant payments etc. Interviewee G observed that if an approval comes in from beneficiary institutions, we pay through the Funds account with the Central Bank of Nigeria and if it is staff loan we pay through the Funds account with the Guaranty Trust Bank. For book development interventions we pay through the Funds Enterprise Bank account while the Research Grants are paid through a Skye bank account. Payment to contractors for supplies and other services come through the Fund's First Bank account, (Interviewee G).

Similarly, questions were raised on how the payments are credited into beneficiary accounts, Interviewee G observed that when an approval comes, the Director of Finance and

199

www.manaraa.com

Investment sends it to management Accounts Unit which raises a voucher, which is countersigned by other officers then sent to the Audit Unit. After it has been certified okay by Audit Unit it is then sent to the e-payment office which is under the Treasury Division. In addition, the e-payment office will raise the mandate schedule, which is sent to Final Accounts which will check the e-payment, the payee, the account details, the amount and purpose of the money. The interviewee mentioned that if all the documentation is certified correct it is then passed to the Director of Finance and Investment who passes same to the ES after vetting to seek final approval for release of funds to the benefitting institution via e-payment by the bank, (Interviewee G)

Identified in discourses on corruption are the issues of authorisation and signatories and this were raised with Interviewee G who pointed out that there are *two* categories of signatories: A and B: Category A is made up of the Executive Secretary and the Director of Corporate Planning while category B is the Director of Finance and Director of Project Management. The interviewee also noted that no payment can be made by the bank without any one of the signatories on category A endorsing the payment. This process is to ensure accountability and control, *(*Interviewee G*)*

The researcher also examined how the money disbursed by the Fund and its beneficiaries were monitored. Interviewee O noted:

> *Our external auditors do. They go to our beneficiaries; they open book of accounts to check if the money we disbursed to beneficiaries have been used for what was accounted for. Also, the office of the Accountant General of the Federation also monitors this money every year on our behalf. Even last year there was a query from the Accountant General's Office that some of the money given to the beneficiaries was not judiciously used. The External Auditors also check our own accounts internally on a yearly basis.*

To ensure probity and accountability, the Fund as a matter of policy decided that benefiting institutions must have dedicated accounts for all its disbursements to them. This is to avoid a situation where disbursements are deployed wrongly. These dedicated accounts are usually monitored by the staff of the relevant Departments and Units of the Fund and appropriate External Financial Consultants. Such Consulting Firms as well as those involved in monitoring projects must use Professionals that are registered with their respective Professional bodies for the purposes of sanctions in the event of collusions or Professional misbehaviour. At such monitoring the cash flow and account balances of the Institutions are matched against the implementation stages of the various projects to ensure that funds have been judiciously used. Similarly, the Fund has a dedicated account in the Central Bank for all education tax collections (as mentioned in earlier), which has provided a platform for avoiding diversion of collections to other areas or misallocation of funds from the Federation Account.

The Fund does not award contracts and its interventions are need- driven. This is perhaps the first of its kind in the history of interventions in Nigeria. The beneficiaries award the contracts for their various projects through their internal systems, but the minutes of the meetings of relevant authorising organs have to be sent to the Fund in respect of each project, and duly endorsed by the Chairman of the Council of the Institution and the Registrar who is the Secretary of the Governing Council of the Institution. This further reinforces the point that all the intervention projects of the Fund are need-driven as they are identified by the beneficiaries based on their needs and never forced on them. By allowing the beneficiaries award contracts through their internal processes, tensions and expectations on the Fund have been considerably reduced. Furthermore, this gives the beneficiaries a sense of responsibility as they decide what they want to use their funds for, based on their needs -as long as these are consistent with the mandate and guidelines of the Fund. Similarly, it allowed for

participation of the various benefiting institutional Communities in decision making processes in respect of what projects to be executed with the Funds interventions. The role of the Fund is to disburse, monitor the utilization of funds released and the projects and ensure that there is not only value for money, but also value to the core academic areas of need in the projects being executed. The Fund has a chain of guidelines and time lines in its project cycles for beneficiaries. Because of this policy the Fund does not have any abandoned project in any of its benefiting institutions. It only has delays in deploying projects which are occasioned by factors external to and beyond its control. Since the public knows that contracts for interventions are not awarded by the Fund the pressure on it is significantly reduced. It has also enshrined transparency and accountability as it is easier for the benefiting institutions to go through the due process themselves at the Bureau for Procurement than it would have been if the Fund was to pursue this for all its beneficiaries. In a way, it has also promoted efficient and effective service delivery and timeliness in the completion of projects. This policy has earned the Fund a lot of respect and confidence across the country (including the tax payers).

The above are part of the Funds strategic management methods and approaches geared towards transparency and accountability and it also allows various beneficiaries claim ownership of their projects. However, in awarding the contracts for the projects and executing, them all guidelines of public procurements and other guidelines outlined by the Fund must be strictly adhered to. These have helped in reducing expectations from the public and the various interest groups in Nigeria since they know that the Fund does not award contracts. In comparison to other interventionist agencies of government, both past and present, where there exist pressures for contracts; in the case of TETFund this problem is non-existent.

Quarterly publications in the Fund's in-house Magazine, and in National Print Media, have helped in terms of the Fund's accounting to the Public and making the beneficiaries also accountable. Unlike a situation where in-house magazines are only used to publicize activities of agencies, the Funds magazine includes all disbursements to institutions, all level of beneficiaries capacity utilization and un-accessed funds as a result of low capacity utilization, the total disbursements in a given year, a summary of disbursements of the year to individual institutions, a summary of disbursements to all institutions in all Federal and State owned institutions in each State of the Federation as well as list of defaulting beneficiaries. This has not only provided information on the Fund's activities but also make the Management of the various institutions held responsible by members of their individual Communities for any low capacity utilization.

Another strategy which has helped the Fund avoid delays is that individual benefitting institutions must seek approval themselves from the due process office for their contracts before they are awarded.

Another important aspect of strategic management used by the Fund is through regular annual disbursements which have ensured continuity in implementation as long as the beneficiaries met laid down procedures. The Fund's collections are not appropriated but approved by the President and so there are no delays like if they were to come through budgetary allocations which would have to be appropriated and approved by various arms of Government. This has also helped a great deal as monies meant for disbursements or disbursed by the Fund are not mopped up at the end of the year for return to the Central Bank.

In finding out whether there has been money missing, or things done with the Fund's money outside the law, Interviewee G noted that there has not been any case of missing disbursements and the Agency does not operate outside its mandate.

Questions were also raised about when disbursement of funds to the benefiting institutions commenced, it was gathered from the comments from Interviewee O that the disbursement started in 1999. However, prior to that the collections between 1994 and 1999, when disbursements of funds to beneficiaries commenced, were stashed in an ETF dedicated account in the Central Bank (Interviewee O).

Although the Fund was established in 1993, collection did not commence until 1994. However, disbursement as mentioned above started in 1999 (as mentioned above); the interviewer raised the question on why this was so. Interviewee G retorted that this was due to the fact that there was no Board of Trustees in place. In fact, the 1st Board was constituted in 1998 by Abacha despite the fact that the Secretariat had been put in place and Directors for the Fund recruited in 1996 by the Federal Ministry of Education (Interviewee G).

Furthermore, the researcher explored the procurement process within the Fund, following the introduction of the Public Procurement Act, 2007. Interviewee D mentioned that the procurement activities of the Fund are basically linked to the Public Procurement Act that stipulates what the responsibilities are, and we have to go by them. Due to the fact that procurement is based on selection process, in particular the selection of contractors or vendors, or consultants for either goods and works or services as the case may be, the agency followed processes which are in line with the procurement Act 2007, (Interviewee D).

The researcher explored what was in place before the introduction of the Procurement Act 2007, to establish whether this was in response to issues of corruption. Interviewee F observed that before the advent of the Procurement Act in 2007 in the Country, procurement

was almost like open trading. For instance, a supplier would have been asked to give a quotation and the Agency would decide whether or not to purchase an item, within the limit set for each category. Some procurement that was not up to N2 million was normally done without any advertisement and at least three quotations or more would have been obtained before any purchase is made from a supplier. However, following the introduction of the Procurement Act, there are processes that stipulate which procedure the agency followed, (Interviewee D). The Procurement Act is geared towards ensuring transparency and reducing favouritism. However, even before the Act, the agency had had some procedures in place to promote transparency and accountability.

In addition, the policy of the Fund on disbursements that requires beneficiaries to account for funds disbursed to them before further disbursements are made to them have made it easier for the Fund to ensure transparency. At first, it was strange to most beneficiaries, because it was 'no more business as usual'. The names of defaulting institutions were published in newspapers -to not only shame them, but to let the public know of their actions. With this, it was easy for the public to understand the reasons why further funding has not been provided to these defaulting institutions.

The waves of reform at the time of Obasanjo's administration (1999 - 2007) also created an environment conducive for beneficiaries to embrace transparency and accountability entrenched in the Funds operations. Similarly, the anti-corruption stance of the Fund which was strengthened by the anti-corruption agencies presentations on anti-corruption to beneficiaries at the Fund's annual Strategic Planning Workshops with beneficiaries sent signals to the beneficiaries to enhance and embrace change.

Similarly, the Fund in its drive for entrenching transparency and accountability in the utilization of its disbursements to institutions engaged with the various Unions of the

benefiting institutions with a view to briefing them on its activities, details of its disbursements and backlogs of disbursements to institutions. This has kept the Management of these institutions in check in terms of ensuring that funds disbursed to them are judiciously utilized to enable them draw on further disbursements. This is illustrative in view of the fact that one of these unions ASUU was instrumental in the creation of the Fund, and as such would do all that is necessary in their various institutions to ensure that transparency and accountability were upheld while utilizing TETFund disbursements.

The commitment of the Fund to transparency and accountability is also acknowledged by one of the top policy makers in the supervisory Ministry who noted that the Board of Trustees, Executive Secretary and the entire Fund have guaranteed that transparency and accountability exists in its operation, (Interviewee S).

5.6.2 Organisational Environment

Within this framework of analysis, the environment can be classified as a more 'immediate' context (the here and now) and context itself connotes the broader context- that is, an object of undetermined extension. Invariably, context is more than the organisational environment; it extends to other broader fabrics of the society in which an organisation operates, (see, e.g. Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). Therefore, the broader context is important to understanding an organisational behaviour because that is where action takes place, (see, e.g. Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015).

As organisations are generally open systems, environmental forces can impact on the performance of agencies. Within this contextual framework, the onus is on the Managers to monitor the environment by seeking to tap aspects of it for organizational purposes or buffer organizational production processes from it (O'Toole and Meier, 2013). According to Osborn and Hunt (1972), the environment of a given organization consists of all those organizations

with which it must interact to grow and survive, (cited in O'Toole and Meier, 2013). Indeed, the environment - whether it consists of many or few elements - influences the management and performance of an agency. With TETFund, it can be said that as the Fund did embrace reforms so too did all the Public Agencies in Nigeria and its supervisory Ministry, as well as those of its beneficiaries which are all Public Tertiary Institutions. This is because of the political commitment on Government's part towards reforming the public service in Nigeria.

It is known that complexity, turbulence and munificence are some of the dimensions of environmental contexts. Complexity is about the degree of homogeneity/heterogeneity and concentration/dispersion of the environment. The argument here is that the more different kinds of organizations occupy a public agency's environment, the more complex it is. The more dispersed, rather than concentrated, these other organizations are, the more separate organizations that are clearly relevant to the core organization's task, the more complex is the core organization's environment, (O'Toole and Meir, 2013). According to Andrews (2009), greater environmental complexity is associated with lower organisational performance. O'Toole and Meir (2013) argue similarly that the more complex an organization's environment, the more managerial effort we would expect is devoted to managing outward. With TETFund, the environment is not complex in that the enabling Acts of the Regulatory Agencies that relate with the Fund do not give powers of sanctions over it other than to submit reports to the Executive and Legislative Arms of Government on the activities of the Fund, and where issues are raised the Fund responds appropriately.

According to Aldrich (1979), turbulence relates to externally driven changes that are obscure to administrators and difficult to plan for. Indeed, turbulences entail uncertainty; rapid changes that are completely unpredictable, and this can affect operations of an agency or organization to a great extent, (e.g. Andrews, 2008). Munificence entails the

availability of resources to the various arms of Government and Central Agencies that relate to another public organization in a given context. In the case of TETFund, there are no problems with resources in terms of budgeting and budgetary allocations that could impede on its performance.

As discussed previously, the Fund does not rely on budgetary allocation from the Federal Government, as with other Agencies in Nigeria. As stated previously, the Fund derives its funding from the 2% education tax on all accessible profit collected by the FIRS from all registered companies in Nigeria. As Interviewee M noted:

> *The law establishing the Fund is very clear and it has indicated how funds should be disbursed so the Fund is not supposed to be subjected to the National Assembly. Because the law has stipulated how allocations should be done by the Fund so there was no need for the National Assembly appropriating any fund to it again. The education tax by law should be allocated and disbursed by the Board based on equality amongst states and geo-political zones. But the National Assembly felt that it is their constitutional duty to appropriate funds that are coming from the Federation Account, (Interviewee M) (as quoted above)*

Unlike some other agencies, the Fund is allowed, by its enabling Act, to invest its collections in appropriate and safe securities. Profits derived from such are then ploughed back into the dedicated account of the Fund, for further disbursement to beneficiaries. For example, in Tanzania, Pollitt and Talbot (2003) noted that the reform took place in an environment of weak fiscal control. The release of budgeted funds to Ministries was problematic. Indeed, the unpredictability of resource flow from the Treasury impacts on both vocational and operational efficiency of an agency, (Pollitt and Talbot, 2003).

Mentioned in the section on the organisational environmental context, is how broader context is central to understanding organisational behaviour. The argument here is that the more different kinds of organizations occupy a public agency's environment, the more complex it is. According to O'Toole and Meir (2013), the more dispersed, rather than concentrated these

organizations are, the more separate organizations that a clearly relevant to the core organization's task and the more complex is the core organization's environment.

As mentioned earlier this is not the case with TETFund. As already discussed in above, TETFund collaborates with a range of Federal Ministries and Agencies as well as the National Assembly and this has been explored in relation to structural disaggregation and autonomy. The Fund operates within a framework that is far from complex. The Tertiary Education Fund Act (2011) has provided a clear vision, goal and mission for the Agency and as a result, friction has been clearly reduced.

Strategic Fora for Interactions

Strategic management is important to understanding the behaviour and operations of a public organisation or agency, like the TETFund. In attempt to unravel whether there are strategic management initiatives in place within the Fund, various questions were asked, and information was sort from documents.

Interviewer J was asked whether there exist Strategic Plans for the operations of the Fund and in response the comment below was made:

> *Well there has been a plan in the sense that everything is working according to the plan, whether you call it strategic or not is another matter, but I tried in 2008 to insist that the beneficiaries must submit a five-year strategic plan and a two-year operational plan. I remember when xxxxx was the Director of Operations, I introduced it and then we even developed the template and gave the Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Education. But very few responded. You need the plan so that it is not when money comes, or money becomes available that you begin to think about what to do with it. For instance, over the next 10 years if you know you are going to get about N50million or N10milion from the Fund, you can have your strategic plan because you know that the money will come and the good thing with TETFund intervention is that unlike the National Budget the money is not mopped up at the end of the year. So, you are sure about the time you receive your letter of allocation, the money is in the kitty in the Central Bank. So we insisted that institutions have a five-year strategic plan in their own interest. For example, if a V.C or Rector or Provost is appointed for a period of 4*

or 5 years as the case may be, there should be some vision, something that you will want to do within the 5-year period and therefore you should look at the basket of funds available from the National Budget, the internally generated revenue, intervention agencies, Alumni support, endowments etc so that you can have a strategic plan. My plan from TETFund intervention is to improve the teaching and learning environment so that no student sits on the floor at lectures and no student hangs on the windows and no science student goes into an empty laboratory, so we insisted that there has to be this kind of strategic plan.

Public Relations and Corporate Planning Strategic Management initiatives were also introduced and mainstreamed into the operations and activities of the Fund. The Fund decided that to make its activities known to all beneficiaries, stakeholders, taxpayers and the general public decided to create *fora* for engagement of various interest groups. At such, meetings the intended interventions of the Fund in a given year and the allocations both new and, in the past, are spelt out. Similarly, at such meetings the Fund outlines its challenges and any perceived threats to its existence as a body. It also listens to feedback from all in respect of its interventions with a view to reviewing some or explaining rationale behind some of its policies or strategies. Example of such *fora* is:

  i)   Yearly Strategic Planning Workshops with beneficiaries

  ii)   Taxpayers Forum

  iii)   Annual meetings with the leadership of the benefiting institutions and briefings at the National Congresses of the various Unions of these Institutions.

  iv)   Zonal meetings with beneficiaries where exhibitions of their various projects with pictures and programmes implemented with TETFund interventions are displayed and explained to the general public and the media

v) Presence of the Fund in both the electronic and print media via interviews, jingles, adverts, documentaries etc.

Top government functionaries, Politicians from the National Assembly, Captains of industries, Government Anti-Corruption Agencies like EFCC and ICPC etc., are also invited to these meetings to keep them abreast of the activities of the Fund in respect of promoting transparency and accountability.

The Fund ensured that it established a strong collaborative relationship with the regulatory bodies of government like the Federal Inland Revenue Service charged with the responsibilities of tax collection and the Central Bank of Nigeria. Monitoring and Reconciliations of tax collections with the FIRS and the Central Bank have been a very important strategic tool employed by the Fund in ensuring that all records of collections are accurate, and collections are paid into the Funds account in the Central Bank as appropriate. In order to encourage the Federal Inland Revenue Service towards this initiative which is an *ad hoc* assignment, the Fund decided to pay some percentage of the collections from such a tax drive to the service. The Fund agreed on a fixed rate of 4% of the total collection, (Interviewee H). For instance, in 1999 the Fund had N10 billion as education tax collection and grew to N18 billion in 2002 and currently the total collection is around N183 billion annually (Interviewee O).

To create impact through its interventions, the Fund strategically resisted including private institutions amongst its beneficiaries. The demand for this was opposed by the Fund at various levels within and outside government. The Fund received the support of the Academic Staff Unions of benefiting institutions and the National Assembly, which refused the enlistment of private tertiary institutions as its beneficiaries in the Amended Act of 2011. In a recent interview, the Executive Secretary noted that including private institutions would jeopardise the focus of the Agency. The Executive Secretary further added that the

211

government had been creating the enabling environment for private institutions to flourish as such there was no need to include them as beneficiaries of TETFund. The Executive Secretary further added:

> *Our law is very clear in terms of their funding intervention; the private sector is privately owned. In reality that is in terms of demographic reality in Nigeria. In the education sector, the public tertiary institutions constitute a glaring majority. It constitutes the majority in terms of student population. If you take it out there you will discover that put together in terms of members the private tertiary institutions especially universities, have caught up, they are almost equal in numbers now with public tertiary universities. But by population I can tell you that the public tertiary institutions constitute more than three quarters of the population. So that tells you that the majority is there. And it has to do with the funding review and government intervention is aimed at doing the best for the largest segment of the population. Taking the demographic realities of Nigeria into consideration, we are in the right direction in funding public tertiary institutions. I don't see it as funding the private sector in the real sense of it. Not funding the private sector but subsidizing it. We should use the word subsidizing the private sector. For example, the children of the less privileged are almost exclusively in the public tertiary institutions and this is a statement of fact. Nobody can contradict it. In this country, the privately owned tertiary institutions charge excessively and children of those people that earn N10, 000 per month are not in these institutions. So, these are part of the demographic realities I'm talking about. I really don't want to dwell on these issues. I know that these are demographic realities (Bogoro, 2015).*

For the Fund to grow its collections, it invests by buying Federal government bonds and making placements in selected and viable Commercial Banks. This has helped strategically in 'growing' collections as profits from these investments are ploughed into its account in the Central Bank. Such profits at the end of each year are reflected as earnings by the Fund in its audited accounts.

The Fund has set up a stabilisation Fund in the Central Bank which is serviced with at least five per cent of the annual intervention budget of the Fund to take care of eventualities like drop in tax collections, the bulk of which are derived from oil based and communication

companies whose profits are dependent on prices in international markets and during national emergencies that might require the Funds intervention, and which fall within its mandate.

In addition, the Fund has managed to remove a great deal of pressure on itself by strategically dealing with institutions only, rather than individuals. For instance, it neither deals with individual contractors handling its funded projects nor individual staff of benefiting institutions on its staff training and development programmes.

An important aspect of strategic management deployed by the Fund is through regular annual disbursements which have ensured continuity in implementation as long as the beneficiaries met the laid down procedures of the Fund. The Funds collections are not appropriated, but approved, by the President and so there are no delays like if they were to come through budgetary allocations which would have to be appropriated and approved by various arms of government. This has also helped a great deal as monies meant for disbursements or disbursed by the Fund are not mopped up at the end of the year for return to the Central Bank.

To meet expectations and responsibilities of the Fund, Management decided to invest in Human Resources as it applies to its employees. Such investments have been in the area of staff training and retraining within and outside the Country. For instance, Interviewee A commented that the Fund has development programmes for its members of staff who want to pursue Ph.D, Masters, Higher Diploma and National Diploma and first Degree programmes. This is supported by annual budgetary allocation every year. There is also the strategic staff training and development policy in the areas of short courses for officers from levels 10 and those who have spent at least five years in the service of the Fund. Even junior members of staff are sent for local trainings regularly, (Interviewee A).

The statement above by Interviewee A on staff development and training was corroborated by Interviewee E, who categorised the issue into two categories. The first category is that the vision and mission of the Fund is to have highly competent staff, and this can only be achieved through investment in staff training and re-training both within and outside the country. The second category covers the idea of sponsorship of staff for post graduate studies abroad.

With the knowledge of time and space in strategic management, the interviewer raised this question with the Project Management Department Staff. Interviewee L note that the Fund operated a time limit according to project time, because it would have been very difficult to assign the same time space to the vetting of a building proposal or library procurement or a book proposal. For instance, the time spent on vetting books, depending on the list of books, may be such that one required twenty-four hours work which equates to about three working days yet, a building presented on ten sheets of drawing could be vetted in a shorter time. The flexibility of our system did not allow the excessive bureaucracy of having to wait for an absent officer for an action to be taken. In fact, most of our processes were project-driven and on the basis of which line staff were available to treat. For instance, if proposals came in from a beneficiary, for the development of laboratory and a level of authority in the decision-making process proved to be absent on, say, a field trip, what usually happened was that somebody else would sign for the line authority so that the file would move forward, and the project would be attended to, and executed, on time. So as much as possible, we maintained something very in between the traditional hierarchy of organisations and a flat organisation, (Interviewee L).

Indeed, the selection and tenure of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees since the inception of Civilian Administration in Nigeria has helped to stabilize the Fund. Although this relates to steering and control, it has set a precedent for the strategic positioning of the Fund. Since

1999, when the 2nd BOT was appointed, the Fund has only had two Chairmen heading the different Boards. The Chairman of the 2nd Board served out a two term of eight years with all her original Board members. The 3rd Chairman of the Board was reappointed for another term of four years after the expiration of his tenure, but with the replacements in the original members of the Board appointed along with him. The personalities of these chairpersons and the continuity of their tenure unlike frequent changes of other Boards of Agencies in Nigeria, have helped the Fund in no small measure. While the Chairman of the 2nd Board was an astute technocrat with several years of experience on financial and Board politics and a renowned Chartered accountant with direct access to the President, the current Chairman has several years of banking experience at top management level and was in recent past a National official of the ruling party in Nigeria. They both brought their individual personalities, experiences and contacts to bear positively on the Fund. This is supported by the point made by Interviewee X who noted that the 1st Board was Chaired by a Professor with experience in University administration and structure. The second Chairman was a chartered accountant chosen because of her pedigree in the field of political connections. We had little or no problem on so many of her projects, in terms of obtaining approval from government. The 3rd Board was headed by xxxxx, a seasoned administrator and a Ph.D. holder who was able to combine his experience with academics, banking and politics, thereby giving the Fund the needed cloud to carry out its programs and projects. Because of their performance, when all Boards of all government agencies were dissolved in Nigeria, the Board was recalled to complete its tenure. After the completion the first four years of their tenure, the Chairman was reappointed but other members on the Board dropped and replaced by new ones.

The interviewer probed interviewee X further whether the Personality of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees and the Members of the Board affect the general administration and management of the Fund, interviewer X noted:

> *I don't know about personality. But what I can say for a definite unlike what is happening now we didn't have a Board full of politicians. We had mostly technocrats, teachers and professionals. Like the Board was chaired by a professional lady an accountant, a chartered accountant. So we didn't have issues with politicians and their antics and their intrigues. The Board operated almost independent of other influences and also allowed Management free hands so long as we are always reporting back to the Board on steps we are taking, our limitation processes and so on. We definitely had a fantastic Board.*

Although the above describes the strategic management initiatives of the Fund, nonetheless the narratives on agencification and TETFund have embedded in them elements of strategic management.

5.6.3. Internal Context

Internal organisational context can impact significantly on the success of policy interventions and reforms. Three key elements of context are important to internal organisation: goal; hierarchy/ centralisation, and, professionalization. Rainey (2009) notes that organisations are goal-oriented collectives and they exist to achieve some expressed purpose, although these goals can often be ambiguous. According to O'Toole and Meier (2013), such goal ambiguity can arise from two main sources, which is goal conflict and inherent ambiguity in some goals. Public organisations have multiple masters and these masters - particularly when political power is not concentrated - can have conflicting goals for organisations, (O'Toole and Meir, 2013). The conflict of goals can affect the performance of an organisation. With the TETFund, there is no conflict in the goals of the Fund as the enabling Act is clear on this. This informed restricting intervention to tertiary institutions.

Hierarchy/centralisation is an important element of internal organisational context. In relation to TETFund, the roles of the BOT and the Management are clearly spelt out in its enabling Act - so there are no conflicts. According to O'Toole and Meir (2013), the degree of hierarchy and centralisation affect both where management will matter in the organisation and also the form that management will take.

Professionalism as an internal context is important in any public sector organisation, as it is upon this that successes and failures are pinned. Professionalism also impacts on external work. Mosher (1982) argues that public service is both professionalised and has itself become a profession. Unlike other countries where civil servants were transferred to agencies as a result of reforms, the TETFund members of staff during the tenure of the 2nd BOT were recruited through competitive means from both the public and private sectors, by an independent consulting firm, Arthur Andersen Consulting but subsequently by other reputable consulting firms and in-house panels on behalf of the Board of Trustees. The members of staff of TETFund are public servants and the Board of Trustees introduced some incentives and allowances which made service in the Fund attractive to professionals from both the private and public sector. This is in variance to the practice in Countries such as Tanzania, where most of the staff in the created agencies resulted from reform initiatives making them Civil Servants drawn from Ministries and other Departments and Agencies. Indeed, goals, hierarchy and professionalism are all key elements of the internal organisation of context that can impact on management and performance, on the one hand, and on the success of reforms on the other hand.

O'Toole and Meir (2013) note that there are three key elements of context which are important to internal organisation: goals, hierarchy/centralisation and professionalization (as discussed in section 6.1.3). Figure 1 represents the management structure of the TET Fund,

(as detailed in the Chapter Five). The researcher explored the Fund's behaviour in terms of its goals, hierarchy and professionalization.

Figure 1: The Organisational Structure of the TET Fund

An organisation must have a goal and vision for it to fulfil its mandate. This was explored in the data collection process as represented in the following interview. Interviewee C noted:

The ETF, now the TETFund, was conceived as an Intervention Agency. It was never conceived of as an alternative proprietor to do everything in the Institutions that it intervenes in. In other words, the Government was making resources available and

المنارة للاستشارات

www.manaraa.com

from the available resources government was supposed to take care of the Institutions it established. In the case of Nigeria, we operate a Federal system, the States and the Federal Governments have Universities and therefore they are the proprietors to provide for these Institutions. But the TETFund was established to assist in specific areas, basically, physically infrastructure for teaching and learning, learning resources and capacity building especially the post graduate training of academic staff. Beyond that, other matters like municipal facilities and hostel accommodation and what have you were are supposed to be handled by the proprietors. So, we provided assistance to the proprietors.

The process of attainment of the agency goal came up in the interview. This is imperative in the sense that the agency has evolved considerable over the years. Interviewee B observed:

What the Fund has been trying to do over the years is to bring about the reforms in all aspects of our operations. Every year we did a retreat whereby we looked at how we had performed and saw where we can do better. For example, we intervened in the area of academic staff training and development as well Research. A department was handling both aspects of our operations along with other related activities. After appraising our performance over time in this regard it was decided that there was need to split the department into two namely: Education Support Services and Academic staff training and development to meet the expanding demands as the quantum of work in these areas of our intervention has increased tremendously. We have sponsored close to about nine thousand academic staff to various Universities in the world for their Masters and Ph.D.s within a few years on embarking on these area of interventions.

Interviewee F noted:

The Fund has changed its name from ETF to the TETFund. This is part of our re-focusing on our mandate. When we were ETF, we were intervening in projects and programmes of the entire education sector and the resources available were thinly spread in a manner that will not make positive impact. It also amounted to duplication of efforts because we had other government agencies that were intervening in the same subsector as we were doing. For example, the Universal Basic Education and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - were intervening in primary and secondary subsector of education in Nigeria along with our own interventions. So, with the change in mandate and name to TETFund, our operations have been streamlined as we will now have to intervene only at the tertiary level of education in Nigeria.

Interviewee T noted:

From the beginning, the Fund was just small, but gradually it started expanding. As at the time the whole staff were not up to 30, but now we are about three hundred, so you see that it is growing, so also the work. It then became necessary for change from the way we were doing things from the beginning and now that things are growing fast.

It was important to also explore how the internal organisation has changed over the years, in particular the creation of new Departments. Interviewee T observed that there have been changes over time and now we have about eight Departments with some other specialized Units under the Office of the Executive Secretary. For example, at inception it was five, later on it was increased to about eight and we may have more depending on needs. Therefore, the Departments were created out of needs, (Interviewee T).

Interviewee F also noted that there are now additional (new) departments and this was informed by the core mandate and functions of the Fund as specified in its enabling Act. The Fund has seen an expansion in the scope of its interventions as its new mandate includes among others Academic Staff Training and Development, Research Funding, Library Development, Conference Attendance, (Interviewee F).

The Fund, at inception, started with five Departments namely: Departments of Finance, Management and Legal services, Corporate Affairs, Project Management, and Monitoring and Evaluation. Following the reforms by the 2nd BOT, the structure of the Fund was streamlined into four Departments: Administration and Personnel, Finance, Fund Generations, and Operations, while the Corporate Affairs Department became Public Relations Unit, (initially under Administration and Personnel and later under the Executive Secretary's Office). In addition, Audit and Legal Units were also created under Executive Secretary's Office. This was followed by another restructuring by the same Board after reviewing its activities and programmes as follows: Department of Administration and

Procurement which had four Divisions under it - Personnel, General Services, Pension and Insurance, Procurement Division; Department of Finance and Accounts had three Divisions namely Management Accounts, Final Accounts, Treasury and Investment; Department of Planning Research and Assessment which had three Divisions namely, Strategic Planning, Revenue, Evaluation and Impact Assessment; and finally Department of Operations which had three Divisions namely, Technical Education, Projects, Registry and Documentation. The development described above can be seen as part of the strategic management initiatives of the Fund towards meeting its obligations to its beneficiaries and the general public.

Presently, there are eleven Departments created on the basis of necessity, in view of the various programmes introduced by the Fund as part of its interventions, (see Figure 1). Clearly, this shows that the Fund is responsive to the needs of the |Tertiary Education Sub Sector in the line Federal Government's vision of Nigeria becoming one of the top 20 economies in the world in the year 2020. This corroborates what Interviewee T mentioned.

An assessment of the performance of the agency was provided by Interviewee A:

The TETFund today is an Agency of the future. It is one of Nigeria's export brands. It is one of the most successful and most outstanding public institutions in Nigeria. We took the awards in 2011, 2012 and in 2013 we came second, but we took the 1st position for accountability and integrity, because we are the only public institution in Nigeria today that has an audited 2012 account. So these are the major milestones in the history of the Fund. The award on transparency and integrity is much more important than any other award for an institution that is charged with the responsibility of managing huge volume of financial resources. That is our pride. That is what makes our Fund an export brand for this country. It is an export brand I said primarily because the Ghanaians came, they copied our model. Ghana today has the GAET Fund, Sierra Leone has also established their version of TETFund and the education authority of Tanzania came to study TETFund and now they have Tanzania Education Trust Fund. We have exported our brand to the West Coast. We say it without any fear of contradiction that the TETFund is one of the foremost interventionist agencies in the educational sector - not only in Nigeria and Africa, but probably in the whole World. We have disbursed to date more than N600billion in the last three years alone towards our

revitalisation of our decayed infrastructure in all the 3 levels that I had mentioned.

We have embarked from 2010 to date on one of the most imaginative capacity building initiative in the history of Nigeria's educational system. Our academic staff training and development programme to date has over 8,610 scholars studying for the Master's and Doctorate degrees across the world. We have invested so far, N32billion on this programme alone. Over 1000 of our scholars have completed their Doctorate or Master Degrees programme and have returned to their respective institutions adding value to knowledge and scholarship. Over 13,000 academics have attended conferences both in Nigeria and abroad. We have funded over 12,000 workshops for academics both outside and within the Nigerian nation. I have talked to you about the researches that have recently been funded. Under our book initiative, we have developed into books 8 Ph.D. thesis and presently the University of Ibadan press is rolling out 32,000 volumes of such books for distribution free of charge to all the tertiary institutions in Nigeria.

Prior to 2010, we had only two professional academic journals in Nigeria that were considered and approved as reference materials for our scholars and other users of Nigerian educational extraction materials worldwide. To date we have funded additional 100. So, 100 new professional journals have been funded by us and now back into our book shops, back into our libraries nationwide and we are doing more.

Currently, in our efforts to enhance the level of quality of teacher education, we embarked on the construction and equipping of 61 academic micro teaching laboratories in all the 60 Federal and State-owned Colleges of Education nationwide. These projects have reached an advanced state. We are 70 to 95 per cent confident that we have reached our completion level.

Indeed, as mentioned previously the vision and mission of the Fund is clear and the degree of professionalism is high in view of the fact the Fund, during the 2ⁿᵈ Board (which re-organised the Fund), recruited qualified staff through competitive exercises handled by consultants. The government resolve on public sector reforms in Nigeria after the 2009 created the right environment for the TETFund interventions to succeed. All government MDAs were galvanised towards embracing the reforms of government both at the central government and agency levels. The commitment and professionalism of the Fund was also acknowledged by the beneficiaries. For instance, Interviewee R noted that the agency's

interventions have moved his institution forward and this is also enhanced by the fact that there is a purposeful interaction between the agency and the institutions in particular, with supporting projects and other key areas of interventions.

5.7. Summary of Findings on Contexual Issues

"An institution public administration functions very much like such an open system, with one of the requisite functions being maintaining its boundary against those who would erode its role in governing and it capacities to perform its appropriate tasks, while at the same time also depending upon imports of energy (in this case personnel and budgets) from its relevant context," (Peters, 2013, p101).

As it has been discussed in detail above, contextual issues are important to understanding public policy interventions, as well as public administration reforms.

In the part two of this chapter, the author used the work of O'Toole and Meir (2013), Pollitt and Bouchaert (2011) and Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) to explore the contextual issues in relation to the Tertiary Education Trust Fund.

Firstly, it examined the political context in relation to the operations and behaviour of the Fund. The key points that can be identified in this section, drawing on the fieldwork and literature, are that there has been some degree of political interference and tension in relation to the functions and operations of the Fund. The dispersion of authority and power as detailed in the enabling Act functions at a vertical level. Corruption is not a major problem with the Fund.

Secondly, the part also explored the environmental context, and this somewhat challenges the conventional presuppositions that an organisation which collaborates with a range of organisations can be affected by complexities, turbulence and munificence. However, in the case of the TETFund, environmental contexts have not been a major problem. This is

because the government initiated sweeping reforms that were adhered to by politicians, public officers and citizens, possibly as a result of prior long periods of military regimes (see Chapter One).

Thirdly, the internal context argument was explored in relation to the TETFund. The finding shows that the Fund has clear goals which were implemented, based on the needs of the beneficiaries and in line with the mandate of the Fund. In terms of hierarchy, the agency was set up with a clear administrative structure, functions and responsibilities. In relation to professionalism, members of staff of the Fund were recruited from both the private and public sectors, based on competitive selection processes. Even the few members of staff that were seconded from the Federal Ministry of Education at the inception of the Fund had to go through the same process of selection before they were absorbed into the service of the Fund.

The next chapter will provide a conclusion to this research, drawing on range of themes, theoretical arguments, concepts and analysis that have been explored in the previous chapters. The chapter, in addition, will revisit pertinent issues that came up in the course of the research in terms of contextual issues and the idea of agencification, (as detailed in section 7.2.)

Chapter Six

Conclusion

This thesis set out to answer two main research questions: first, to understand the behaviour of a New Public Management (NPM)-inspired agency in the context of a Developing Country, and, second, to explore the impact of New Public Management Reforms on Public Sector Management in Nigeria. In order to answer the research questions, the following research objectives were set: first, to examine literature in order to establish the behaviour, principles and doctrines of NPM driven agency; second to detect the extent to which NPM doctrines have penetrated and shaped the organisational life of the organisation (TETFund), or rather have been factually rejected- albeit nominally adopted- as they are spurious to the organisation and its context; and third, to explore the mainstreaming of NPM into public sector management in Nigeria.

Indeed, both NPM and NPM- agency continue to have impact on public sector management across the world, as detailed in the literature. In the process of scrutinising the literature, some interesting ideas were uncovered in relation to the emergence and introduction of NPM

225

reforms and creation of agencies across the world which is worth reiterating here. Although, in different countries around the world, the power, size, functions and power of agencies vary, the reasons for its introduction are similar. According to McGauran *et al.* (2015, p4), the reasons for the growth in such agencies can be grouped into five factors namely: economic/efficiency reasons; changing societal expectations; political reasons; requirements for specialisation, and, isomorphic factors. In terms of economic/ efficiency reasons, it is argued that the fiscal crisis of the 1970s and the needless bureaucratic measures (defined as the clogged up' in red tape) impacted on the functions of public sector. As such, NPM was seen as an effective tool to improve efficiency and revitalise the public sector. Changes in societal expectations have been expressed in the form of the expectations of citizens in the form of delivery of goods and services. The idea of active citizens emerged at this point in time. Political reasons given for the proliferation of agency has much to do with unbundling of civil service. The removal of the implementation of policy programmes from civil service bureaucracies (McGauran *et al.*., 2015, p4). It is also argued that this is to give politicians some sense of credibility and commitment to addressing a range of social issues confronting the society. According to Gains (2003), setting up an independent agency to deal with political 'hot potatoes' can help the political administration to deal with problematic policy areas without being seen as directly responsible for this (cited in McGauran *et al.*., 2015, p4). Another political reason offered is that by setting up agencies government can have more firm control over various programmes. In relation to requirements of specialisation, agency creation was seen as possessing a tool to address specialist issues, thereby freeing-up principal ministries. According to Talbot *et al.* (2000), this is a sort of functional specialisation, where policies on specific issues are handed over to agencies. According to McGuaran *et al.* (2014), isomorphic facts are based on the notion that, 'everyone is doing it so why don't we?'- This is called the, 'mimetic isomorphism' as if everyone is doing it, so

you must- the 'normative isomorphism' There is also the coercive isomorphism which focuses on how international organisations force countries to adopt the NPM style agency in order for them to receive support.

Whilst the above are related to OECD and other Developed Countries, it is important to stress here that the above factors, which are exogenous and endogenous in nature, are, in fact, the reasons for the introduction of NPM and NPM agencies in Nigeria (as discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Two). What has been uncovered in the literature, is that Public Management Reforms are having marked impact across various countries in the world- and no Country is immune - whether they operate in an NPM or non-NPM setting. This can be associated with globalisation and the pursuit of neoliberal agendas which know no boundaries. In the case of Nigeria, the NPM-driven reforms were introduced under different politico-administrative models. An important discovery, and contribution to knowledge, would be that the politico-administrative setting of a Country does not have direct bearing on whether an NPM-driven reform will work or not. However, the success of those reforms are shaped by contextual issues which in the case of Nigeria, has been covered in Chapter Six of this work

One of the research questions is to examine the impact of New Public Management on public sector management in Nigeria. In Chapter Two, the concept of NPM was discussed. However, whilst in the case of Nigeria, it did not follow a particular format as detailed in the literature, it is worth noting that the impact could be seen in the various public sector reforms embarked upon from the 1990s through to 2005. For instance, the Dotun Phillips Panel of 1986 attempted to reform the civil service as part of the structural adjustment programme of government. The commission was set up to study the structure, staffing and operations of the federal civil service (Anazodo *et al..*, 2012). The recommendations of the Phillips panel

227

were: to enhance professionalism; to align with the presidential system of government; to decentralize and delegate; to combine authority with responsibility; to enhance accountability; to enhance checks and balances; to implement a general modernisation of the service, and, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency as well as speed of operation. What is clear is that the mandate is based on 'coercive isomorphism', that is, the influence of the International Monetary Fund. The language and the wording used are that of NPM. The public-sector reforms from 1999- 2007 also had NPM settings embedded within. For instance, in 2003, National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) was established. It was a national strategy for public sector reforms that involved partnership working amongst Stakeholders, States and Local Governments, as well as the National Assembly. It was deemed as a pre-requisite to good governance, and sustainable National Development. As a macroeconomic framework, NEEDS has three main priorities: (1) job creation, provision of affordable housing, improving health care services, strengthening the skill base, protection of the vulnerable and promoting peace and security; (2) promoting and encouraging private enterprise by creating an enabling environment for business to thrive, stabilizing the value of the Naira, diversifying the economy to reduce dependency on oil, privatizing, de-regulating and liberalizing government-owned industries, developing infrastructure, improving agriculture and promoting other key sectors such as information and communications technologies, tourism, entertainment and financial services, protect the environment and ensuring sustainable management of natural resources, and, (3) changing the way government operates by identifying the core business of government and adhering to this while allowing other stakeholders to run businesses and provide other services for which they have comparative advantage over government. Others include implementing accountability, transparency and anti- corruption measures and curtailing unbridled waste in the public service through pension reform, modernization of fringe benefits, national health

insurance scheme and budgetary discipline (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on Nigeria's Public Service Reform, 2006:44). What is obvious is that the reforms recommended by National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) are based on the New Public Management doctrines.

Research Question 1 (What is the Influence of NPM on Public Sector Management in Nigeria) and Contribution to Knowledge

Within the various recommendations of the civil service reform committees introduced from the 1980s, are NPM doctrines and principles - such as value for public money, responsiveness, outcome and output, contracting, purchaser/provider, autonomy, entrepreneurial management culture, steering, transparency, accountability, budget and financial management, human resources, enhanced checks and balances, general modernization of the service, and enhanced effectiveness and efficiency, training and development, and the professionalization of the service as well as speed of operation. In addition, elements such as scrapping of Ministries, Departments, Agencies, as well as mergers and acquisitions, the creation of Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Parastatals as well as the actual restructuring of existing Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Parastatals have dominated the reforms from the 1980s to 1999 and onwards. The 1990s, in particular, witnessed the restructuring, privatization, merging and scrapping of public organisations with a view to enhance service delivery. The various measures introduced, albeit at different periods and forms, have a strong leaning towards the ideological position of neoliberalism- encapsulated in the free market doctrines and principles.

In relation to Nigeria, since 1980, different NPM reforms have been mainstreamed into civil service (see Chapter Two- section 2.2.). For example, Section 2.2. the Dotun Phillips 1986 panel made the following recommendations: to enhance professionalism; to align with the

Presidential System of Government; to decentralize and delegate; to combine authority with responsibility; to enhance accountability; to enhance checks and balances; to implement a general modernisation of the service, and, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency as well as speed of operation. In addition, the Public Sector Reforms 1999- 2007 were driven by both internal and external pressures. New Public Management measures introduced are: *Budget and financial management:* procurement system review, institutionalization of fiscal responsibility, accounting reforms and audit reforms; *Accountability:* due process, transparency and accountability in government transactions, establishment of Service Charters and institutionalization of compliance enforcement; *Human Resources Management:* decentralization of human resources management from the Federal Civil Service Commission to ministries, departments and agencies, personnel records and payroll cleaning, staff cadre reviews, remodelling of recruitment and promotion procedures of the civil service, including the injection of competent professionals, young and bright people, experts with rare skills; introduction of a new performance management scheme; creation of professionally-manned human resources management departments, competent in manpower planning, career and succession manning, training and development etc., undertaking pay reforms, as a strategy for attracting and retaining talents in the service, massive capacity development and training and organisational culture change; *Operation and system***:** organizational restructuring and right-sizing, work process redesign and information and technology applications; and *Value reorientation and integrity reforms:* This involves the development of a new generation of leaders of high integrity and a service driven by a culture of integrity (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on Nigeria's Public Service Reform, 2006:44).

Similarly, the reforms affected Agencies, Parastatals and their Managements. For instance, there were over 500 government-owned Agencies, Parastatals and Corporations in Nigeria.

Over the years, they have haemorrhaged government resources. The following are some of the measures taken in relation to the functions of the parastatals: accelerated privatization through the Bureau of Public Enterprises(BPE); scrappage and/ merger of some parastatals; review of mandate and amendment to the legal instruments through the adoption of incorporated legal forms to replace the legal status of statutory corporations; possible conversion of some parastatals to executive agencies; total removal of subvention for certain categories of parastatals; reorientation of management of Parastatals towards self-sustenance, profit making, cost effectiveness and cost consciousness; establishment of benchmarks of recruitment/overhead ratio to capital expenditure; redundancy management and right-sizing; and re-professionalization, and, strengthening of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism of parastatals through the introduction of such accounting instruments such as service charter. In addition, regular survey of stakeholders' perception and service delivery, peer review, as well as league-ranking parastatals based on predetermined corporate performance indicators is recommended (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on Nigeria's Public Service Reform, 2006:44).

The key point here is that the mainstreaming of NPM principles and techniques are politico-administrative resilient. Within international and sustainable development narratives they are the importance of institutions, e.g. political institutions and economic institutions (see, e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008, p8). Although a non-NPM State, the research discovered that New Public Management principles and techniques have been embedded in public sector reforms in Nigeria since 1980s. However, whilst it is clear that the above is the case, it is imperative to note that some of these NPM principles are evident in the behaviour and operations of TETFund, and this is covered in the section on the research questions. What has been witnessed so far, with the various public sector reforms, has been the formal and

nominal adoption of NPM. Nonetheless, it is imperative to note that NPM is the lymph system of the Nigerian public sector.

Research Question 2 (Understand the Behaviour of a New Public Management (NPM) Driven Agency in the Context of a Developing Country) and Contribution to Knowledge

Addressed in Chapter Three is the core element of agencification. Structural disaggregation, autonomy and performance contracting in the literature are addressed. In other to address research question two, the author used the Tertiary Education Trust Fund as empirical evidence. The proliferation of NPM agency was largely influenced by both endogenous and exogenous factors. In relation to the TETFund, it was uncovered that its establishment was as a result of both internal pressures (that is social factors, political factors such as the strike by the Academic Staff Union of University and Strike action by other union against the adoption of the structural adjustment programme) external pressures, such as the influence of funding organisations such as IMF, and World Bank, (that is coercive isomorphism).

The author detected in relation to TETFund all three the key features of agencification, that is, structural disaggregation, autonomy and steering and control by the parent administration. TETFund is structurally disaggregated, partially autonomous, but regulated/controlled in other areas through oversight functions from different organs of the state like the National Assembly, regulatory agencies and parent ministry, (the Federal Ministry of Education). Similarly, employees of the Fund are Public Servants; however, they are subjected to the rules and regulations as well as conditions of the Federal Civil Service such as Pension, National Health Insurance, annual and maternity leave, etc. The Fund has allowances and other benefits that are special to its employees in view of the nature of their duties and responsibilities.

One of the reasons provided for the creation of Agencies is that of political expediency, that is, they are set up to achieve particular policy programmes and interventions by the government: they represent a form of organisational specialisation.

This research has been able to establish that the Fund has national acceptability across the board in view of the visibility and impact of its intervention projects, which could be attributed to streamlining its interventions to tertiary institutions by the 2011 Amendment Act. As such, the Fund operates with clear vision, missions, goals and objectives. The Agency can serve as a major reference point for other Agencies in the Country, based on its various successful interventions. The Fund's operations and activities are anchored on creativity and innovations which are evidenced by its various interventions and cutting-edge programmes. The programmes key into the National Education Policy of Federal Government of Nigeria.

In addition, the Fund exhibited some degree of accountability and transparency, to a point that appears not to have been reached by other NPM-inspired Agencies in other (relatively) similar contexts. Literature on agencification in Africa has identified that the failure of Agencies could be linked to issues of corruption and lack of accountability, (as in the case with first agencification agenda in Tanzania). The Fund has a functioning policy of attracting professional staff from other public sector organisations and agencies, which has helped in what may be deemed to be an effective and efficient delivery of services. This is complemented by various staff training and retraining of staff geared towards a more effective manpower.

Contrary to the situation in some Developing Countries, where Agencies had problems with funding for their operations and interventions, TETFund, due to its enabling Act, has sustained sources of funding which does not go through the rigours of budgetary allocations. The source of funding is from the 2% education Tax on the accessible profit of all registered companies in Nigeria. The fund produces its audited account annually and reports on its activities. This has been the determining factor in terms of the success of the agency.

The key contribution to knowledge in relation to agencification is that all the three elements can be present in the operation of an agency; such 'NPM-style' agency may provide levels of service delivery comparable to 'similar' agencies elsewhere, thereby including also the developed world (OECD countries). Key factors that seem to contribute to this behaviour include a ring-fenced funding, financial independence, autonomy, strategic management initiatives and policy making independence and strategic monitoring processes.

Some lessons that can be drawn – by means of analogical reasoning based on the analysis of the behavioural dynamics of TETFund – for the development of NPM-inspired Public Agencies in jurisdictions in sub-Saharan Africa, include financial independence, strategic management initiatives, adoption of working contextual political arrangements, (in the case of Nigeria- the use of Federal Character Concept, and the establishment of Regulatory Agencies to monitor the activities of an Agency).

For further research it would be interesting to focus on other Agencies within the same setting, (in this case Nigeria,) to see whether the result would be different in terms of the presence of the key elements of agencification.

Bibliography

Abdullah, A. (2008) *enhancing the performance of the Public Service in a Developmental State: a country case of Nigeria*, prepared in association with ms Hanlie van Dyk- Robertson, AAPAM Roundtable, October, Accra: Ghana

Acemoglu, D and Robinson, J (2008) *The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development*. Working Paper 10. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. World Bank

Adamolekun, L and Kiragu, K. (1999) "Public Administration Reforms", in L. Adamolekun, Ed. (1999) *Public Administration in Africa: Main Issues and Selected Country Studies*. Boulder, CO.: Westview

Adedeji, A (eds) (1993) *Africa: Within the world: beyond dispossession and dependence*. London: Zed Books/ African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies

Adetayo, O. (2014) Oronsaye Report: FG merges NAMA, NCAA, NiMET, http://www.punchng.com/news/oronsaye-report-fg-merges-nama-ncaa-nimet/ Oronsaye report: FG merges NAMA, NCAA, NiMET. Accessed 25/05/2015

Adegoroye, G. (2005) *mainstreaming ethics and professionalism in the public service: the Nigerian experience, a paper presented at the conference on the African charter and related reforms*, Swakopmund- Namibia, 3-7 October

Adegoroye G. (2006) *public service reform for sustainable development: the Nigerian experience*. Address at the Commonwealth Advanced Seminar, Wellington, New Zealand. 20th February- 3rd March 2006.

Adelman, C., Jenkins, D and Kemmis, S. (1984) rethinking case study, in J. Nell, T. Bush, A. Fox, J. Goodey, and S. Goulding (eds) *conducting small scale investigations in Educational Mangement*. London: Harper and Row

Aduda, G.T. (2007) Budget *Monitoring and prince intelligence Unit (Due Process): A mechanism for combating corruption in infrastructure delivery in Nigeria*. Loughborough: WEDC

Adu-Amoah, L. G. (2012) Constructing a New Public Administration in Africa; Reflections on Philosophical Clarity and the Process-Orientation Turn, *Administrative Theory & Praxis /* September 2012, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 385–406.

African Development Bank. (2005) *African Development Report 2005. Public Sector Management in Africa*. Oxford: African Development Bank

Andrews, C.W. (2008) legitimacy and context: implication for public sector reform in developing countries. *Public Administration and Development*, 28, 171-180

Alexander, P and Agency Policy Review Team (2002) *better government services- executive agencies in the 21st century* (the agency policy review- report and recommendations). London: cabinet office

Aldrich, H.E. (1979) *organization and environment*. NJ: Prentice- Hall

Anazodo, R.O., Okoye, J.C. and Chukwuemeka, E.E.O. (2012) civil service reforms in Nigeria: the journey so far in service delivery, *American Journal of social and management sciences*, 3, 1, pp 17-29

Anuforo, E. (2014) anxiety as government implements Oronsaye panel's report http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/02/anxiety-as-govt-implements-oronsonye-panel-s-report/ accessed 25/05/2015

Attride Stirling, J (2001) *Thematic networks: an analytic tool for qualitative research.*1:3; 385-405

Ayee, J.R. (2005) *Reforming the African Public Sector; retrospect and prospect.* Dakar: CODESRIA

Aucoin, P. (1990). Administrative reform in public management: paradigms, principles, paradoxes and pendulums. *Governance, 3*(2), 115-137

Ayo-Sobowale, M and Akinyemi S. (2011), Funding Strategies for quality University Education in Nigeria: The Principle of Fiscal Justice. *Journal of studies in Education*, vol 1, p1-16

Bach, T., Niklasson, B., and Painter, M. (2012) The Role of Agencies in Policy-making, *Policy and Society* 31, 183–193

Bach, T. (2012) The Involvement of Agencies in Policy Formulation: Explaining Variation in Policy Autonomy of Federal Agencies in Germany, Policy *and Society* 31, pp 211–222

Bamberger, P. (2008) "From the Editors. Beyond Contextualization: Using Context Theories

to Narrow the Micro-Macro Gap in Management Research." *Academy of Management Journal* 51, 5: 839-46.

Barzelay, M. (1992) *breaking through bureaucracy- a new vision for managing in government*, Berkeley: University of California Press

Basheka, B.C. and Sebola, M.P. (2015) Good Government in Africa: What is the role of Bureaucratic Governance? *Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology*. Volume 12, Number 2, PP54-66

Bassey, M. (2002) case study research, in M. Coleman and C.Briggs (eds) *Research Methods in Educational Leadership and Management*. London: Paul Chapman

Barzeley, M (2001) the new public management. Berkeley, CA: University of California.

Becker, S. and Bryman, A. (eds) (2004) *Understanding Research for Social Policy and Practice: Themes, Methods and Approaches*, The Policy Press and Social Policy Association, Bristol.

Bello, M. (2012) *President signs performance contracts with ministers today*, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/president-signs-performance-contracts-with-ministers-today/122914/, Accessed 20/05/2015

Bello, M., and Roslan, A. (2010) *Future of the Millennium Development Goals in Nigeria. Paper presented at the International Conference on Business and Economic Research (ICBER),* 15-16 March 2010, at the Hilton Hotel in Kuching, Sarawak. Organised by the Global Research Agency

Behn, R. (2001) *rethinking democratic*, Washington: Brookings Institution

Bernard, H.R. (2002) *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative methods*. 3rd edition. AltaMira Press ,Walnut Creek, California.

Bhattacherjee, A. (2012) "Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices" *Textbooks Collection.* Book 3.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=oa_textbooks.
Accessed 20/12/2014

Bogdan, R and &Biklen, S. (1992) *Qualitative Research for Education: an introduction to theory and methods*, Boston: Allyn and Bacon

Bogoro, S (2015) Why Private Institutions Can't Benefit from TETFund. Vanguard Nigeria.
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/01/private-institutions-cant-benefit-tetfund-bogoro/.
Accessed 20/12/2014

Boston, J. (2013) Basic NPM Ideas and their Development, in T Christensen, and P Laegreid (eds) *the ashgate research companion to New Public Management*. Surrey: Ashgate, pp 17-32

Bouckaert and Peters (2004) what is available and what is missing in the study quangos, in C. Pollitt and C. Talbot (eds), *Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation.* London: Routledge.pp22-50

Bouckaert, G., Peter, B.G. and Verhoest, K. (2010) the coordination of public sector organisations: shifting patters of public management. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

British Council. (2012) *Gender in Nigeria Report 2012- improving the lives of girls and women in Nigeria: Issues, Policies and Actions*. Johannesburg: British Council Nigeria

Bryman, A. (1988) *Quantity and Quality in Social Research*. London: Routledge

Burgess, R.G. (1982) '*The unstructured interview as a conversation', In R.G Burgess (ed.) Field Research: a sourcebook and field manual*, Contemporary Social Research Series, London: George Allen and Unwin

Caiden, G.E. and Sundaram, P. (2004) "The Specificity of Public Service Reform", *Public Administration and Development*, Vol 24: 373-383.

Caufield, J. (2004) *New Public management in a developing country: creating executive agencies in Tanzania*, in C. Pollitt and C. Talbot (eds.) Unbundled government, London and New York, Routledge/Taylor and Francis, pp. 229-246

Carter, N., Bryant- Lukosius, D., DiCenso, A., Blythe, J and Neville, A.J (2014) The Use of Triangulation in Qualitative Research, *Oncology Nursing Forum*, Vol. 41, No. 5, pp 545-547

Christensen, T., Lie, A., Laegreid, P. (2008) Beyond New Public Management: Agencification and Regulatory Reform in Norway. *Financial Accountability & Management*, 24(1), PP15-30

Christensen, T and Laegreid, P. (eds) (2011) *Transcending New Public Management: the Transformation of Public Sector Reform.* Surrey: Ashgate

Christensen, T and Laegreid, P. (eds) (2013) Introduction, in T Christensen, and P Laegreid (eds) The *Ashgate Research Companion to New Public Management*. Surrey: Ashgate. pp 1-13

Christensen, T and laegreid, P (eds) (2003) *New Public Management: the transformation of ideas and practice.* Cheltenham: Aldershot: Ashgate

Christensen, T and laegreid, P. (eds) (2006) *Autonomy and regulation: coping with agencies in the modern state.* Cheltenham: Edward Eldgar

Cheche, S.G and Muathe, S.M.A. (2014) a critical review of literature on performance contracting, *Global Journal of Commerce and Management perspective*, Vol3 (6): 65-70

Cohen, L and Manion, L (1997) *research methods in Education, 4th edition*. London: Routledge

Connelly, L.M (2014) Understanding Case Studies, *MEDSURG Nursing* Vol. 23/No. 6, pp.422-424

Cope, D.G. (2014) Methods and Meanings: credibility and trustworthiness of qualitative research, *Oncology Nursing Forum*, Vol. 41, No 1, pp 89-91

Cronin C (2014) Using Case Study Research as a Rigorous Rorm of Inquiry. *Nurse Researcher*. 21, 5, 19-27.

Dan, S. (2014) The Effects of Agency Reform in Europe: A Review of the Evidence. *Public Policy and Administration* 2014, Vol. 29(3) 221–240

Darma, N.A. (2013) *examining performance contract in Nigeria*, http://afrik4r.org/profiles/blogs/examining-performance-contract-in-nigeria, Accessed 20/05/2015

Davies, P (2006) interview, in V. Jupp. (ed) *the sage dictionary of social research methods*. London: sage. Pp157-158

Davidson, J (2006) sampling, in V. Jupp. (ed) *the sage dictionary of social research methods*. London: sage, pp271-272

De Jong, M., Lalenis, K., and Mamadouh, V.(eds) (2002) *the theory and practice of institutional transplantation: experience with the transfer for policy institutions*. Dordrecht, Kluwer

Denhardt, R.B. (1993) *the pursuit of significance-strategies for managerial success in public organisations*, Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers

Denzin, N.K. (1989) *The Research Art: a theoretical introduction to sociological methods*, 3rd edition. New York: McGraw Hill

Dike, V. (2001) the state of education in Nigeria and the health of the Nation, Economic Analysis, http://www.afbis.com/analysis/education10204234737.htm. Accessed 13/08/2012

Dzimbiri, L.B. (2008) Experiences in New Public Management in Africa: The Case of Performance Management Systems in Botswana. *Africa Development,* Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, 2008, pp. 43–58

Dunleavy, P. (1991) *democracy, bureaucracy and public choice; economic explanations in political science*, Hemel Hampstead: Harvest Wheatsheaf

Dunleavy, P. and C. Hood (1994). From Old Public Administration to New Public Management. Public Money & Management, vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 9-16.

Easton, G (2010) Critical Realism in Case Study Research, *Industrial JMarketing Management*, 39, 118-128

Egeberg, M and Trondal, K (2009) Political Leadership and Bureaucratic Autonomy: Effects of Agencification. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, Vol. 22, No. 4, October 2009 (pp. 673–688).

ECA. (2003a) *Public Sector Management Reforms in Africa: Lessons Learned*: Addis Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa

Economic Commission for Africa (2003b) *Public Sector Management Reforms in Africa.* Addis Ababa: ECA

Economic Commission for Africa (2010) *innovations and best practices in public sector reforms: the case of civil service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.* Dakar: ECA

Ekaete, U.J. (2005) 'Structure of the Federal Government', in Adegoroye, G., ed., *Nigeria Public Service Reform: Driving Reforms*, Nigeria Public Service Reform Series, No. 3, Abuja: The Regent Printing and Publishing Limited.

Ekaete, U.J. (2007) *the structure of the Federal Government, in in BPSR Strategic, implementation status, gains and challenges 2004-2005*. Abuja: Bureau of Public Services Reforms, p 13-24

El- Rufai, N.A. (2011) *Reforming our dysfunctional Public Service*. Available at: http://elombah.com/index.php/articles/nasir-el-rufai/8339-reforming-our-dysfunctional-public-service-nasir-el-rufai-v15-8339. Accessed 13/08/2012

Elston, T (2014) Not So 'Arm's Length': Reinterpreting Agencies in UK Central Government, *Public Administration* Vol. 92, No. 2, pp 458–476

Eme, O. and Ugwu, S.C. (2011) 'Developmental State Bureaucracy in Nigeria: Restructuring for Effectiveness (1999-2007) Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, Vol.1.(4): 41-54

Farrelly, P. (2013) Selecting a Research Method and Designing the Study. *British Journal of Nursing*, Vol 7 No 10, pp 508-511

Fedele, P., Gaili, D. and Ongaro, E. (2007) 'Disaggregation, autonomy and re-regulation, contractualism: public agencies in Italy (1992-2005)'. *Public Management Review,* 9 (4), pp. 557-585

Ferlie, E and Ongaro, E.(2015) *Strategic Management in Public Services Organizations: Concepts, Schools and Contemporary Issues*. London: Routledge

Flinders, M. (2001) *the politics of accountability in the modern state*. Aldershot: Ashgate

Flyvberg, B. (2006) Five misunderstandings about case-study research, *Qualitative Inquiry*, Volume 12, Number 2, 216-245

Fortin, Y and Van Hassel, H. (2000) (eds) contracting in the New Public Management, Armsterdam: IOS Press

Gilbert, N. (2008) Research, Theory and Method, in N. Gilbert (ed) *researching social life*. London: Sage: pp21-40

Gillham, B. (2000) *Developing a Questionnaire,* London: Continuum.

Goom, R., Hammersely, M and P. Foster. (2006) case study and generalization in R. Goom, M.Hammersely and P. Foster (eds) *case study method*, London: Sage pp98-116

Graham, A and Roberts, A. (2004) the agency concept in North America: failure, adaptation and incremental change', in C.Pollitt and C. Talbot (eds) *Unbundled government*. London: Taylor and Francis, pp.140-64

Gray, D.E. (2006) *Doing research in the real world*, London: Sage

Gregory, R. (2003) transforming government culture: a sceptical view of new public management, in T. Christensen and P. Laegried (eds) *New Public Management: the transformation of ideas and practice.* Aldershot: Ashgate, pp231-257

Greer, P (1994) *transforming central government: the next steps initiative*: Open University. Buckingham

Greeve, C. (2000) exploring contracts as reinvented institutions in the Danish public sector, *Public Administration* 78 (1):153-164

Groot, T and Budding, T. (2008) New Public Management's current issues and future prospects. *Financial Accountability & Management*, 24(1), pp1-13

Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 105-117). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Hambleton. (1992). "Decentralization and Democracy in UK Local Government." Public Money and Management 12(3), 9–20.

Hammersley, M. and Goom, R. (2000) Introduction: In R. Goom, M. Hammersley and P. Foster (Eds.) *Case Study Method*: London: Sage Publications.1-16

Hansen, M. B., Laegreid, P., Pierre, J and Salminen (2012) comparing agencification in Nordic Countries, in K.Verhoest., Van Thiel, S., G. Bouckaert and Laegried, P (eds) *Government Agencies: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp259-264

Heckscher, C. and Donnellon, A. (eds) (1994) *The Post-Bureaucratic Organization*, London: Sage.

Henn, M., Weinstein, M., & Foard, N. (2006) *A short introduction to social research*. London: SAGE.

Hood, C and Jackson, M (1991) *Administrative Argument*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing.

Hood, *C.,* Scott, C., James, O., Jones, G and Travers, T (1999) *regulation inside government*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Hood, C. (1991) 'A Public Management for All Seasons?' *Public Administration*, 69 (Spring): 3– 19.

Hood, C. (1995) 'The NPM in the 1980s: Variations on a Theme', *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 20(2/ 3): 93– 110.

Houghton C, Casey D, Shaw D, Murphy K (2013) rigour in qualitative case-study research. *Nurse researcher.* Vol20, No 4, 12-17.

Howell, K.E. (2013) *an introduction to the philosophy of methodology*. London: Sage

Jega A. (2000) *Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*. The Centre for research and documentation, Kano

Jessop, B (2004) hollowing out the 'nation state' and multi-level governance, in P. Kenneth (ed) A Handbook of comparative social policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

James, O. (2003) *the executive agency revolution in Whitehall: Public interest versus bureaucracy shaping perspectives.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Johns, G. (2006) "The Essential Impact of Context on Organizational Behavior." *Academy of* Management *Review* 31: 396-408

Johnson, D. (1994) *research method in Educational Management*, Harlow: Pitman

Igbuzor, O.M. (1988) Reflections on Allison Ayida's Proposal on the Reform of the Nigerian, *the Nigerian Social Scientist*, Vol. 4: 8

Index Mundi- http://www.indexmundi.com/

Islam, F (2015) New Public Management (NPM): A dominating paradigm in public sectors, *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations,* Vol. 9(4), pp. 141-151

Keddie, V. (2006) Case Study Method, in V. Jupp (ed) *the sage dictionary of social research methods*. London: sage. Pp20-21

Kemp, P. (1993) *beyond steps: a civil service for the 21st century*. London: Social Market Foundation

Kothari, C.R (2004) Research methodology methods and techniques, 2nd edition. New Delhi: New Age International Limited Publishers

Kwakwa, V., Adenikinju.A., Mousley, P and Owusu-Gyamfi, M. (2008) binding constraints to growth in Nigeria. In P. Collier., C. Chukwuma and C. Pattilo (eds) *Economic Policy Options for a Prosperous Nigeria*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Kristol, I. (1995) *Neo Conservatism – Selected Essays*. New York: Free Press.

Kunbur, R and Sunmer, A (2011) *Poor countries or poor people? Development assistance and the new geography of global poverty*; available at http://www.voxeu.org/article/poor-countries-or-poor-people-new-geography-global-poverty. Accessed 18/11/2014

Kvale, S (1996) *Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications

Laking, R. (2005) Agency: Their Benefits and Risks. *OECD Journal on Budgeting, Volume 4, No 4: 7-25*

Lane, J.E. (2000) *New public management.* London: Routledge

Lawal, T and Oluwatoyin, A (2011) National development in Nigeria: issues, Challenges and prospects, *Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research*. Vol.3 (9).pp. 237-241

Lewis, J.L. and Sheppard, S.R.J. (2006) Culture and communication: can landscape visualization improve forest management consultation with indigenous communities? *Landscape and Urban Planning* 77:291–313.

Lidbury, C and Petrie, M. (1999) *Lessons from performance contracting case studies and a framework for public sector performance contracting*. Paris OECD

Lincoln, Y. S and Guba, E.G (1985) *naturalistic inquiry.* Newbury Park. CA: Sage

Lincoln, Y. S and Guba, E.G. (2006) the only generalization is: there is no generalization, in in R. Goom, M. Hammersely and P. Foster (eds) *case study method*, London: Sage. Pp27-46

Lieberthal, K (1995) governing china: from revolution through reform. New York. W.W. Norton

Long, N.E. (1949) "Power and Administration" *Public Administration Review* 9, 4: 257-264

Long, N.E. (1952) "Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism" *The American Political Science*

Review 46, 3: 808-818

Madill, A (2015) COMMENTARY   Qualitative Research Is Not a Paradigm: Commentary on Jackson (2015) and Landrum and Garza (2015) *Qualitative Psychology* Vol. 2, No. 2, 214–220

Manning, N (2001) the legacy of the new public management in developing countries, *International Review of Administrative Sciences,* Vol.67, pp.297-312

Maikudi, A.S (2012) Civil service reforms in Nigeria 1999-2007: dimensions and consequence, in F. Adewumi and W. Idowu (eds) *public sector reforms in Africa: Nigerian Perspective*. Dakar: CODESRIA, pp 71- 82

Matsuda, Y. and Manning, N. (2000) 'Difficulties with Autonomous Agencies'. World Bank Administrative and Civil Service Reform website, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/test/civilservice/autonomous.htm. Assessed 14/12/2014

Maykut, P. and Morehouse, R. (1994) *Qualitative Research: a philosophic and practical guide*. London: The Falmer Press

McGauran, A., Verhoest, K and Humphreys, P.C. (2005) t*he corporate governance of agencies in Ireland: non-commercial national Agencies*. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration/ the committee for public management research.

McGloin, S. (2008) The trustworthiness of case study methodology, *Nurse Researcher*, 16, 1, pp 45-55

Medina McKeon, J.M and King, M.A (2015) Building a case for case studies, Human Kinetics - *IJATT* 20(5), pp. 1-5

Moja, T (2000) Nigerian Education Sector Analysis: an analytical synthesis of performance and main issues, New York: World Bank

Monye- Emina, A.I. (2012) the theoretical basis of public sector reforms in Nigeria: A general Critique, in F. Adewumi and W. Idowu (eds) *public sector reforms in Africa: Nigerian Perspective*. Dakar: CODESRIA, pp11- 28

Moses J.W. and Knutsen, T.L. (2007) *Ways of knowing: competing methodologies in social and political research.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Mortensen, P.B. (2016) Agencification and blame shifting: evaluating a neglected side of public sector reforms, *Public administration*, 94, pp.630-646

Moynihan. D.P. (2006) Ambiguity in policy lessons: the agencification experience, *Public Administration*, 84 (4) pp1029-1050

Munn, E and Drever, P. (1991) *using questionnaires in small scale research*. Glasgow: SCRE

National Planning Commission (2004) *National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy; NEEDS*, Abuja: National Planning Commission.

National Political Reform Conference (2005) *Report,* Vol.1. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation. Pp 1-184

National Planning Commission (2011) *National Monitoring and Evaluation Report: guidelines for completion of 2011 mid- year Scorecard for Ministers, Departments and Agencies (MDAs).* Abuja: National Planning Commission.

National Planning Commission (2012) *the report of the joint monitoring of TETFund projects by National Planning Commission and Tertiary Education Trust Fund conducted across states of Federation.* Abuja: National Planning Commission

Neuman, W. L. (2006) *social research methods: qualitative and quantitative approaches- 6th edition.* London: Pearson International Edition

Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2009). *Profile of Women and Men in Nigeria.* At: www.nigerianstat.gov.ng. accessed 24/10/2012

Noordegraff, M. (2015) *public management, performance, professionalism and politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Nzioki, B.M (2011) Features of performance contracting- Kenya's experience. A presentation during the AAPSComs General Assembly Meeting on 19th- 20th July, Sheraton Hotel and Towers Abuja http://www.aapscoms.org/Presentations/d7.pdf. Accessed 20/05/2015

Obasanjo, O. (2007) *moving on: the significance of reform and change in Nigeria, in BPSR Strategic, implementation status, gains and challenges 2004-2005*. Abuja: Bureau of Public Services Reforms, p1-12

Obi, C.I and Ake, C. (2004) Nigeria: Democracy as Trial, Text of a Lecturer organised by the Swedish Development Forum, Stockholm, September 14

Odebiyi, A.I and Aina O.J. (1999) *Alternative Modes of Financing Higher Education in Nigeria and implications for University Governance.* Final Report Accra: Association of African Universities (AAU)

Ogunrotifa, .A.B (2012) Federal civil service reform in Nigeria: the case of democratic centralism, *Journal of Radix International Educational and Research Consortium*, Volume 1, Issue 10, pp. 2250-3994

Ojameruage, E (2012) improving the performance contract initiative of President Goodluck Jonathan, http://chatafrik.com/articles/nigerian-affairs/improving-the-performance-contract-initiative-of-president-goodluck-jonathan#.VVyoZCx0yP4. Accessed 20/05/2015

Olaopa, T. (2012) *Nigeria: Public Service and the Udoji Reform - a Review*, Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201204100520.html. accessed 24/10/2012

Olesin , A. (2011) Nigeria's Jobless Growth. National Mirror. 19 Septermber 2011. At http://nationalmirroronline.net/business/business-and-finance/matrix-with-ayo-olesin/20978.html accessed 24/10/2012

Okojie, C.E.E. (2002) *Gender and education as determinants of Household poverty in Nigeria*. UNUWIDER, Discussion Paper No 37

Okotoni, O. (2001) problems and prospects of Nigerian bureaucracy, *journal of social sciences*, vol. 1(3): 223-229

Onimode, B and Synge, R (1995) Issues in African Development: Essays in honour of Adebayo Adedeji at 65. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc

Omisore, B.O (2013) Strategies to improve the competence of public service officials in Nigeria, *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, Vol 3, No 4: pp 15-30

Omar, M (2012) *rethinking public sector reforms in Nigeria, in in F. Adewumi and W. Idowu (eds) public sector reforms in Africa: Nigerian Perspective*. Dakar: CODESRIA, pp29- 48

Ongaro, E. (2009) *public management reform and modernisation: trajectories of Administrative change in Italy, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain*. Cheltenham and Northampton. Mass. Edward Elgar

Onosode, G.O (1981) *Report of the presidential commission on parastatals*, Lagos: Federal Government Press

OPEC (2012) *Annual Statistics Bulletin*. Vienna: Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

OECD (2002) *Distributed public governance: agencies, authorities and other government bodies*. Paris: OECD

OECD (2003) *public sector modernization: changing organizations*, GOV/PUMA (2003), 19, Paris, 28 October

OECD (1995) *Governance in transition: public management reforms in OECD Countries*. Paris: PUMA/OECD

OECD-PUMA (1999) *Performance contracting- Lessons from Performance Contracting Case Studies: A framework for public sector Performance contracting*. Paris: OECD

Osborn, R. N., and J. G. Hunt (1974) "Environment and Organizational Effectiveness." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 19, 2: 231-46.

Osborne, D and Gaebler, T (1992) *re-inventing government: how the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector*. Reading: Mass Addison- Wesley

Osoba, S.O. (1996). Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives *Review of African Political Economy Vol.23 issue 69 (pp371-*386).

O'Toole, L.J and Meir, K.J. (2013) *Public Management and Performance: A Theory of Context.* Paper presented at the 11th Public Management Research Conference, Madison, Wisconsin, June 20-22

Overman, S, Van Genugten, M and Van Thiel, S (2015) accountability after structural disaggregation: comparing agency accountability arrangements, Public Administration, 93, pp1102-1120

Painter, M and Yee, W (2012) Agencies and policy in an administrative state: The case of Hong Kong, *Policy and Society*.31, pp223–235

Palys, T (2008). <u>Purposive Sampling</u>. In Lisa M. Given (Ed.) (2008). *The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*. Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA, Vol.2, pp.697-698.

Palnikas, L.A., Horwitz, S.M., Green, A.G., Wison, J.P.,Duan, N and Hoagwood, K (2013) purposeful sampling for qualitative data collection and analysis in Mixed Methods implementation research. Administrative Policy Mental Health

Patton, M.Q. (2002) *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods* (3rd edition) Thousand Oaks, Sage

Patton, M.Q. (1990) *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. London: Sage Publications

Peters, B.G. (2013) institutions in context and as context, in C. Pollitt (ed) *Context in public police and management: missing link?* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, PP 101-114

Phillips, D. (1985) *the Nigerian Federal Civil Service in the mid-80s and Beyond: Report of the study on the structure, Staffing and Operations of the Nigerian Federal Civil Service*. Lagos: Federal Ministry of information printing Division

Pollitt, C. (2013a) the evolving narratives of public management reform: 40 years of reform white papers in the UK. *Public Management Review*, Vol. 15, No. 6, 899–922,

Pollitt, C. (2013b) *context in public Policy Management: the missing link*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

Pollitt C. (2004) learning from UK Private Finance Initiative Experience, in G. Hodge and C. Greve (eds) *the challenge of public-private partnerships Learning from* international experience. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

Pollitt C. (2004) castle built on sand? Agencies in Latvia, in *Unbundled Government: A critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation*. London: Routledge

Pollitt, C. (2003) 'Public Management Reform: Reliable Knowledge and International Experience', OECD *Journal on Budgeting*, 3, 121 – 36.

Pollitt, C., J. Caulfield, A. Smullen and C. Talbot (2001), "Agency Fever? Analysis of an International Fashion", *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 3, pp. 271-290.

Pollitt, C and Bouckaert, G. (2011) *Public Management Reform: A comparative analysis-new public management, governance and the neo-weberian state*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Pollitt, C., Talbot, C. Caulfield, J. and Smullen, A. (2004) *agencies: how governments do things through semi-autonomous organizations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Pollitt, C and Talbot C. (eds) (2004) *unbundled government: a critical analysis of the global trend to agencies, quangos and contractualisation*. London: Routledge

Pollitt, C., K. Bathgate, J. Caulfield *et al...* (2001) 'Agency Fever: Analysis of an International Policy Fashion', *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 3, 271 – 90.

Pollitt, C. (2000) 'Is the Emperor in his Underwear? An Analysis of the Impacts of Public Management Reform', *Public Management*, 2, 181 – 99

Pollitt, C and Bouckaert, G (2000) *Public management reform: a comparative analysis.* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Pollitt, C and Bouckaert, G (2004) Public management: a comparative analysis, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Pollitt, C., Birchall, J and Putman, K (1998) *Decentralizing public service management.* Basingstoke: Macmillan

Power, M (1999) the audit society: the rituals of verification. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Porta, D.D. and Keating, M. (eds) (2008) *approaches and methodologies in the social sciences: a pluralist perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Proeller, I (2013) what we know so far and how to proceed: contextual variable in NPM reform research in C. Pollitt (ed) *Context in public police and management: missing link? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing,* pp. 219- 227

Public Accounts Committee. (1994) *Eighth Report: The Proper Conduct of Public Business (154).* London: HMSO.

Public Service Commission. (1974) *Public Service Review Commission: Main Report.* Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information Printing Division

Punch, K. (2005) *introduction to social research: quantitative and qualitative approaches.* London: Sage

Rainer, H.G. (2009) *understanding and managing public organisations.* 4th edition; San-Francisco: Jossey Bass

Rubbin, N. K. and Rubin, I. S. (1995) *Qualitative Interviewing. The Art of Hearing Data.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Rugge, F. (2013) the intransigent context: glimpses at the history of a problem, in C. Pollitt (ed) *Context in public police and management: missing link*? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp44-54

Sandelowski, M (2011) ''Casing'' the Research Case Study, *Research in Nursing and health*, 34, 153-159

Salisu, M. (2001) 'incentives structure, civil service efficiency and the hidden economy in Nigeria' Kyari-Mugerwa (ed) *Reforming Africa's institutions*. Helsinki: UNU/WIDER publication.

Sapsford, R. (2006) methodology, in V. Jupp (ed) *the sage dictionary of social research methods*. London: sage. pp175-177

Schick , A. (1998) ' Why Most Countries Should Not Try New Zealand's Reforms' , The World Bank Research, *Observer* , 13 , 123 – 31

Schick, A. (2002) agencies in search of principles' in OECD. Distributed public governance: agencies, authorities and other government bodies. Paris: OECD, PP33-52

Schofield, J. (1993) Increasing the generalisability of qualitative research, In M. Hammersley (ed.) *Social Research: philosophy, politics and practice*. London: Sage. 200-225

Silverman, D. (1993) *interpreting qualitative data*. Thousand Oaks: Sage

Silverman, D (2000) *Doing qualitative research: a practical handbook*. London: Sage

Simons, H. (2009) *Case Study Research in Practice.* London: Sage

Smullen, A. (2010) *translating agency reform: rhetoric and culture in comparative study*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Smullen, A. (2004) 'Lost in Translation? Shifting Interpretations of the Concept of 'Agency': the Dutch case', in C. Pollitt and C. Talbot (eds), *Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation*. London: Routledge, pp .184 – 202

Stake, R.E. (2006) The case study method in social inquiry, in R. Goom, M. Hammersely and P. Foster (eds) *case study method*. London: Sage pp19-26

Stivers, C. (2009) 'the ontology of public Space: grounding governance in social reality. *American Behavioural Scientist*, 52:7, 1095-108

Snyder, C (2012) A Case Study of a Case Study: Analysis of a Robust Qualitative Research Methodology, *The Qualitative Report* 2012 Volume 17, Article 26, 1-21

Sturgis, P. (2006) designing samples, in N. Gilbert (ed) researching social life, 3rd edition, London: Sage. Pp 165-181

Sumner, M. (2006) qualitative research, in V. Jupp (ed) *the sage dictionary of social research methods*. London: sage. Pp 249-250

Swyngedouw, E (2005) governance innovation and the citizen: the Janus face of governance-beyond- the state, Urban Studies, 32 (11), pp1991-2006

Talbot, C. (2004) 'The Agency Idea', in C. Pollitt and C. Talbot (eds), *Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation.* London: Routledge, pp. 1 – 21.

Talbot, C. (1996) *Ministers and Agencies: responsibility and performance, second report- Ministerial accountability and Responsibility HC313-ii. Public Service Select Committee.* London: HMSO.ii (Memoranda of Evidence)

Talbot, C. (1997) UK Civil Service Personnel Reforms: devolution, decentralisation and delusion' *Public Policy and Administration*, 12:4, pp.14-34

Talbot, C. and Caulfield, J. (2005) 'United Kingdom', in C. Pollitt, C. Talbot, J. Caulfield and A . Smullen (eds), *Agencies: How Governments Get Things Done through Semi-Autonomous Agencies.* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Talbot,C and Caulfield, J. (2002) eyes on, hands off- executive agencies in Tanzania, in C.Talbot and J. Caulfield (eds) *hard agencies in soft states?* Glamorgan: institute for performance and Accountability. University of Glasgow,   (pp74-119),

Talbot, C., Pollitt, C., Bathgate, K., Caulfield, J, Reilly, and Smullen, A. (2000) *the idea of agency: researching the agenfication of the (public service) world*. Paper presented at the American Political Studies Association. Washington DC. August

Talierco, R.R. (2004). The design, performance and sustainability of semi-autonomous revenue authorities in Africa and Latin America. In: C. Pollitt, & C. Talbot. (eds). *Unbundled Government: a critical analysis of the global trend to agencies, quangos and contractualisation.* London and New York, Routledge. [pp. 264-282].

Taylor, B (2014) In vogue and at odds: systemic change and new public management in development, *Enterprise Development and Microfinance Vol. 25 No. 4., pp271-287*

Tertiary Education Trust Fund (Establishment, ETC) Act, 2011 Establishment, ETC) Act, 2011

TETFund (2012) *the report of the joint monitoring of TETFund funded projects*. Abuja: Tertiary Education Trust Fund and National Planning Commission

TETFund (2014) *guidelines for accessing TETFund intervention funds.* Abuja:Tertiary Education Trust Fund and National Planning Commission

Thynne, I. (2004) state organisations as agencies: an identifiable and meaningful focus of research? *Public administration and development*. 24, 91–99 (2004)

Tongo, M.D.C. (2007) Purposive Sampling as a Tool for Informant Selection, *Ethnobotany Research & Applications* 5:147-158

Tracy, S.J (2013) *Qualitative research methods: collecting, evidence, crafting analysis, communicating impact.* Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell

Treasury and Civil Service Committee (1990) *eight report: civil service management reform: the next steps,* Vol 1 and 2 (HC 494). London: HMSO

Trondal, J. (2014) *Agencification*. *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 74, Iss. 4, pp. 545–549.

Tsand, E.W.K (2013) Case study methodology: causal explanation, contextualization, and theorizing, *Journal of International Management*, 19, pp 195-202

Usman, S (2013) Mid-term report on the performance of National Planning Commission (May 2011- May 2013) a presentation at the Ministerial Platform June 24. http://www.slideshare.net/TransformNG/national-planning-23405716 Accessed: 20/05/2015

Vaughan, D. (1992) theory elaborations: the heuristics of case analysis. In C. Ragin and H. Becker (eds) what is case? Exploring the foundations of social inquiry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.pp 173-202

Van Dijk, T.A. (2009) *Society and discourse: how social context influence text and talk*. Cambridge: Cambridge university press

Verhoest, K., Van Thiel S., Bouckaert, G and Laegreied, P. (eds) (2012) *government agencies: practices and lessons from 30 countries*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Verhoest, K., Peters, B.G., Bouckert, G and Verschuere (2004) the study of organisational autonomy: a conceptual review, *Public Administration and Development* 24(2) .pp101-118

Verhoest, K and Verschuere, B (2002) "agencification": *Pending questions and how to address them. Paper for the Annual NIG Conference. Workshop 5: trust at arms' length: How can politicians trust agencies*? October 30-31

Verschuere, B and Vancoppenolle, D (2012) Policy-making in an era of agencification: An exploration of task divisions between politicians, core departments and public agencies, Policy and Society 31 (2012) 249–258

Vos, E (2003) agencies and the European Union, in l. Verhey and T. Zwart (eds) *agencies in European and Comparative Law*, intersential Publishing, pp113-47

Wethen-hall, R. (2005) these executive agencies!' *Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration*, February, No 106, 9-14 (change to 2003)

Wilson, J,Q (1994) Can bureaucracy be deregulated? Lessons from government agencies, in J. Dululio (ed) *deregulating the public service: can government be improved?* Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, PP37-61

Wirth, W. (1986) control in public administration plurality, selectivity and redundancy in F.X. Kaufman, Majone, G and Ostrom, V (eds) *guidance, control and evaluation in the public sector*. Berlin: De Gruyter

World Bank. (2011) *Operationalizing the 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development*. Washington: The World Bank

World Bank. (2008) Nigeria- A *Review of the Costs and Financing of Public Education. Vol. II., Main Report*. Washington: The World Bank

World Bank (2004) School Education in Nigeria: Preparing for Universal Basic Education. *Africa Region Human Development Series*. No 53 Washington: The World Bank

Yamamoto, K. (2004) agencification in Japan, renaming or revolution?' in C Pollitt and C Talbot, C (eds) *unbundled government*. London: Taylor and Francis, pp215-26

Yesikagit, K. and Van Theil, S. (2008) political influence and bureaucratic autonomy, Public organisation review, special issues 'coordination and autonomy of government organisations, in P. Laegreid., W. Jann, and K. Verhoest (eds) , 8 (2) pp137-154

Yin, R.K. (2003) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 3rd edition, London: Sage Publications

Reports and Other Sources:

Report of the commission on the Civil Services of British West Africa, 1945-46 by Sir Walter Harragin, Kt. C. M.G.,Chief Justice, Gold Coast.

Report of the Commission on the Public Services of the Government in the Federation of Nigeria, 1954-55 by L. H. Gorsuch.

The integration of Departments with Ministries 'report of the Committee to consider the integration of Departments with Ministries, with a foreward by the Prime Minster of the Federation, 1959(January) by A.F.F.P. Newns, Chairman.

Review of Salaries and wages ;Report by the Commission appointed by the Governments of the Federation, Northern Region, the Eastern Region and the Southern Cameroons, 1959 (November) by L.N. Mbanefo, Chairman.

Report of the Commission on the review of Wages , Salary and Conditions of Service oif the Junior Employees of the Governments of the Federation and in Private Establishments , 1963-64 by A. Morgan, Chairman.

Report of the Grading Team on the grading of posts in the Public Services of the Federation of Nigeria, April 1966 by T. Elwood, Chairman.

Second and Final Report of the Wages and salaries Review Commission, 1970-71 by Chief S. O. Adebo , Chairman.

Public Service Review Commission Main Report, September 1974 by Chief Jerome. O Udoji, Chairma

Report on In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on Nigeria's Public Service Reform, August, 2006

Mid-Term Report of the Transformation Agenda (May 2011- May 2013) - Taking Stock, Moving Forward, http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pages/download/156. Accessed: 20/05/2015.

Nigerian Education Act No.7 of 1993

Nigerian Education Trust Fund by Act no. 40 of 1998

http://leadership.ng/news/385571/tetfund-gets-5-year-vision-improved-education-quality; TETfund Gets 5 Year Vision for Improved Education Quality

Mid-Term Report of the Transformation Agenda (May 2011- May 2013) - Taking Stock,

Moving Forward, http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pages/download/156)

Appendix I
Sample of Ethics Form Submitted and Approved by the Faculty/University Ethics Committees

School of Arts and Social Sciences – Ethics Framework
Undergraduate / Masters Student Checklist

To be completed by the student under the guidance of the Module Tutor

Student Details

Name of student	Jacob Alada
Programme and year	PhD
Attendance Mode (Part-Time/Full-Time)	Full Time
Student Registration No.	11039493

Project Details

Module Code	
Project Title	**Public Sector Management Reforms in Nigeria: A case study of TETFund**

Brief Description of the Project

Methodology

Tutor Details

Name	**Professor Edoardo Ongaro**
Status (Personal/Module Tutor etc)	

Ethics Checklist

Please answer each question by ticking the appropriate box

If you select an amber box: please explain your answer overleaf   **Yes**   **No**

N/A

		Yes	No	
1	Have you read the School's Ethics Framework? http://www.northumbria.ac.uk/archive/artsandss/res_con/schethicspolicyanddocs/	x	▩	
2	Have you read the University's ethics Policies and Procedures? http://www.northumbria.ac.uk/researchandconsultancy/sa/ethgov/policies/	x	▩	
3	Have you read the University's Records Management Policy? http://www.northumbria.ac.uk/sd/central/uso/Recman/remang/	x	▩	
4	Have you read the University's Policy on Copyright? http://www.northumbria.ac.uk/sd/central/library/resources/copyright/	x	▩	
5	Does the study involve participants who are particularly vulnerable (e.g. children, people with learning disabilities, asylum seekers)?	▩	x	
6	Does the study involve participants who are unable to give informed consent?	▩	x	
7	Have you submitted a self-declaration CRB disclosure form?	▩	x	
8	Date of clearance (if applicable)			
9	Is the research subject to external research committees?		x	
10	Does the research have mechanisms for informed consent?	x	▩	☐
11	Have the necessary copyrights or permissions been obtained?		▩	x
12	Is the research likely to involve legal matters?	▩	x	
13	Are the outcomes of the research likely to be sensitive for individuals and/or groups?	▩	x	
14	Has the funder placed any restrictions upon the research?	▩	x	☐
15	Have you considered your personal safety whilst undertaking this research?	x	▩	
16	Will the study require the co-operation of a gatekeeper for initial access to the groups or individuals to be recruited? (e.g. students at school, members of self-help group, residents of nursing home)	▩	x	
17	Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge or consent at the time? (e.g. covert observation of people in non-public places)	▩	x	
18	Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety or cause harm or negative consequences beyond the risks encountered in everyday life?	▩	x	
19	Does the project involve the use of animals, human tissue or fluids?	▩	x	
20	Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses & compensation for time) be offered to participants?	▩	x	
21	Will the study involve NHS patients or staff or the use of NHS premises?	▩	x	

Please elaborate on any amber box answers given above   ▩

(and continue on a separate sheet if necessary)

Signature of Student	I declare that I have read and understood the School and University Ethics Policies and I will notify my tutor if my research changes to a significant extent	Date

Signature of Tutor	I can confirm I have discussed and approved the research project outlined above	Date

Signature of Divisional Ethics Chair

The Divisional Committee has considered and approved this project | Date

Any queries regarding Ethics Forms can be directed to Debra Shannon – debra.shannon@northumbria.ac.uk – 0191 227 3180

Appendix II

Sample of Consent form Used

**School of Arts and Social Sciences – Research Ethics Framework
Participant Consent Form**

To be completed by both participant and researcher before research commences

Name of project

New Public Management (NPM) Agency and Public Sector Reforms: A Case Study-Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) Nigeria

Organisation(s) initiating research

Northumbria University

Researcher's name

Jacob Alada

Research Organisation

Northumbria University

Participant's name

I confirm that I have been supplied with and have read and understood an Information Sheet (ASS-RE5) for the research project and have had time to decide whether or not I want to participate.
I understand that my taking part is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason.
I agree with Northumbria University recording and processing this information about me.
I understand that this information will only be used for the purposes set out in the information sheet.
I have been told that any data generated by the research will be securely managed and disposed of in accordance with Northumbria University's guidelines.
I am aware that all tapes and documents will remain confidential with only the research team having access to them.
My consent is conditional upon the University complying with its duties and obligations under the Data Protection Act.

Signature of Participant (even if below 18 years old)   Date

Signature of Parent/Guardian/Representative
(if participant is under 18 years old)   Date

I can confirm that I have explained the nature of the research to the above named participant and have given adequate time to answer any questions concerning it.

Signature of Researcher   Date

Appendix III

Sample of Interview Protocol

Interviewer: Good afternoon Sir. My name is Jacob Alada a PhD research student at Northumbria University Newcastle UK. The topic of my research is New Public Management (NPM) Agency and Public Sector Reforms: A Case study- Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund), Nigeria. Thank you for signing the consent form, thus agreeing to take part in the interview. As you are aware the details in respect of the aims and objectives of the research are contained in the written notification to you in respect of this interview and I want to reconfirm from you that I still have your consent for the interview.

Interviewee: It is my pleasure to grant the interview strictly speaking covering the period I served as an xxxxxxx in what was called ETF and later TETFund that is, the period of from xxxxxx to xxxxx. So my responses will be confined to my 5 year of tenure.

Interviewer: Can we briefly know your Sir?

Interviewer: As a former xxxxx could you briefly describe your role in the Fund?

Interviewer: What in can say about the establishment of the Fund?

Interviewer: Could the creation of the agency be as a result of other factors and not only the pressures by the academic Unions given the economic situation in the Country then?

Interviewer: As you mentioned earlier the xxxxxx is responsible for the day to day administration of the Fund on behalf of the BOT. Who appointed you as the xxxxx xxx and did you report to any other authority other than the BOT?

Interviewer: Has there been any tension or conflict in line of reporting between the xxxxxx reporting to the Board then reporting to the Ministry of Education because it looked like the xxxxx had so many principals?

Interviewer: In terms of policy making and implementation in the Fund what was the role of the Ministry? Was there any interference or overbearing influence from the Ministry on the Fund?

Interviewer: So the Fund was to a certain degree autonomous of the Ministry in terms of policy formulation and implementation?

Interviewer: Did the personality of the Chairmen of the Board of Trustees and its member affect the general administration and management of the Fund?

Interviewer: When you came on board what was the style of operation and the structure of the Fund? Did anything change in these regards during your tenure?

Interviewer: With all these programs that you implemented where there any mechanism for monitoring and evaluation?

Interviewer: Were there Strategic plans in relation to the operations of the Fund?

Interviewer: With all these innovations in terms of structures and programs, did you envisage when you were restructuring that there will be increase in collections or were there deliberate attempts to collaborate with the Federal Inland Revenue Service to boost collection?

Interviewer: With the changes in the structure and introduction of programs, what was done in terms of staff development and recruitment for the Fund's staff to cope with the challenges?

Interviewer: Were there any recruitments or secondments to the Fund during your tenure?

Interviewer: Pressure from whom Sir?

Interviewer: When you were appointed were you given any performance target? Was there any contract between you and government or the Federal Ministry of Education whether written or verbally?

Interviewer: Are there other things that you will want to add that we have not discussed?

Interviewer: During your tenure was the government making provisions for the Fund in its budgetary allocations?

Interviewer: Were you investing given the nature of TETFund's revenue?

Interviewer: During your tenure, was TETFund different from other public agencies in Nigeria in terms of its operations?

(* please note that some of the questions from the interviewer were follow up questions from the answer provided by the interviewee).

Appendix IV

Interview Questions/ Guide

Group 1: Respondents: Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Education

1. What are the processes and operations in TETFund over the years?

2. What were the processes and operations in the Fund from1993-1999 under the military administration and from 1999 to date under a democratic government? What are the Changes that took place? How and why did the changes take place? What are the drivers of these changes?

3. What changes took place under the different Chairmen and Board of Trustees as well as the Executive Secretaries the Fund has had? What influence did they have on the Fund?

257

4. How has the changes in the name of the Fund affected the relationship between it and your institution?

5. What and who are the drivers of these changes?

6. What have been the leadership styles in the Fund over the years?

7. What impact did the various changes in the leadership and enabling Acts of the Fund have on its operations and processes? What and who are the drivers of these changes?

8. What are the channels through which your voice is heard as a beneficiary and stakeholder?

9. What are the issues you want to talk about that are not covered by these questions?

Group 2: TETFund

i). what are the factors that led to the establishment of TETFund and what were the instruments used to achieve this? Who and what are the drivers for its establishment?

ii). what work do you do in the Fund and how do you do it?

iii).what Changes took place in the Fund from 1993 to date and how and why did they happen? What and who are the drivers of these changes?

iv). Kindly explain the Mandate, Goals, Vision, Mission and Objectives of the Fund. Does the Fund have a service charter?

v). which roles and actions did the staff of the Fund play in delivering on the Mandate of the Fund? What did they do and how?

vi). Explain the factors that led to the change in the Mandate of the Fund? What were the driving forces for these changes?

vii). How has the administrative structure of the Fund been over years and how was it constituted? What had been the nature of this composition? What had the functions and responsibilities of the various components of the structure performed?

viii) What are the changes in the administrative structure of the Fund over time? What led to these changes? Who and what are the drivers of the changes?

ix). what have been the leadership styles of the respective Chairmen and Executive Secretaries of the Fund? What influence did they have on the operations of the Fund? what was the relationships between the respective Chairmen and the successive Executive Secretaries?

What are the operations and processes in the Fund during the Military regime compared to those under a democratic regime?

vii). How did the Fund evolve and what were the transformations that occurred in the Fund? Who are the players in this transformation? What role did the Fund itself play in this transformation?

viii). what has been the modus operandi of the Fund and how and when were this put in place? Who and what were the drivers?

ix). what changes happened in the internal processes and operations of the Fund? How and why did they happen? Who and what were the driving forces for these changes?

x). How had the organisation been funded for its capital and recurrent expenditure as well as its interventions and what were its scope, area(s) of operation as well as target population? How had the Fund related to its target population?

xi). what has been the relationship between the Fund and the Federal Ministry of Education, Parliament, the Federal Government and other Central Agencies of Government

respectively? What had been the changes in this relationship over the years and why did the changes occur?

xii). what have been the conditions for staff recruitments and what are the processes involved in this respect? What had been the status of the Staff of the Fund and how were they recruited? What were the changes in the recruitment process?

xvii) Are there other issues you wish to highlight which had not been captured by this interview?

Group 3: Federal Level

i). what informed the formation of TETfund? What were the drivers?

ii).what informed the changes in the laws of the Fund and how did these changes impact on its relationship with your organisation? Why and how did the changes occur?

iii). what role had your organisation played over time in policy formulation and implementation, recruitments, Board constitution, selection of Executive Secretary deployment of staff, budgeting and general management of the Fund? What informed this role?

iv). what had been the behaviour of the Fund over the years?

iv). Are there areas you will want to elaborate on which are not captured in this interaction?

Group 4: Association of Academic Staff of Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Education

i). what informed the establishment of TETFund? Who and what were the drivers for the establishment of the agency?

ii). what had been the behaviour of the Fund over the years?

iii). are there issues you will want to elucidate on in terms of the behaviour and operation of

the Fund that have not been brought to fore in this discussion?

Appendix V

Sample of Interview Format

	POSITION	DATE
	Executive and Board Members	
1.	Former Federal Minister of Education	4th Dec. 2013
2.	Former Executive Secretary	17th Nov. 2013
3.	Former Executive Secretary	20th Dec. 2013
4.	Former Chairman of BOT	17th Mar. 2014

Executive Management Cadre

5. Current Director Project   17th Dec. 2013
6. Current Director Human Resources   10th Oct.2013
7. Current Director Education support service   22nd Dec.2013
8. Director of Finance   6th Sep. 2013
9. Deputy Director Procurement   17th Dec. 2013
10. Head, ICT   9th Sep. 2013
11. Deputy Director Academic Staff Training   16th Dec. 2013
12. Head, Audit   17th Dec. 2013
13. Deputy Director Public Relations   9th Sep. 2013
14. Acting Director Monitoring and Evaluation   10th Oct. 2013
15. Deputy Director Finance   9th Sep. 2003
16. Assistant Director Legal   10th Oct. 2013

Management Cadre

17. Head, SERVICOM   12th Dec. 2013
18. Deputy Director Admin.   27th Nov. 2013
19. Principal Personal Officer   2nd Oct. 2003
20.   Assistant Director Procurement   4th Dec. 2013

Senior and Middle Officers Cadre

21. Senior Officer Account   9th Oct. 2013
22. Senior Officer SERVICOM   5th Dec. 2013
23. Senior Officer ICT   3rd Sep. 2013
24. Senior Admin Officer   3rd Sep. 2013

Principal Officers of Tertiary Institutions

25. Former Bursar   17th Dec. 2013
26. Provost Osun State College of Education Ilesa 16th Dec. 2013
27. 2 Rectors of Polytechnics that want to remain anonymous
28. 3 Vice Chancellors of Universities that want to remain anonymous
29. 2 Directors of Federal Ministry of Education that want to remain anonymous